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Zusammenfassung
Abstimmungen werden auf verschiedene Gebiete angewendet. Leider kann es bei
einer Abstimmung einzelne Teilnehmer geben, die Vorteile daraus ziehen, die Wahl
durch strategisches Verhalten zu manipulieren. Eine Mo¨glichkeit diesem Problem
zu begegnen ist es, die Berechnungskomplexita¨t als Hindernis gegen strategisches
Verhalten zu nutzen. Die Annahme ist, dass falls es NP-schwer ist, um strategisches
Verhalten erfolgreich anzuwenden, der strategisch Handelnde vielleicht den Plan aufgibt
die Abstimmung zu attackieren.
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit strategischem Vorgehen in eingeschra¨nkten Ab-
stimmungen in dem Sinne, dass die vorgegebenen Abstimmungen kombinatorischen
Einschra¨nkungen unterliegen. Ziel ist es herauszufinden, wie sich die Komplexita¨t des
strategischen Handelns von dem sehr eingeschra¨nkten zu dem generellen Fall a¨ndert.
Kapitel 1 gibt einen U¨berblick zu der Arbeit.
Kapitel 2 diskutiert die Verhaltenskontrolle in ,,k -peaked” Abstimmungen. Ins-
besondere wird die Komplexita¨t der Verhaltenskontrolle unter r -Approval, Condorcet,
Copeland und Maximin Abstimmunssystemen studiert. k -peaked Abstimmungen
verallgemeinern ,,single-peaked” Abstimmungen in der Art, dass ho¨chstens k -Peaks in
jeder Abstimmung auftauchen.
Kapitel 3 diskutiert die gleichen Probleme wie Kapitel 2, jedoch in Abstimmungen
mit beschra¨nkter single-peaked Breite. Intuitiv knnen, in einer Abstimmung mit single-
peaked Breite k die Kandidaten gruppiert werden, wobei die Gro¨ße jeder Gruppe
durch begrenzt ist k , und fu¨r jede Gruppe alle Wa¨hler die gleiche Pra¨ferenz u¨ber
alle Kandidaten in dieser Gruppe haben, im Vergleich zu Kandidaten, die nicht der
Gruppe zugeho¨ren. Daru¨berhinaus, falls man jede Gruppe als ein Kandidat betrachtet,
dann ist die Abstimmung single-peaked.
Kapitel 4 bescha¨ftigt sich mit Bestechungsproblemen mittels Abstandsein-
schra¨nkungen. In diesem Szenario darf ein korrumpierter Wa¨hler eine neue Stimme
abgeben die nahe an der Originalstimme liegen muss. In dieser Arbeit werden die bekan-
nte Hamming-Distanz und die Kendall-Tau-Distanz verwendet um die A¨hnlichkeit zu
messen.
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In Kapitel 5 betrachten wir Abstimmungen, die in einem Wettbewerb durchgefu¨hrt
werden. Dabei sind die Kandidaten als Knoten in einem gerichteten Graphen dargestellt,
wo eine Kante von einem Knoten a nach einem Knoten b die Bedeutung ,,a schla¨gt b”.
In diesem Zusammenhang heißt es, dass mehr Wa¨hler fu¨r a als fu¨r b gestimmt haben.
Die Gewinner werden in wohldefinierten Wettbewerbsverfahren ermittelt, z.B., Landau-
Menge, Bank-Menge, usw. Besonderer Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Problemen bei der
Ermittlung mo¨glicher Gewinner. Die Fragestellung dabei ist, ob eine Untermenge von
Knoten (Kandidaten) durch Hinzufu¨gen oder Umkehren der Kanten in der Landau-
Menge (Bank-Menge) hinzugefgt werden kann .
In Kapitel 6 werden gewichtete und ungewichtete Borda-Manipulationsprobleme
betrachtet. Insbesondere leiten wir kombinatorische Algorithmen ab fu¨r den Fall einer
erheblich eingeschra¨nkten Kandidatenmenge und fu¨r den Fall einer eingeschra¨nkten
Menge von Maniupulatoren.
Kapitel 7 fasst die Ergebnisse zusammen und liefert Anhaltspunkte fu¨r weitere
zuku¨nftige Fragestellungen.
Preface
Voting has found applications in a variety of areas. Unfortunately, in a voting
activity there may exist strategic individuals who have incentives to attack the election
by performing some strategic behavior. One possible way to address this issue is to
use computational complexity as a barrier against the strategic behavior. The point
is that if it is NP-hard to successfully perform a strategic behavior, the strategic
individuals may give up their plan of attacking the election.
This thesis is concerned with strategic behavior in restricted elections, in the sense
that the given elections are subject to some combinatorial restrictions. The goal is to
find out how the complexity of the strategic behavior changes from the very restricted
case to the general case.
In Chapter 1, we provide an overview of this thesis.
Chapter 2 is devoted to discussing control behavior in k -peaked elections. In
particular, the complexity of control behavior for r -Approval, Condorcet, Copelandα
and Maximin is studied. k -peaked elections generalize single-peaked elections in the
way that at most k peaks occur in each vote.
Chapter 3 is devoted to discussing the same problems as studied in Chapter 2,
but in elections with bounded single-peaked width. Intuitively, in an election with
single-peaked width k , the candidates can be grouped together, where the size of each
group is bounded by k , and for each group, every voter has the same preferences over
all candidates in this group compared to candidates not in the group. Moreover, if
considering each group as a candidate, the election is single-peaked.
Chapter 4 is concerned with bribery problems with distance restrictions. In this
scenario, every bribed voter can recast a new vote which needs to be as close as to
its original vote. In this thesis, we adopt the prominent Hamming distance and the
Kendall-Tau distance to measure the closeness.
In Chapter 5, we study elections which are performed on tournaments. In this
scenario the candidates are represented by vertices, and there is an arc from a vertex
a to a vertex b if a beats b in a pairwise comparison. Here, “a beats b” means that
there are more voters who prefer a to b. The winners are selected according to some
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well-defined tournament solutions, e.g, Uncovered set, Banks set, etc. We focus on the
possible winner(s) problems with respect to the Uncovered set and the Banks set. The
input is a partial tournament and a vertex subset of the partial tournament, and the
question is whether the given subset of vertices (candidates) can be included in the
Uncovered set (Banks set) by adding/reversing some arcs.
In Chapter 6, we study the weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems.
In particular, we derive combinatorial algorithms for both the case where the number
of candidates is considerably small, and the case where the number of manipulators is
considerably small.
Chapter 7 summarizes our results and provides some directions for future research.
Acknowledgments
It is a great pleasure to express my heartfelt thanks to all the people who have
supported and helped me over the past four years.
My first special thanks goes to my supervisor Prof. Jiong Guo. I thank him for
giving me the opportunity to work in his “Efficient Algorithms for Hard Problems”
group which consists of many talented researchers like Matthias Mnich, Ondrˇej Suchy´,
Peng Sun and Yash Raj Shrestha. I also thank Prof. Jiong Guo for bringing me to
the avenue of Computational Social Choice.
I thank my colleague Yash Raj Shrestha who shared the same office with me in
the past four years. We are more like brothers other than colleagues. Besides sharing
the office, we share happiness and sadness. I thank Matthias Mnich, Ondrˇej Suchy´ and
Peng Sun for their helpful discussions. I also thank many excellent researchers from
MPI (Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Informatik) for their insightful discussions. Especially, I
thank Geevarghese Philip and Kunal Dutta for the discussion of many interesting graph
problems, and Marek Kosˇta for the discussion of several kernelization algorithms.
I thank my master supervisors Prof. Jianxin Wang in Central South University
and Prof. Jianer Chen in Texas A&M University. I thank their recommendation for
my PhD study in Prof. Jiong Guo’s group. I also thank them for bringing me to
the Parameterized Complexity Theory, from where I learnt many algorithm design
techniques. These techniques have been proved very useful in exploring many problems
studied in this thesis.
My PhD study was supported by CSC (China Scholarship Council), DFG
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and MMCI (Cluster of Excellence “Multimodal
Computing and Interaction”). I am thankful for their support.
I thank the anonymous reviewers of the publications that are incorporated in this
thesis for their constructive comments.
I thank my wife Fang Xu. She made a lot of sacrifices in order to be with me. I
appreciate everything that she has done for me. I thank my little sweetie daughter
Emily Xinyan Yang whose birth made my life different.
vi
I thank my parents, my grandparents, my brother and my sister for their encour-
agements and supports.
Finally, I thank the readers of this thesis for their interest in my work.
Contents
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 A Small Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Voting Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Strategic Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Classical Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.2 Parameterized Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Lenstra’s ILP Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.4 Dynamic Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Structure of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Control in Multi-Peaked Elections 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 r -Approval Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.1 2-Peaked Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.2 3-Peaked Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Condorcet, Copeland and Maximin Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.1 3-Peaked Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.2 4-Peaked Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Control in Elections with Bounded Single-Peaked Width 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Condorcet and Weak Condorcet Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Copeland Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Maximin Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5 A General Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.1 Single-Crossing Width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6.2 Euclidean Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 Bribery with Restricted Distances 95
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
viii Contents
4.1.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Kendall-Tau Distance Restricted Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3 Hamming Distance Restricted Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5 Possible Winners in Partial Tournaments 129
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.1.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.1.3 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.2 Uncovered Set in Partial Tournaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3 Banks Set in Partial Tournaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6 Combinatorial Algorithms for Borda Manipulation 145
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.1.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.1.2 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.2 Algorithm for Weighted Borda Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.3 Algorithm for Unweighted Borda Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7 Conclusion and Outlook 161
7.1 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.2 Further Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.2.1 Practical FPT Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.2.2 Experimental Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.2.3 Approximation Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.2.4 Surveys to Read . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Bibliography 167
List of Tables
2.1 A summary of results of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 A summary of results of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Comparisons for DCAV-Maximin-UNI in 3-peaked elections . . . . . . 44
2.4 Comparisons for DCAV-Copeland0-NON in 3-peaked elections . . . . . 47
2.5 Comparisons for CCDV-Maximin-UNI and DCDV-Maximin-NON in
4-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6 Comparisons for CCDV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-UNI in
4-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.7 Comparisons for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON and
DCDV-Copelandα-NON in 4-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.8 Comparisons for DCDV-Copelandα-UNI in 4-peaked elections . . . . . 57
3.1 A summary of results of Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2 Complexity of Copelandα control in elections with bounded single-
peaked width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 Complexity of Maximin control in elections with bounded single-peaked
width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1 A summary of results of Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.2 Comparisons for C-KT(3)-Condorcet-UNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3 Comparisons for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4 Comparisons for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Comparisons for D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.6 Comparisons for D-KT(4)-Maximin-UNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Comparisons for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.8 Comparisons for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.9 Comparisons for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.10 Comparisons for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-UNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.1 A summary of results of Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1 A summary of results of Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

List of Figures
1.1 A small map of COMSOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Condorcet paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 A single-peaked election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 A 2-peaked vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Two 2-peaked votes represented by 2-discrete intervals . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Dynamic table for CCAV-r -Approval in 2-peaked elections . . . . . . . 31
2.5 A property of graphs with maximum degree 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 An unregistered vote in theNP-hardness reduction for DCAV-Maximin-
UNI in 3-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.7 W [1]-hardness reduction for DCAV-Copeland0-UNI in 3-peaked elections 48
2.8 Dummy candidates in the W[1]-hardness reduction for DCAV-
Copelandα-UNI in 3-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.9 Intersection of two 2-intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.10 A Claim in the W [1]-hardness reductions for CCDV-Maximin-UNI and
DCDV-Maximin-NON in 4-peaked elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1 An illustration of median group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2 A single-crossing election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Extension of our results to 2-dimension Euclidean elections . . . . . . . 92
3.4 Extension of our results to 3-dimension Euclidean elections . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Promoting a candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.2 Degrading a candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1 W [2]-hardness reduction for Pwu-Add . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.2 W [2]-hardness reduction for Tw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3 W [1]-hardness reduction for Tw-Indegree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.1 A reduction from UM-Borda to FMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

1
Introduction
Voting plays an important role in our daily life. You may have been involved in the following
situations several times: deciding where to have a picnic; when should an exam to be
held; who deserves to be the new leader; which brand of computer should you buy for your
company. In all these situations, you are making collective decisions with other people
involved. After the final decision is made, some people are happy with the result while
others are not. If the result is predicable, the unhappy guys would have incentive to change
the result to make themselves better off, perhaps by acting some strategic behavior. To
achieve their goal, they need to figure out in a reasonable time how to act a strategic
behavior to make themselves better off. Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) is
concerned with this interesting topic of exploring the computation cost of performing a
successful strategic behavior.
2 1. Introduction
1.1 A Small Map
Life is full of making decisions: when to sell your stocks, where to hold your birthday
party, how to get to school, with whom should you collaborate. In many real-world
settings, however, making a decision is not only the business of yourself. For instance,
making the decision of who is qualified as the president of a country involves all citizens
who have the right to vote. In this situation, a collective decision is needed. With
the rapid development of social media, people are more and more frequently involved
in scenarios where collective decisions are needed to be done. Moreover, apart from
arising in human communities, collective decision making also arises in many scenarios
where no human being directly participates. For instance, in a multiagent system a
collective decision would be made by a set of agents which might be robots, computers
or something else.
One common and natural way to make a collective decision is by means of voting.
In a voting activity, every voter casts his (for simplicity, we take the gender “male” for
voters throughout this thesis) vote (or ballot) according to his preference over a given
set of potential decisions (candidates), and then a designed voting rule works on the
votes to make the final decision. Generally, different voting rules would lead to different
results, while a good voting rule should be helpful in maximizing the benefits of the
whole community involved. However, even we have a good voting rule in hand, there
is no guarantee to get the expected result. One reason is the existence of strategic
individuals who have incentive to change the result by acting some strategic behavior.
To check this, take a look at the following example.
A community is going to select a new leader from candidates A and B.
Suppose that there are 10 community members and everyone is asked to
give his vote to either A or B according to which candidate is preferred
by himself. The candidate who gets the majority votes wins. Suppose
further that 6 community members would give their votes to A, and 4
community members would give their votes to B. Then, A will be the
winner. However, if the candidate B knows this information in advance,
he can make himself the winner by carrying out the following strategy:
persuade another candidate C who is very similar to A to compete with
him and A. The similarity between A and C implies that every community
member who prefers A to B also prefers C to B, and who prefers B to
A also prefers B to C. Then in this case, it might be that 3 community
members give their votes to A, 3 community members give their votes to
C, and 4 community members give their votes to B, resulting in B to be
the winner.
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Due to the above discussion, a natural question arises: is there a strategy-proof
voting rule? That is, a voting rule under which no one can change the result by
performing a strategic behavior. The answer is “Yes”: just consider the voting rule
which always selects a fixed candidate as the winner, no matter what or how the
voters vote. Nevertheless, a pertinent answer to this question is “no”. This is because
that all these voting rules which are strategy-proof cannot be reasonable voting rules
(voting rules that satisfy a set of desirable criteria). In fact, there have been several
impossibility theorems established in the middle of the last century, which state that
under any reasonable voting rule the winners can be changed by performing a certain
strategic behavior, say, misreporting true preferences (see e.g., [134, 135, 202, 225] for
further details). Since the establishment of those impossibility theorems, the question
of how to prevent voting from being attacked by means of strategic behavior had
tantalized researchers for many years. A prominent answer to this question was given
by Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick in the early 1990s [154, 155, 156, 157]. To address
this issue of preventing voting from being attacked, they adopted the complexity as a
barrier against strategic behavior. The point is that if performing a successful strategic
behavior is NP-hard, the strategic individuals may give up attacking the voting.
Their work also sparked researchers to model more strategic behavior occurring in the
real-world settings, such as the swap bribery by Elkind, Faliszewski and Slinko [98],
the model of destructive control by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra and Rothe [146],
and the coalition weighted manipulation by Conitzer, Sandholm and Lang [68], to
name a few. The efforts of the researchers finally foster the birth of the emerging
area—Computational Social Choice (COMSOC).
Over the last decade, COMSOC has witnessed a significant development with more
and more researchers joining the community. Moreover, quite a few papers are published
in AI (stands for artificial intelligence) top conferences (e.g., AAAI, AAMAS, IJCAI,
ECAI) and AI journals (e.g., Artificial Intelligence, Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research) every year. On the one hand, COMSOC fosters the development of many
other research areas such as multiagent systems, political elections, recommendation
systems, machine learning etc., due to its importance and practicability in these
areas [209, 211, 212, 213, 229, 245]. On the other hand, COMSOC has independent
interest on its own right. In the following, we first briefly introduce several hot topics
in COMSOC. For each topic, we list a number of remarkable papers for the interested
readers to get further details. See also Figure 1.1 for a small map of COMSOC. We
hope that this brief introduction is helpful for readers who are getting ready to embark
on related researches to quickly get the landscape of COMSOC. Then, we give a brief
introduction to the problems studied in this thesis.
Since the conducted work of Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [154, 155, 156, 157],
COMSOC has been attracting an astonishing amount of attention from the theoretical
computer science, artificial intelligence and social choice theory communities. Nowa-
days, COMSOC has been dominated by the following research directions: designing
algorithms for voting problems, analyzing the complexity of voting problems, proposing
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Figure 1.1: This is a small map of COMSOC showing research topics that have been
receiving or will probably receive a considerable amount of attention of researchers. Hot
topics that have been extensively studied by researchers are represented by plain arcs and
dark arcs. The dashed arcs mean that the corresponding topics have not been extensively
studied so far as this thesis is written, but are prominent topics for future research from our
perspective. The lines of research that this thesis follows are represented by dark arcs.
new voting models and characterizing voting systems with mathematic criteria. The
development of these directions also fosters each other.
Designing algorithms for voting problems lies in the core of COMSOC. On the
one hand, faster algorithms are needed to solve many voting problems. For instance, a
central question in a voting system is how to calculate the winners as fast as possible.
On the other hand, algorithms can tell us, in another way different from the way that
complexity theory does, whether a strategic voting problem is really hard to solve in
real-world applications. For instance, even though the Borda manipulation problem has
been proved NP-hard [26, 75], Davies et al. [73] derived several heuristic algorithms
for the problem, and showed that these algorithms perform quite well in elections that
are created randomly. The algorithms designed for voting problems include non-exact
algorithms, such as approximation algorithms, randomized algorithms and heuristic
algorithms, as well as exact algorithms and parameterized algorithmsi. See Figure 1.1
for an illustration. In spite of the importance of algorithm design for voting problems,
many lines of research have not been extensively investigated, as indicated by the
dashed arcs in Figure 1.1. But since COMSOC is still in its developing period, this
does not indicate that these topics are not important. Conversely, we believe that
iIn fact, a parameterized algorithm can also output exact solutions. However, parameterized
complexity puts strong emphasize on parameters. Another reason we distinguish between parame-
terized algorithms and exact algorithms is that parameterized complexity has been commonly
recognized as an independent research area.
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these currently less-studied lines of research will attract a considerable amount of
attention in the near future. The reasons are as follows. Randomized algorithms
for voting problems have not attracted much attention since in many cases people
desire to get determined results. However, as the proposal of many randomized voting
systems very recently (see, e.g., [11, 13, 14, 217]), designing randomized algorithms
for related voting problems will be of particular importance. Non-exact algorithms
on special elections might also receive attention in the future due to the emerging
of many hardness results of voting problems in special elections (see, e.g., [252, 253]
the work wherein is part of the thesis, and [111]). For some other representative
work on these research directions, we refer to [54, 57, 58, 74, 176, 248, 257, 258] for
approximation algorithms, [72, 73, 143, 176, 181, 240] for heuristic algorithms, and
[23, 79, 121, 163, 199, 241] for parameterized algorithms.
Analyzing complexity of voting problems is another hot topic in COMSOC. In this
direction, researchers focus on the classical complexity of voting problems, where the
main task is to prove whether the voting problem in hand is NP-hard or polynomial-
time solvable, as well as the parameterized complexity of voting problems, where the
main task is to prove whether the voting problem in hand isW-hard or FPT . One aim
of this line of research is to provide worst-case based evidence of the hardness of voting
problems, such as election control, manipulation and bribery. The classical complexity
of voting problems has been prevalent in the last decade, while the parameterized
complexity counterpart has received a considerable amount of attention recently. For
some representative work on this topic, we refer to [10, 79, 84, 99, 108, 109, 110, 112,
118, 184, 185, 199].
Proposing new voting models, such as new voting systems or new models of
strategic voting behavior, is also an active topic in COMSOC. New voting models
naturally emerge as new observations on real-world applications arise. For instance,
based on the observation that in many real-world settings of partition of voters, one
wants the two parts of the partition to be of (almost) equal size, or is partitioning into
more than two parts, or has groups of actors who must be placed in the same part
of the partition, Erde´lyi, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [100] recently proposed
several voter partition models which better capture many real-world applications. Some
recently proposed voting models can be also found in [37, 63, 100, 141, 166, 207].
Characterizing voting systems with mathematic criteria has been a long studied
topic in social choice theory. This line of research aims at providing useful guideline
for people who desire to arise a voting. Some voting systems are better than others
in a specific situation, according to the mathematic criteria that the voting systems
hold. This line of research also provides critical properties of voting systems, which
are useful in deriving algorithms or analyzing complexity of voting problems. We
refer to [124, 204, 222, 255] for some representative early work, and refer to [9, 41,
96, 127, 141, 151, 227, 231, 247] for recent developments of this line of research. In
particular, we refer to Figure 9.3 in [231] and Table 9.2 in [227] for summaries of many
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well-studied mathematic criteria of single-winner voting systems, and refer to Table 1
in [96] for a summary of some recently proposed mathematic criteria of multiwinner
voting systems.
The voting problems that have been extensively studied in the literature include
winner determination problem, possible/necessary winner problem and strategic behav-
ior such as manipulation, control and bribery. These problems have been extensively
studied in general elections (the domain of the preferences of the voters is not restricted)
since the seminal work of Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [154, 155, 156, 157]. Recently,
voting problems in special elections (the domain of the preferences of the voters is
restricted in some way) have attracted a considerable attention, see, e.g., [111, 113, 188].
Winner determination is intrinsic in voting: each voting ends up with a set of winners
(or a single winner) being elected. Hardness of winner determination of a voting
system impedes the practical applications of the voting system. Fortunately, only
few of common voting systems are NP-hard to determine the winners. Among them
are the Dodgson voting system [118, 156, 145], the Kemeny voting system [147, 156]
and the Young voting system [221]. The possible winner and the necessary winner
problems were initialized by Konczak and Lang [170] in 2005. Both problems arise in
the scenario where the information (normally refers to the information of votes) of the
election is incomplete. The possible winners are then defined as all candidates that win
an election which is extended from the given incomplete election, while the necessary
winners are defined as all candidates that win every full extension of the given election.
We refer to [170] for further details on the possible winner and the necessary winner
problems. The manipulation problem is studied as early as the social choice theory.
However, algorithmic and complexity analysis of manipulation problems were first
studied by Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [154] in 1989. In the manipulation problem, a
set of voters (manipulators) who have not cast their votes yet attempt to change the
winners by casting their votes in some way. The control problems were also introduced
by Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [157] in 1992, where an external agent (a strategic
individual) wants to change the winners by modifying the vote set or the candidate
set. In particular, Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [157] considered the modification opera-
tions vote/candidate deletion/addition/partition. Later, several other modification
operations were also studied by researchers [110, 112, 146]. We defer further detailed
discussion on control to the next section. The study of the bribery problems was
initialized by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [107] in 2006. Many
variants of the bribery problems studied in [107] were proposed and extensively studied
by researchers [50, 98, 106, 108, 190]. In general, the bribery problems are concerned
with how an external agent changes the winners by bribing the voters. A bribed voter
need to recast his vote in the external agent’s favor.
This thesis is devoted to making a contribution to this emerging area by exploring
the complexity of strategic voting problems in some prominent voting systems. In
particular, this thesis is concerned with strategic voting problems in a restricted way,
in the sense that the given voting profiles satisfy some combinatorial properties. This
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study of restricted strategic voting problems is motivated by the observation that
in many real-world settings the voters may cast their votes based on some common
principles, which in turn leads to a voting profile that satisfies several combinatorial
properties. For example, imagine a voting where residents who live on the same
street are asked to vote for the location of a supermarket. If the votes cast by the
voters are represented by linear orders over the candidates (potential locations of the
supermarket), it is natural that every voter would rank the candidate which is nearest
to his residence in the highest position. Moreover, the farther the other candidate
located away from this ideal candidate, the lower it is ranked. The consequence of the
above setting is an election that fits into the category of single-peaked domain, which
has been extensively studied in the literature [34, 44, 60, 103, 111, 113, 129, 178, 232].
The lines of research that this thesis follows are depicted in Figure 1.1. A detailed
description of the structure of this thesis is given in Section 1.4. Before that, in the
following sections, we give definitions and notations that will be used throughout this
thesis, as well as a brief introduction to the technique toolkit that we adopt to study
the voting problems in this thesis.
1.2 Problem Statement
1.2.1 Voting Systems
In this chapter we shall formally introduce the definitions and notations on voting
systems that will serve us throughout this thesis. We may introduce some additional
notations in the latter chapters, on an ad hoc basis.
Multiset. A multiset S = {s1, s2, ..., s|S|} is a generalization of a set where
objects of S are allowed to appear more than one time in S, that is, si = sj is allowed
for i 6= j. An element of S is one copy of some object. We use s ∈+ S to denote that
s is an element of S. The cardinality of S denoted by |S| is the number of elements
contained in S. For two multisets A and B, we use A unionmulti B to denote the multiset
containing all elements in A and B. Moreover, we use A ∪-- B to denote the multiset
containing for each object s, max{0, n1 − n2} copies of s, where n1 and n2 are the
numbers of copies of s in A and B, respectively. A multiset B is a submultiset of a
multiset A if for every object s that occurs n times in B, A contains at least n copies
of s. We use B v A to denote that B is a submultiset of A.
Example. Consider multisets A = {1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4} and B = {1, 2, 3}. Then we
have
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• The cardinalities of A and B are |A| = 7, |B| = 3, respectively;
• A unionmultiB = {1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4};
• A ∪-- B = {1, 1, 3, 4}; and
• B v A.
Voting System. A voting system can be specified by a set C of candidates , a mul-
tisetii ΠV = (piv1 , piv2 , ..., pivn) of votes cast by a corresponding set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
of voters (pivi is cast by vi), and a voting correspondence ϕ
iii which maps the election
E = (C,ΠV ,V) to a nonempty set of candidates ϕ(E), the winners. For simplicity,
we often discard V from the above notation for election E when ΠV is sufficient to
determine the winners (we will discuss a weighted voting scenario in Chapter 6, where
each voter has a positive weight which is indispensable to determine the winners. In
this case, we retain V in the notation. This is the only case we do so throughout
this thesis). If there is only one winner, we call it a unique winner; otherwise we call
them co-winners. Moreover, each vote piv ∈+ ΠV is defined as a linear order over the
candidates. Throughout this thesis, we interchangeably use the terms “vote” and
“voter”. The linear order of a vote is also called the preference of the vote over the
candidates. For convenience, we use v to denote the preference of the vote cast by
the voter v. Therefore, for a voter v who prefers the candidate a to b to c, the vote will
be written as piv : a v b v c. We say that the voter v casts vote piv with preference
a v b v c. In context where v is clearly known to be whose preference, we drop
v from v. In many places in this thesis (especially in Sections 2 and 3), for ease
of exposition, we also use curve braces with candidates listed inside to represent the
preferences of the voters. For instance, piv = (a, b, c, d) is saying that the preference of
the vote piv cast by the voter v is a  b  c  d.
A candidate c is preferred to another candidate c′ by a vote piv if c v c′. We also
say that c is ranked above c′ in the vote. The position of a candidate c in a vote piv,
denoted as posv(c) (or simply posv(c)), is defined as |{c′ | c′ v c}|+ 1, the number
of candidates that are ranked above c in the vote plus one.
For a vote piv and a subset C ⊆ C, let piv(C) denote the partial vote of piv restricted
to C, such that in piv(C) every two distinct candidates in C preserve the same order
as in piv. For example, for a vote piv with preference a  b  c  d  e, the partial
vote piv({b, d, e}) over the candidates b, d, e has preference b  d  e. For a multiset Π
iiIn some literature, the votes are enclosed in a list other than a multiset. The reason for using
multiset is twofold. On the one hand, from the mathematic point of view, multiset allows us to
use operations generalized from the set theory. On the other hand, all the voting correspondences
considered in this thesis are anonymous, which means that the winners do not change if we change
the order of the voters; thus, we do not need the terminology “list” to emphasize the order of the
voters.
iiiA similar concept is voting rule which maps an election to a single candidate. A voting correspon-
dence can be modified to a voting rule by using a tie-breaking method.
1.2. Problem Statement 9
of votes and a subset C ⊆ C, let Π(C) be the multiset of votes obtained from Π by
replacing each pi ∈+ Π by pi(C).
For two candidates c and c′ in an election E = (C,ΠV), let NE(c, c′) denote the
number of votes which prefer c to c′. We drop the index E when it is clear from
context. If NE(c, c′) > NE(c′, c), we say c beats c′ by NE(c, c′) in E ; otherwise if
NE(c, c′) = NE(c′, c) we say c ties c′ in E .
Voting Correspondences. We mainly study the following voting correspon-
dences in this thesis.
• Positional scoring correspondences. Every candidate gets a specific score from
each vote according to the position of the candidate in the vote. More specifically,
a positional scoring voting correspondence is defined by a scoring vector ~λ =
〈λ1, λ2, ..., λm〉 with λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥, ...,≥ λm, where m is the number of candidates
and each λi is a real number. The candidate ranked in the i-th position in a vote
gets λi points from this vote. The winners are the candidates with the highest
score. Following are some well-known positional scoring correspondences.
Name Scoring Vectors
Borda 〈m− 1,m− 2, ..., 0〉
r -Approval 〈1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0〉 with exactly r many 1’s.
Plurality 〈1, 0, 0, ..., 0〉
Veto 〈1, 1, ..., 1, 0〉
• Condorcetiv. A candidate in an election is a Condorcet winner if it beats every
other candidate in the election. A candidate in an election is a weak Condorcet
winner if it ties or beats every other candidate in the election. Note that an
election may not have a Condorcet winner or a weak Condorcet winner. See
Figure 1.2 for an example. However, if an election has a Condorcet winner, the
Condorcet winner is unique.
• Maximin. The maximin score of a candidate c in an election E with candidate
set C is defined as minc′∈C\{c}NE(c, c′). The winners are the candidates with the
highest Maximin score.
• Copelandα. Each candidate is compared with every other candidate. In each
comparison, the one which beats its rival gets one point and its rival gets zero
points. If they are tied, both get α points. The winners are the candidates
ivStrictly speaking, Condorcet is not a voting correspondence since there could be no Condorcet
winner or weak Condorcet winner in an election. Nevertheless, the concept of Condorcet winner
and weak Condorcet winner plays significant role in many common voting correspondences, such
as Kemeny, Young and Dodgson voting correspondences [22]. Moreover, complexity of making a
given distinguished candidate (not) a Condorcet winner (weak Condorcet winner) by performing
some strategic behavior has been widely studied in the literature. We list it here since we shall also
study the complexity of strategic behavior with respect to Condorcet winner and weak Condorcet
winner.
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a
c b
a  b  c
b  c  a
c  a  b
Figure 1.2: An election with three candidates a, b, c and three votes with preferences shown
on the right side of the figure. The comparison between every two candidates is shown on
the left-hand. An arc from a candidate c to another candidate c′ means that c beats c′. It is
clear that this election contains neither a Condorcet winner nor a weak Condorcet winner.
with the highest score. We remark that Copeland0.5 is commonly referred to as
Copeland, and Copeland1, developed by the thirteenth-century mystic Llull, is
referred to Llull voting in the literature [112].
For readers who are interested in voting correspondences, we refer to [231] for an
excellent summary. Moreover, we refer to [179, 234] for two further auxiliary references
for voting correspondences, where economic and political aspects of many voting
correspondences are discussed with concrete examples.
1.2.2 Strategic Behavior
In this section, we introduce the strategic voting problems which will be studied in this
thesis. We do not give all definitions and notations which will be used or studied in
this thesis since listing all these definitions and notations is cumbersome and will tax
the reader. Instead, we choose problems which we believe to be significant for readers
to grasp the main idea of strategic voting problems quickly. Further definitions and
notations concerning concrete problems are given in Chapters 2-6, on an ad hoc basis.
We refer to [22] for a comprehensive survey for other strategic voting problems which
are not considered in this thesis but have been also widely studied in the literature.
1.2.2.1 Control
Election control models the scenario where there is an external agent (e.g., the chairman
of a committee) who attempts to influence the result of the election by doing some
tricks. There would be two goals that the external agent wants to reach. One goal
is to make a given distinguished candidate win the election. The other goal is to
make the given distinguished candidate lose the election. The former case is called a
constructive control and the latter case is called a destructive control. Moreover, the
tricks involved in a control attack include adding some new, unregistered votes to the
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registered votes, deleting votes from the registered votes, adding new candidates to
the election or deleting candidates from the election. The complexity of constructive
control problems were first studied by Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick [157] in 1992, and
the complexity of destructive control problems were first studied by Hemaspaandra,
Hemaspaandra and Rothe [146] in 2007. In the following, we give the formal definitions
of the control problems.
Problem definitions. Let ϕ be a designed voting correspondence. We first define
the constructive control problems. The destructive counterpart is defined analogously.
In all strategic voting problems studied in this thesis, we distinguish between the
unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. In the unique-winner model of
constructive control, we are asked to make a given distinguished candidate the unique
winner (with the assumption that the distinguished candidate is not the unique winner
in advance). However, in the nonunique-winner model of constructive control, we
are only asked to make the distinguished candidate a winner (with the assumption
that the distinguished candidate is not a winner in advance), in the sense that the
distinguished candidate is the unique winner or one of the co-winners in the final
election (obtained from the original election by performing a certain control behavior).
The unique-winner model is indicated by “UNI” and the nonunique-winner model is
indicated by “NON”.
Constructive Control by Adding Votes under ϕ (CCAV-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E , a multiset ΠT of unregistered votes and
an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠT |.
Question: Are there at most R votes ΠT ′ in ΠT such that p is the unique winner/a
winner in the election E ′ = (C ∪ {p},ΠV unionmultiΠT ′) under the voting correspondence ϕ?
Constructive Control by Deleting Votes under ϕ (CCDV-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E , and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠV |.
Question: Are there at most R votes ΠT in ΠV such that p is the unique winner/a
winner in the election E ′ = (C ∪{p},ΠV ∪-- ΠT ) under the voting correspondence ϕ?
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Constructive Control by Deleting Candidates under ϕ (CCDC-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E , and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |C|.
Question: Are there at most R candidates C ⊆ C such that p is the unique winner/a
winner in the election E ′ = ((C ∪ {p}) \ C,ΠV((C ∪ {p}) \ C)) under the voting
correspondence ϕ?
Constructive Control by Adding Candidates under ϕ (CCAC-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election (C ∪ D ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV(C ∪ {p})), and an integer
0 ≤ R ≤ |D|.
Question: Are there at most R candidates D ⊆ D such that p is the unique
winner/a winner in the election E ′ = ((C ∪D ∪ {p}),ΠV(C ∪D ∪ {p})) under the
voting correspondence ϕ?
The destructive control problems are defined in the similar way with two differences.
First, instead of making the distinguished candidate p the unique winner/a winner,
the destructive control is to prevent the distinguished candidate from being the unique
winner/a winner (corresponding to the unique-winner model/nonunique-winner model).
Second, instead of assuming the distinguished candidate is not the unique winner/a
winner in the given election E , we assume that the distinguished candidate is the
unique winner/a winner in E in the destructive control problems.
Even though Condorcet is not regarded as a voting correspondence in most of
the literature (since there could exist no Condorcet winner), we still define the same
problems as above for Condorcet. In particular, in the unique-winner model, the
objective is to make the distinguished candidate the Condorcet winner or not the
Condorcet winner, depending on whether the constructive control or the destructive
control is discussed. On the other hand, in the nonunique-winner model, the objective is
to make the distinguished candidate a weak Condorcet winner or not a weak Condorcet
winner, depending on whether the constructive control or the destructive control is
discussed. The study of Condorcet control can be dated back to the work of Bartholdi,
Tovey and Trick [157].
We study control problems in Chapters 2 and 3. Concretely, we study control
problems in multi-peaked elections in Chapter 2 and control problems in elections
with bounded single-peaked width in Chapter 3. In particular, we consider r -Approval,
Plurality, Condorcet, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin voting correspon-
dences. We defer the definitions of single-peaked elections and multi-peaked elections
to Chapter 2 and defer the definition of single-peaked width to Chapter 3.
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1.2.2.2 Bribery
The bribery problem is concerned with the question whether a given distinguished
candidate can become the unique winner/a winner (unique-winner model of constructive
bribery/nonunique-winner model of constructive bribery), or not the unique winner/a
winner (unique-winner model of destructive bribery/ nonunique-winner model of
destructive bribery) by bribing a limited number of voters. Here, if a voter is bribed,
the vote cast by the voter will be replaced with a new vote recast by the voter.
The bribery problem and many of its variants were first studied by Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [107]. Formal definitions are as follows.
Constructive Bribery under ϕ (CB-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E , and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠV |.
Question: Can we replace at most R votes ΠT in ΠV with |ΠT | many new votes ΠT ′
such that p is the unique winner/a winner in the election E ′ = (C ∪ {p},ΠV ∪-- ΠT unionmulti
ΠT ′) under the voting correspondence ϕ?
Destructive Bribery under ϕ (DB-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is the unique winner/a winner in E , and an integer 0 ≤ R ≤ |ΠV |.
Question: Can we replace at most R votes ΠT in ΠV with |ΠT | many new votes
ΠT ′ such that p is not the unique winner/a winner in the election E ′ = (C ∪
{p},ΠV ∪-- ΠT unionmulti ΠT ′) under the voting correspondence ϕ?
Bribery problems are studied in Chapter 4. In particular, we study distance
restricted bribery problems which differ from the traditional bribery problems as
discussed above in that each voter can only be bribed to recast a new vote which is
similar to the original one. To this end, we adopt the Hamming distance and the
Kendall-Tau distance to measure the similarity between two votes. We defer the formal
definitions of the Hamming distance and the Kendall-Tau distance to Chapter 4.
1.2.2.3 Manipulation
In the manipulation problem, we are given an election and a set of voters who have
not cast their votes yet. These voters who have not cast their votes form a coalition
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and attempt to change the result of the election. Due to this reason, they are given
the name manipulators. The manipulation problem asks whether the manipulators
can cast their votes in some way so that a given distinguished candidate becomes the
unique winner/a winner after adding their votes to the election.
Manipulation under ϕ (CM-ϕ-UNI/NON)
Input: An election E = (C ∪ {p},ΠV), where p is the distinguished candidate who
is not the unique winner/a winner in E , and a set of manipulators.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes in a way so that p becomes the
unique winner/a winner after adding their votes to the election?
In some literature, the above problem is called Constructive Manipulation, where
“Constructive” takes the same meaning as in the control and bribery problems. The
Destructive Manipulation is also studied in the literature [68]. In this thesis, we study
only the constructive manipulation since the destructive counterpart of the problems
studied in this thesis straightforwardly turned out to be polynomial-time solvable.
In this thesis, the manipulation problem is studied in Chapter 6. We will also
study weighted manipulation problem in Chapter 6. We defer further details on
weighted voting to Chapter 6.
1.2.2.4 Possible Winner(s)
In many practical settings, we might not be able to access or get the full information
of an election. The possible winner(s) problem is concerned with the question of which
candidate(s) should be the winner(s) in the situation where only partial information of
the election is provided. The principle is to extend the given partial election in some
way, and examine winner(s) in the extended election. In Chapter 5, we will study
possible winner(s) problem in partial tournaments under several prominent tournament
solutions. We defer further notations and definitions to Chapter 5.
1.3 Toolkit
In this section, we briefly introduce classical complexity, parameterized complexity,
Lenstra’s theorem on integer linear programming, and dynamic programming.
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1.3.1 Classical Complexity
In this section, we give a brief introduction to the classical complexity. Insightful
discussion is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, we refer the interested readers to
the textbook of Arora and Barak [4], or the textbook of Garey and Johnson [131] for
a comprehensive understanding of computational complexity theory. For readers who
want to quickly improve their intuitive ability to assess complexity, we refer to the
survey by Tovey [236]. Readers who have been familiar with the concepts of P , NP
and NP-hard can safely skip to the next section.
Generally, computational complexity measures how efficiently problems can be
solved, and classifies the problems into complexity classes, such as P (polynomial-time
solvable) and NP-hard (nondeterministic polynomial-time hard) etc., accordingly. We
need the concept of Turing machine to define the complexity classes.
A Turing machine works on a tape associated with a head which can read, write,
and shift to left or to right. Turing machine can powerfully illustrate in a mathematic
way how human beings solve real-world problems. The basic idea is to encode the
instances of the problem in hand into strings, which are then written in the tape of
a Turing machine. Then, the Turing machine imitates the procedure of how human
beings deal with the instance by reading, writing the tape, shifting its head to the left
or the right, or remaining its head unmoved. In a formal way, a Turing machine is
defined by a 7-tuple M = (Q,Γ, b,
∑
, δ,H, F ), where
• Q is a finite, non-empty set of states.
• Γ is a finite, non-empty set of the tape symbols.
• b ∈ Γ is the blank symbol.
• ∑ ⊆ Γ \ {b} is the set of input symbols.
• H consists of an initial state q0 and a halt state q1.
• F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
• δ : Q \ F × Γ → Q × Γ × {L,R,N} is a partial function called the transition
function, where L is left shift, R is right shift, and N means remaining the head
unmoved.
In a formal way, a problem is defined as a language L ⊆∑∗. Given an instance of
a problem L, a Turing machine deals with the instance in the following way. First, the
instance is written in the tape with the head pointing at the beginning of the instance
and the state being set as the initial state q0. Then, the head reads, writes or shifts
according to the partial function δ. If the machine finally stops at an accepting state,
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we say that the Turing machine accepts the instance; otherwise if it stops at a state
other than any of the accepting states, we say it rejects the instance.
Now we are ready to define the complexity class P. A problem L is polynomial-
time solvable if there exists a Turing machine such that for every instance I ∈ L the
Turing machine accepts I in a polynomial number of steps in the size of I, and for
every instance I ′ 6∈ L the Turing machine rejects I ′ in a polynomial number of steps
in the size of I ′. Here, each step means either a writing operation, reading operation
or shifting operation of the head. The complexity class P includes all the problems
which are solvable in polynomial time. The polynomial-time solvable problems are
regarded as tractable by convention.
In real-world applications, people are often confronted with problems which
seem not solvable in polynomial time. Many of these problems are related to the
complexity classNP , which stands for nondeterministic polynomial-time solvable. Here,
“nondeterministic” refers to nondeterministic Turing machine which is different from the
above defined Turing machine (which we call deterministic Turing machine afterward) in
the partial function δ. Concretely, in the definition of nondeterministic Turing machine,
the partial function is replaced with a state relation δ′ ⊆ (Q\F×Γ)×(Q×Γ×{L,R,N}).
Therefore, given a current state of the machine and the symbol the head reads at
the moment, the next step is not determined—each a ∈ Q \ F × Γ may be mapped
to more than one element in Q × Γ × {L,R,N}. A problem L is nondeterministic
polynomial-time solvable, if there exists a nondeterministic Turing machine NTM such
that for every instance I ∈ L, NTM can accept I in a polynomial number of steps
in the size of I, and for every instance I ′ 6∈ L, NTM can reject I ′ in a polynomial
number of steps in the size of I ′. According to the above definitions, we have that
P ⊆ NP .
Now we come to introduce the complexity classNP-hard. Basically, every problem
in NP-hard is at least as hard as every problem in NP. This is conveyed by the
many-one reduction [4].
Definition 1.1 ([4]). A problem Q is many-one reducible to another problem Q′,
denoted by Q ≤m Q′, if for every instance x of Q there is a polynomial-time algorithm
which takes x as input and returns an instance y of Q′ as output. Moreover, the
instance x is equivalent to the instance y, in the sense that x is a yes-instance of Q if
and only if y is a yes-instance of Q′.
The complexity class NP-hard includes all the problems to which every problem
in NP is many-one reducible. By convention, if a problem is in NP-hard, we simply
say that the problem is NP-hard. The NP-hard problems are regarded as intractable
since they cannot be solved in polynomial time unless P = NP which is widely
believed not the case [4]. Another important complexity class is NP-complete which
is defined as the intersection of NP-hard and NP .
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NP-complete = NP-hard ∩NP
We refer to http://www.nada.kth.se/~viggo/problemlist/compendium.html
maintained by Crescenzi and Kann, and http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/~ped/
teachadmin/COMP202/annotated_np.html maintained by Dunne for two lists of NP-
hard problems that are well-studied in diverse areas.
1.3.2 Parameterized Complexity
In the following, we briefly introduce the parameterized complexity. For a comprehen-
sive understanding of parameterized complexity, we refer to the textbook of Downey
and Fellows [88] and the textbook of Niedermeier [203]. Readers who are familiar with
parameterized complexity can safely skip to the next section.
As we have seen in the previous section, there exist problems which cannot be
solved in polynomial time unless P = NP. Here, the computational complexity is
measured with respect to the whole input size. However, many problems are companied
with several parameters which can significantly affect the computational complexity
of the problem but are ignored in the classical complexity analysis. Parameterized
complexity compensates this negligence by dealing with problems in two dimensions:
a main part and a parameter. In essence, how a parameter affects the complexity of
the problem is the main concern of parameterized complexity.
Parameterized complexity was firstly systematically studied by Downey and
Fellows [87] (see [88] for the second version of this textbook released in 2013). In a
formal way, a parameterized problem is a language in Σ∗ × Σ∗, where Σ is a finite
alphabet. The first component is called the main part of the problem while the second
component is called the parameter which normally is a positive integer. Parameterized
problems have the following main hierarchy:
FPT ⊆ W [1] ⊆ W [2] ⊆, ...,⊆ XP
where FPT includes all parameterized problems which admit O(f(κ) · |I|O(1))-time
algorithms, while XP includes all parameterized problems which admit O(f(κ) · |I|g(κ))-
time algorithms. Here, I is the main part of the instance, κ is the parameter, and f
and g are computable functions depending only on κ. There are also parameterized
problems beyond XP. For example, the κ-colorable problem which is to determine
whether an undirected graph admits a proper κ-coloring of the vertices has no algorithm
of the form O(f(κ) · |I|g(κ)), unless P = NP [89]. These problems fall into the class
of so-called paraNP-hard introduced by Flum and Grohe [125]. In a formal way,
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paraNP-hard includes all the parameterized problems that are NP-hard for every
fixed value of κ above some threshold K. Finally, classes between FPT and XP are
defined based on FPT -reductions.
Definition 1.2. Given two parameterized problems Q and Q′, an FPT -reduction
from Q to Q′ is an algorithm that takes as input an instance (I, κ) of Q and outputs
an instance (I ′, κ′) of Q′ such that
(1) the algorithm runs in f(κ) · |I|O(1) time, where f is a computable function;
(2) (I, κ) ∈ Q if and only if (I ′, κ′) ∈ Q′; and
(3) κ′ ≤ g(κ), where g is a computable function.
A problem is W[i]-hard if all problems in W[i] can be FPT -reducible to the
problem. From the practical point of view, W[1] is the basic class of parameterized
problems which unlikely admit FPT -algorithms.
Kernelization is a main technique to derive FPT -algorithms. The formal definition
of kernelization is as follows.
Definition 1.3. A kernelization for a parameterized problem Q is a polynomial-time
algorithm that reduces a given instance (I, κ) of Q to a new instance (I ′, κ′) of Q such
that
(1) (I, κ) is a yes-instance if and only if (I ′, κ′) is a yes-instance;
(2) κ′ ≤ κ; and
(3) |I ′| ≤ f(κ), where f is a computable function.
The new instance (I ′, κ′) is called the problem kernel, and the function f(κ) is
the kernel size. Moreover, if f is a polynomial function, we call (I ′, κ′) a polynomial
kernel. Intuitively, a kernelization shrinks the original instance to a new equivalent
and size-bounded instance. It is folklore that a parameterized problem is FPT if and
only if it has a kernelization (See Theorem 1.39 in [125] or Proposition 7.2 in [203] for
formal proofs). For more background on kernelization, we refer to [29, 120, 142]. We
refer to [59] by Cesati, and [76] by Haan and Szeider for compendiums of parameterized
problems.
Kernelization has been widely used to solve real-world problems [1, 62, 128, 159].
For the purpose of using kernelization in practice, one desires to have a kernel as
small as possible. Unfortunately, many FPT problems are not likely to admit even a
polynomial kernel. Polynomial parameter reduction (or polynomial time and parameter
transformations), introduced by Bodlaender, Thomasse´ and Yeo [33], is a commonly
used method to show the non-existence of polynomial kernels for FPT problems.
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Definition 1.4. A parameterized problem Q is polynomial parameter reducible to a
parameterized problem Q′, if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm with an instance
(I, κ) of Q as input, where κ is the parameter, and with an instance (I ′, κ′) of Q′ as
output such that
(1) (I, κ) ∈ Q if and only if (I ′, κ′) ∈ Q′; and
(2) κ′ ≤ Poly(κ), where Poly(κ) is a polynomial function in κ.
To use polynomial parameter reduction to show the non-existence of polynomial
kernel of an FPT problems, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1.1. ([33, 83]) Let Q and Q′ be two parameterized problems and Q˜ and Q˜′ be
the unparameterized versions of Q and Q′, respectively. Suppose that Q˜ is NP-hard
and Q˜′ is in NP. Moreover, Q is polynomial parameter reducible to Q′. Then, if Q′
has a polynomial kernel, then Q has a polynomial kernel.
The above lemma will be used in Chapter 5 to show the non-existence of polynomial
kernel of a possible winner problem on partial tournaments. We refer to [30, 32, 149,
150, 172] and Chapter 13 of [88] for representative literature on lower bounds for
kernelization, where one can find many concrete problems that are showed to have no
polynomial kernels using Lemma 1.1, as well as many other approaches to establish
lower bounds for FPT problems.
1.3.3 Lenstra’s ILP Theorem
Integer linear programming (ILP for short) is a very powerful technique to tackle major
combinatorial optimization problems, see, e.g., [3, 169, 210, 244], due to the remarkable
power of modern ILP solvers. However, the ILP problem is NP-hard [131, 133, 162].
On the way exploring this fundamental NP-hard problem, Lenstra [177] derived a
polynomial-time algorithm for ILP instances with constant number of variables. The
algorithm was later improved by Kannan [161], and then further improved by Frank
and Tardos [126]. In fact, from the perspective of parameterized complexity, all their
algorithms are FPT -algorithms with respect to the number of variables. Due to this
fact, all the parameterized problems which can be FPT -reducible to ILP with respect
to the number of variables are FPT (see e.g., [112, 119, 122] for some examples).
Many FPT -reductions from parameterized problems to ILPs had been established
long before the parameterized complexity was systematically introduced. Nevertheless,
the ILP technique had not been widely used for classifying parameterized problems
until the work of Niedermeier [203]. We refer to [186] (Section 2.8) for an interesting
discussion on the ILP problem in parameterized complexity. The following theorem is
a summary of the work by Lenstra, Kannan and Frank [126, 177, 161].
20 1. Introduction
Theorem 1.1. ILP can be solved using O(v2.5v+o(v) × L) arithmetic operations and
space polynomial in L. Here L is the number of bits in the input and v the number of
variables in ILP.
Theorem 1.1 will be used in Chapter 3 to show the fixed-parameter tractability of
several control problems in elections with bounded single-peaked width.
1.3.4 Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming as a general algorithm design technique has been widely used
to solve combinatorial optimization problems (see, e.g., [2, 25, 55, 206, 224, 256]. The
basic idea of dynamic programming is iteratively break down the given instance of
the problem in question into a reasonable number of subinstances, in such a way that
we can use optimal solutions to smaller subinstances to give us optimal solutions to
larger subinstances. In particular, the solutions to smaller subinstances are stored
in a dynamic table in order to avoid repeat calculation. We refer to [90, 230] for a
comprehensive and vivid introduction to dynamic programming.
In this thesis, we will use the dynamic programming technique to derive a
polynomial-time algorithm for several control problems in 2-peaked elections in Chap-
ter 2, and two exponential time algorithms for the Borda manipulation problems in
Chapter 6.
1.4 Structure of this Thesis
This thesis is concerned with (parameterized) complexity of strategic voting problems
in elections under natural restrictions. The remainder of this thesis is divided into 5
chapters, each is concerned with a specific topic. See Figure 1.3 for an overview.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we study (parameterized) complexity of control problems
in generalized single-peaked elections. In particular, Chapter 2 is concerned with
control by adding/deleting votes/candidates in k -peaked elections for r -Approval,
Condorcet, Maximin and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our results concerning this
topic are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Chapter 3 is concerned with control by
adding/deleting votes in elections with bounded single-peaked width for Condorcet,
Maximin and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our main results in this chapter
are summarized in Table 3.1 and Theorem 3.9. Chapters 2 and 3 are based on the
papers [252, 253, 254].
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In Chapter 4, we study the distance restricted bribery problem which differs from
the traditional bribery problem in the way that the bribed voter can recast a vote
which needs to be as close as to its original vote. We adopt the Hamming distance and
the Kendall-Tau distance to measure the similarity of different votes. In particular,
we investigated the problem for Borda, Condorcet, Maximin and Copelandα for all
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our results of this chapter are summarized in Table 4.1.
In Chapter 5, we study several possible winner(s) problems on partial tournaments
related to Uncovered set and Banks set. Our results concerning this topic is summarized
in Table 5.1. This chapter is based on the paper [251].
In Chapter 6, we study exact combinatorial algorithms for both weighted and
unweighted Borda manipulation problems. Our main results are summarized in
Table 6.1. This chapter is based on the paper [250].
In Chapter 7, we summarize our results and discuss several directions for future
research.
2
Control in Multi-Peaked
Elections
Imagine again the scenario discussed in the previous section where the residents living on
the same street are asked to vote for the location of a supermarket among a set of potential
candidates. Every voter prefers the candidate which is closest to his residence, and the
farther the other candidate located away from his ideal candidate, the less it is preferred.
The story in this section differs from the above one in the way that we allow voters to
have more than one house on the street, or have relatives who also live on the same street.
Therefore, in this story, when we visit the candidates from one side to another side, the
preferences of the voters may repeatedly increase and decrease, leading to a multi-peaked
voting profile.
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2.1 Introduction
In this section, we mainly study control problems in multi-peaked elections. In
particular, we are interested in exploring the complexity of control problems in k -
peaked elections, where k is a small constant.
2.1.1 Motivation
Voting is a common method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making,
and has applications in political elections, multi-agent systems, web spam reduction,
pattern recognition etc [92, 93, 160, 187]. Unfortunately, by Arrow’s impossibility
theorem [5], there is no voting system which satisfies a certain set of desirable criteria
(see [5] for the details) when more than two candidates are involved. One possible way
to bypass Arrow’s impossibility theorem is to restrict the domain of the preferences,
for instance, the single-peaked domain introduced by Black [28]. Intuitively, in a
single-peaked election, one can order the candidates from left to right such that every
voter’s preference increases first and then decreases after some point as the candidates
are considered from left to right. See Figure 2.1 for an example.
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Figure 2.1: A single-peaked election
with five candidates a, b, c, d, e and
three votes with preferences b u
d u e u c u a, d v b v c v
a v e and a w c w b w d w e,
respectively. The preferences u, v
and w are illustrated by the dark
line, the gray line, and the dotted
line, respectively.
Recently, the complexity of various voting problems in single-peaked elections
has been attracting attention of many researchers from both theoretical computer
science and social choice communities [44, 103, 113, 129, 237]. It turned out that many
voting problems being NP-hard in general become polynomial-time solvable when
restricted to single-peaked elections [44, 113]. However, most elections in practice are
not purely single-peaked, which motivates researchers to study more general models of
elections. We refer readers to [51, 71, 78, 101, 111] for some variants or generalizations
of single-peaked elections.
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In this section, we consider a natural generalization of single-peaked elections,
where more than one peak may occur in each vote. We call this generalization k -
peaked elections (or multi-peaked elections if the number of peaks is not specified).
This generalization might be relevant for many real-world applications. For example,
imagine again the scenario that the residents living on the same street are asked to
vote for the location of a supermarket among a set of potential candidates on the same
street. Moreover, every resident may owe more than one house, or have relatives who
also live on the same street. It is a natural assumption that every voter prefers the
candidates which are closest to his residences or his relative’s residences, and the farther
the other candidates located away from his ideal candidates, the less they are preferred.
In this case, when we visit the candidates from one side to another side along the street,
the preferences of the voters may repeatedly increase and decrease. Nevertheless, the
preference of a voter increases (or decreases) at most the number of times that is
equal to the number of houses the voter and his relatives owe. k -peaked elections with
k being a small constant may also arise in the scenario where the initial election is
single-peaked but some voters are bribed to rank some specific candidates higher in
order to get some extra benefits (e.t., money, permission, etc.) from the bribers. In
addition, multi-peaked elections also play an important role in politics [69, 93]. We
refer to the work of Egan [93] for a detailed discussion of how and when multi-peaked
political elections arise in real-world political settings. Very recently, 2-peaked domain
of preference was also studied in the context of facility location problem [123].
In this chapter, we mainly study control problems for r -Approval, Condorcet,
Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin in k -peaked elections. We first study
r -Approval in Section 2.2, and then we study the other three voting correspondences in
Section 2.3. We put the last three voting correspondences into one section due to the
following reasons. First, unlike r -Approval, the other three voting correspondences are
pairwise comparison based voting correspondences. Moreover, they are all Condorcet-
consistent. Finally, the techniques used for showing hardness of the control problems
under these voting correspondences are similar.
2.1.2 Preliminaries
Apart from the definitions in the Section 1, we need the following notations and
definitions to investigate the problems in this section.
Single-peaked/k -peaked elections. An election (C,ΠV) is single-peaked if
there is a linear order L of C such that for every vote with preference v in ΠV and
every three candidates a, b, c ∈ C with a L b L c or c L b L a, c v b implies b v a,
where a L b means a is ordered before b in L. The candidate ranked in the first
position of v is the peak of v with respect to L.
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Figure 2.2: This figure shows a 2-peaked
vote piv = (c3, c4, c7, c6, c8, c9, c5, c2, c10, c1)
with respect to the 2-harmonious order
L = (c1, c2, . . . , c10). Here, L is partitioned
into L1 and L2 with L1 = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) and
L2 = (c6, c7, c8, c9, c10). Clearly, piv(C(L1)) and
piv(C(L2)) are single-peaked with respect to L1
with peak c3 and L2 with peak c7, respectively.
For an order L = (c1, c2, . . . , cm) of C and a vote piv, we say piv is k -peaked with
respect to L, if there is a k ′-partition L1 = (c1, c2, ..., ci), L2 = (ci+1, ci+2, ..., ci+j), . . . ,
Lk ′ = (ck, ck+1, ..., cm) of L such that k ′ ≤ k and piv(C(Lx)) is single-peaked with
respect to Lx for all 1 ≤ x ≤ k ′, where C(Lx) is the set of candidates appearing in Lx.
See Figure 2.2 for an example.
An election is k -peaked if there is an order L of C such that every vote in the
election is k -peaked with respect to L. Here L is called a k -harmonious order.
Problem declaration. We study constructive/destructive control by
adding/deleting votes/candidates. These problems in the general case have been
defined in Section 1.2.2. In this section, we study these problems in k -peaked elections.
However, these problems in this section differ from that in the general case (see
Section 1.2.2) in the way that the input elections are required to be k -peaked elections.
In particular, in the control by adding votes, the election with both the registered
votes and unregistered votes has to be k -peaked, according to a common k -harmonious
order. In the control by adding candidates, the election with candidate set C ∪ D ∪ {p}
(see Section 1.2.2) has to be k -peaked. Furthermore, we assume that a k -harmonious
order is given alone with the given k -peaked election. This assumption is based on
the observation that in many real-world applications, the harmonious order is known
in advance. This is actually one of the reasons why domain restricted elections arise
in practice. For example, in real-world single-peaked political elections, the voters are
thought to agree upon that the candidates are ordered on a common known left-right
dimension. See [28] for related discussion.
2.2 r -Approval Control
This section considers the complexity of r -Approval control in k -peaked elections.
We begin with a short discussion of two famous voting correspondences related to
r -Approval. Many of our results apply to these voting correspondences as well.
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Approval voting is one of the most famous voting systems and has been extensively
studied both in theory and in practice [18, 36, 199]. In an Approval voting, we are given
a set C of candidates and a set V of voters . Each voter approves or disapproves every
candidate c ∈ C. The system selects a candidate who is approved by the most voters
as a winner. A prominent variant of Approval voting is the sincere-strategy preference-
based Approval voting (SP-AV for short), proposed by Brams and Sanver [39]. In
an SP-AV election, each voter provides both a linear order of the candidates and a
subset C of candidates such that the candidates are approved according to C, and the
“admissible” and “sincere” properties should be fulfilled. In particular, the “admissible”
property requires that the candidate ranked in the first position must be approved
and the candidate ranked in the last position must be disapproved, and the “sincere”
property requires that if a candidate c is approved then all the candidates ranked
above c must be approved (see [39, 102] for more details). Many of our results apply
to Approval voting and SP-AV.
In the following, we consider only constructive control. Hemaspaandra, Hemas-
paandra and Rothe [146] proved that the control problems by adding/deleting votes for
Approval voting are NP-hard. The proofs can be adapted to show the NP-hardness
of control by adding/deleting votes in SP-AV [102]. Lin [180] proved that control
by adding votes in 4-Approval and control by deleting votes in 3-Approval are both
NP-hard, while control by adding votes in 3-Approval and control by deleting votes
in 2-Approval are polynomial-time solvable. As for the control by modification of
candidates, Approval voting turned out to be immunei to control by adding candidates
and polynomial-time solvable for control by deleting candidates [146]. However, the
control problems by adding/deleting candidates are NP-hard for r -Approval, even
when degenerated to 1-Approval [157]. The NP-hardness also holds for control by
adding/deleting candidates in SP-AV [102]. Recently, control problem in Approval
voting and r -Approval voting have also been considered in single-peaked elections.
Faliszewski et al. [113] proved that the control problems by adding/deleting votes
in Approval are polynomial-time solvable in single-peaked electionsii. Moreover, the
control problems by adding/deleting candidates for 1-Approval are polynomial-time
solvable in single-peaked elections [113].
Motivated by the NP-hardness in the general case and the polynomial-time
solvability in the single-peaked case, we study the complexity of control problems for
r -Approval voting in k -peaked elections with respect to various values of k , aiming at
exploring the complexity border for these control problems. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra
and Hemaspaandra [111] studied a nearly single-peaked model which is called Swoon-
SP and can be considered as a special case of 2-peaked elections. They proved that
the control problems by adding/deleting candidates for 1-Approval are NP-hard when
iA voting system is immune to a control behavior if one cannot make a candidate who is not a
winner become a final winner by imposing the strategic behavior on the election.
iiIn [113], for the approval voting, an election is single-peaked if there is an order of the candidates
such that each voter’s approved candidates are contiguous within the order.
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Table 2.1: A summary of the complexity of r -Approval control problems. Our new results
are in bold. In this table, “NP-h” stands for NP-hard and “P” stands for polynomial-time
solvable. Moreover, “Thm. #” means that the result follows from Theorem # in this chapter.
Note that general elections are k -peaked elections with k = dm/2e, where m denotes the
number of candidates. All results apply to the unique-winner and the nonunique-winner
models. Moreover, all our NP-hardness results apply to both Approval voting and SP-AV.
However, there are no “r” in both cases. Moreover, the W [1]-hardness result apply to SP-AV
as well. Results marked by ♦ are from [180], by ♣ from [157], by ♠ from [113] and by 4
from [111].
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restricted to Swoon-SP elections, implying the NP-hardness of these problems in
2-peaked elections. We complement their results by studying the adding/deleting votes
case. In particular, we show that, control by adding votes in r -Approval with r being a
constant is polynomial-time solvable in 2-peaked elections, but NP-hard in k -peaked
elections for k ≥ 3. Meanwhile, if r is not a constant, then control by adding votes
in r -Approval in 2-peaked elections becomes NP-hard. Moreover, the deleting votes
case turns out to be NP-hard for k -peaked elections with k ≥ 2, even for r being a
constant.
In addition, we present a W-hardness result for r -Approval control in 3-peaked
elections. Liu et al. [183] proved that control by adding votes in Approval voting is
W[1]-hard and control by deleting votes in Approval voting is W[2]-hard, with the
numbers of added and deleted votes as parameters, respectively. In addition, they
proved that control by adding candidates in 1-Approval isW [2]-hard, with the number
of added candidates as the parameter. Betzler and Uhlmann [27] complemented
the results in [183] by proving that control by deleting candidates in 1-Approval is
W[2]-hard, with the number of deleted candidates as the parameter. We extend the
above results to k -peaked elections by showing that control by deleting candidates in
1-Approval in 3-peaked elections is W [1]-hard with the number of deleted candidates
as the parameter. All our findings in this Section are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.2.1 2-Peaked Elections
In this section, we study control problems for r -Approval in 2-peaked elections. We
begin with some polynomial-time solvability results.
Theorem 2.1. Both CCAV-r -Approval-UNI and CCAV-r -Approval-NON in 2-peaked
elections are polynomial-time solvable for every constant r .
Proof. We prove Theorem 2.1 by giving a polynomial-time algorithm based on dynamic
programming. We first consider CCAV-r -Approval-UNI.
Let ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV), ΠT , L, R ) be an instance of CCAV-r -Approval-UNI in 2-
peaked elections. For a candidate c ∈ C, let ←−c (1) be the candidate lying immediately
before c in L and ←−c (i) be the candidate lying immediately before ←−c (i − 1) in
L. Similarly, we use −→c (1) and −→c (i) to denote the candidates lying immediately
after c and −→c (i − 1), respectively. For example, if L = (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h), then−→
d (1) = e,
−→
d (4) = h,
←−
d (1) = c and
←−
d (3) = a.
For a vote piv, let 1(v) denote the set of candidates who get 1 point and 0(v)
denote the set of candidates who get 0 points, from piv. For a candidate c, let SCΠV (c)
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Figure 2.3: This figure shows two votes
piv = (c3, c4, c7, c6, c8, c9, c5, c2, c10, c1)
and piu = (c7, c6, c5, c8, c9, c10, c1, c4, c3, c2).
Each vote gives one point to its top
four ranked candidates. 1(v) is rep-
resented by a 2-discrete interval
{I1v = (c3, c4), I2v = (c6, c7)} and 1(u)
is represented by a 1-discrete interval
{Iu = (c5, c6, c7, c8)}.
(or simply SCV(c) if it is clear from the context) be the total score of c from ΠV , that
is, SCΠV (c) = |{piv ∈+ ΠV | c ∈ 1(v)}|.
Given an order A = (a1, a2, . . . , an), a discrete interval I over A is a consecutive
sub-order (ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+j) of A. We denote the first element ai (ai is also referred
to as the left endpoint of I) by l(I) and the last element ai+j (ai+j is also referred
to as the right endpoint of I) by r(I). We also use A(l(I), r(I)) to denote I. Let
S(I) denote the set of elements appearing in I and set |I| = |S(I)|. For example,
for a discrete interval I = A(3, 6) over the order A = (2, 5, 3, 10, 4, 6, 0), S(I) is
{3, 4, 6, 10}. A b-discrete interval over an order A is a collection of b disjoint discrete
intervals over A, where “disjoint” means no element in A appears in more than one
discrete interval. For a b-discrete interval I, let S(I) = ⋃I∈I S(I).
We have the following observation (a similar observation on Approval voting in
single-peaked elections is given in [113]).
Observation 2.1. For each k -peaked election (C,ΠV) associated with a k -harmonious
order L over C, and each vote piv ∈+ ΠV , there is a b-discrete interval I over L such
that 0 < b ≤ k and 1(v) = S(I).
By Observation 2.1, for every vote piv in a 2-peaked election associated with L as
a 2-harmonious order, 1(v) can be represented by a 2-discrete interval or a 1-discrete
interval over L. See Figure 2.3 for an example.
We first derive a polynomial-time algorithm for CCAV-4-Approval-UNI in 2-
peaked elections. It is easy to generalize the algorithm to CCAV-r -Approval-UNI in
r -peaked elections with r being a constant. The following observation is trivial.
Observation 2.2. Every yes-instance of CCAV-r -Approval has a solution where each
added vote approves the distinguished candidate p.
Due to Observation 2.2, we can safely assume that for each piv ∈+ ΠT , p ∈ 1(v).
By Observation 2.1, for every vote piv ∈+ ΠT , 1(v) can be represented by a 2-discrete
interval Iv = {Ipv , Ipv} or a 1-discrete interval Iv = {Ipv} with p ∈ S(Ipv). Let Π be
the multiset of all votes piv ∈+ ΠT where 1(v) is represented by a 1-discrete interval
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over L. We say two votes have the same type if they approve exactly the same
candidates (For instance, the two votes with preferences a  b  c  d  e  f
and c  d  b  a  e  f in 4-Approval have the same type, since both votes
approve exactly the same candidates a, b, c, d). Since every voter approves exactly four
candidates, votes in Π have at most four different types:
(1) votes approving ←−p (3),←−p (2),←−p (1), p;
(2) votes approving ←−p (2),←−p (1), p,−→p (1);
(3) votes approving ←−p (1), p,−→p (1),−→p (2); and
(4) votes approving p,−→p (1),−→p (2),−→p (3).
We then can enumerate all possibilities of how many votes in the solution are
from each of the four types of votes in Π. This reduces the original instance to at
most R 4 subinstances. Thus, in the following, we assume that every vote in ΠT is
represented by a 2-discrete interval. Let
−→
Π T = (piv1 , piv2 , ..., piv|T |) be an order of ΠT
such that r(I
p
vi) = r(I
p
vj) or r(I
p
vi) L r(Ipvj) for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |ΠT |.
Our dynamic programming algorithm uses a binary dynamic table
DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, si,1, si,2, si,3),
where we set DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1 if there is a submultiset
ΠT ′ v {piv1 , piv2 , . . . , pivi} satisfying
(1) |ΠT ′ | = j;
(2) pivi ∈+ ΠT ′ ;
(3) max{SCV∪T ′(c) | c ∈ C} = s;
(4) SCV∪T ′(ct) = st for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 6, where c3 = ←−p (1), c2 = ←−p (2), c1 =←−p (3), c4 = −→p (1), c5 = −→p (2) and c6 = −→p (3); and
(5) SCV∪T ′(ci,t) = si,t for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where ci,1 = r(Ipvi), ci,2 = ←−ci,1(1) and
ci,3 =
←−ci,1(2). (See Figure 2.4 for an illustration of (4) and (5)).
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ci,2
si,3
ci,3
si,1 s3
c3
s2
c2
s1
c1
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I
p¯
vi I
p
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of (4) and (5) in the definition of the dynamic table DT .
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It is easy to see that the given instance is a yes-instance if there is a
DT (n,R ′, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3) = 1 for some n ≤ |ΠT |, R ′ ≤ R , s ≤
SCV(p) +R ′− 1 and s′ ≤ s for all s′ ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, sn,1, sn,2, sn,3}. Therefore, to solve
the problem we need to calculate the values of DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ R , j ≤ i ≤ |ΠT |, 1 ≤ s ≤ SCV(p) + R − 1 and s′ ≤ s for all
s′ ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, si,1, si,2, si,3}. Thus, we have at most |ΠT | · R · (|ΠV |+ R )10 entries
to calculate.
We use the following iterative recurrence to update the table.
DT (i, j, s, s1, s2, . . . , s6, si,1, si,2, si,3) = 1, if at least one of the following cases
applies:
Case 1. ∃DT (i1, j − 1, s, s′1, s′2, . . . , s′6, s′i1,1, s′i1,2, s′i1,3) = 1 such that conditions
(1)-(4) hold.
Case 2. ∃s′ ∈ {s1, s2, ..., s6, si,1, si,2, si,3} with s′ = s and
∃DT (i1, j − 1, s− 1, s′1, s′2, . . . , s′6, s′i1,1, s′i1,2, s′i1,3) = 1
such that conditions (1)-(4) hold.
The four conditions are:
(1) j − 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i− 1;
(2) st = s
′
t + SC{vi}(ct) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 6;
(3) si,t = s
′
i1,t1
+ SC{vi}(ci,t) for all ci,t = ci1,t1 ; and
(4) si,t = SCV∪{vi}(ci,t) for all ci,t ∈ A, where
A = {r(I p¯vi),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi)(1),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi)(2)} \ {r(I p¯vi1 ),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi1 )(1),
←−−−
r(I p¯vi1 )(2)}.
The above algorithm can be adapted to solve the nonunique-winner model CCAV-
r -Approval-NON: replacing all appearances of “SCV(p)+R −1” in the above description
with “SCV(p) + R ”.
The algorithm can be easily generalized to every r ≥ 4 by using a bigger but
still polynomial-sized dynamic table. In particular, for each fixed r , we need a
3r -dimension dynamic table DT (i, j, s, s1, ..., s2(r−1), si,1, ..., si,r−1), where i, j, s take
the same meanings as in the above algorithm, s1, ..., s2(r−1) maintain the scores of the
2(r − 1) candidates around the distinguished candidate p (precisely, we maintain the
scores of the r − 1 candidates immediately lying on the left side of p, and the scores
of the r − 1 candidates immediately lying on the right side of p in the 2-harmonious
order. If there are less than r − 1 candidates lying on one side of p, we reduce the
dimension of the dynamic table accordingly), and si,1, ..., si,r−1 maintain the scores of
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the candidate r(I
p
vi) and the r − 2 candidates immediately lying on the left side of
r(I
p
vi) in the 2-harmonious order.
Recall that both CCAV-r -Approval-UNI and CCAV-r -Approval-NON are NP-
hard in general for every constant r ≥ 4 but polynomial-time solvable when restricted to
single-peaked elections [113]. Theorem 2.1 shows that the polynomial-time solvability
of CCAV-r -Approval-UNI/NON remains when extending from single-peaked elections
to 2-peaked elections, for r being a constant. This bound is tight as indicated by the
following theorem. More precisely, if r is not a constant, CCAV-r -Approval-UNI/NON
becomes NP-hard in 2-peaked elections, in contrast to the polynomial-time solvability
in the single-peaked case [113].
Theorem 2.2. Both CCAV-r -Approval-UNI and CCAV-r -Approval-NON are NP-
hard in 2-peaked elections if r is not a constant.
Proof. We prove Theorem 2.2 by a reduction from a variant of Independent Set
which is NP-hard [164].
Let ( ) denote an empty order containing no element. For a linear order
A = (a1, a2, . . . , an), over the set {a1, a2, ..., an}, let A[ai, aj ] (resp. A(ai, aj ], A[ai, aj)
and A(ai, aj)) with i ≤ j be the sub-order (ai, ai+1, . . . , aj) (resp. (ai+1, ai+2, . . . , aj)
if i < j and ( ) if i = j, (ai, ai+1, . . . , aj−1) if i < j and ( ) if i = j,
and (ai+1, ai+2, . . . , aj−1) if i < j − 1 and ( ) if j ≥ i ≥ j − 1), and let
A[aj, ai] (resp. A[aj, ai), A(aj, ai] and A(aj, ai)) be the reversed order of A[ai, aj]
(resp. A(ai, aj], A[ai, aj) and A(ai, aj)). For two linear orders A = (a1, a2, ..., an)
and B = (b1, b2, ..., bm) with A ∩ B = ∅, denote by (A,B) the linear order
(a1, a2, ..., an, b1, b2, ..., bm). Let [n] be the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
A Variant of Independent Set (Vis)
Input: A multiset T = {T1, T2, ..., Tn} where each Ti ∈+ T is a set of
discrete intervals over the linear order (1, 2, ..., 12n). Moreover, |Ti| ≤ 3
and each discrete interval in Ti is of size 4.
Question: Is there a set S ⊆ ⋃T∈+T T of discrete intervals such that
|S| = n, |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for every Ti ∈+ T and no two discrete intervals in S
intersect?
We first prove the NP-hardness of CCAV-r -Approval-UNI. Given an instance
F = (T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}) of Vis, we construct an instance E = ((C ∪
{p}, ΠV), ΠT , L, R = n) for CCAV-r -Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections with r
being not a constant as follows.
Let I = ⋃T∈+T T . For each discrete interval I ∈ I, let l(I) be its left endpoint
and r(I) be its right endpoint. Let Γ be the set of all elements appearing in some
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discrete interval of I, i.e., Γ = {S(I) | I ∈ I}. Let ~Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x|Γ|) be an order
of Γ where xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1].
Candidates: We create three kinds of candidates C, D and E:
(1) C = Γ, that is, for each xi ∈ Γ, we create a candidate;
(2) D contains exactly 2n− 1 candidates d1, d2, . . . , dn, . . . , d2n−1;
(3) E contains exactly (n + 3) · (|C| + |D| − 1) dummy candidates
x′1, x
′
2 , ..., x
′
|C|·(n+3), d
′
1, d
′
2 , ..., d
′
(n+3)·(|D|−1) which will never be winners. The dis-
tinguished candidate is dn, that is, p = dn. Moreover, r = n+ 4.
2-Harmonious Order: L = (~Γ, ~D, ~E) where ~D = (d1, d2, ..., d2n−1) and ~E =
(x′1, ..., x
′
|C|·(n+3), d
′
1, ..., d
′
(n+3)·(|D|−1))
Registered Votes ΠV : We create the following registered votes:
(1) for each xi ∈ C, create n− 2 votes defined as
(xi,L[x′(n+3)i−n−2, x′i(n+3)],L(xi, x1],L(xi, x′(n+3)i−n−2),L(x′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(2) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ [n− 1], create n− (i+ 1) votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−n−2, d′i(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−n−2),L(d′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(3) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, create i− (n+ 1) votes
which is defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−2n−5, d′(i−1)·(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−2n−5),L(d′(i−1)·(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]).
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each Iij ∈ Ti ∈+ T ,
create a corresponding unregistered vote which is defined as
(L[l(Iij), r(Iij)],L[di, d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)],L(l(Iij), x1],L(r(Iij), di−1]). Clearly, this
vote approves exactly all four candidates lying between l(Iij) and r(Iij) (including
l(Iij) and r(Iij)) in L and all candidates lying between di and di+n−1 (including di
and di+n−1) in L. Thus, every unregistered vote approves dn.
It is clear that all votes are 2-peaked with respect to L. Due to the construction,
it is easy to see that SCV(c) = n− 2 for all c ∈ C, SCV(di) = n− i− 1 for all di ∈ D
with i ∈ [n− 1], SCV(di) = i−n− 1 for all di ∈ D with i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1},
and SCV(c) ≤ n− 2 for all c ∈ E and SCV(dn) = 0.
⇒: Suppose that F is a yes-instance and let S be a solution for F . Let ~S =
(I1, I2, . . . , In) be an order of S where Ii = S ∩ Ti for all i ∈ [n]. Then, we can make
dn the unique winner by adding votes from ΠT according to S. More specifically,
for each Ii ∈ S we select its corresponding vote constructed as above and add it to
the registered votes. Clearly, the final score of dn is n. Due to the construction, no
two added votes which correspond to two different intervals Ii and Ij, respectively,
approve a common candidate from C. Thus, after adding these votes to the registered
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votes, no candidate in C has a higher score than that of dn. To analyze the score
of dj ∈ D with j ∈ [n− 1], we observe that for any i > j the vote corresponding to
Ii does not approve dj. Since SCV(dj) = n − j − 1 and |S ∩ Ti| = 1 for all i ∈ [j],
we know that the final score of dj is less than n. Similarly, to analyze the score of
dj ∈ D with j ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, we observe that for any i ≤ j−n the vote
corresponding to Ii does not approve dj . Since SCV(dj) = j−n−1 and |S∩Ti| = 1 for
all i ∈ {j−n+ 1, j−n+ 2, ..., n}, we know that the final score of dj is less than n. The
final score of each c ∈ E is clearly less than n− 2 since no unregistered vote approves
c. Summarize the above analysis, we conclude that the distinguished candidate dn
becomes the unique winner after adding the selected votes to the registered votes.
⇐: Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠS is a multiset of votes chosen from
ΠT which makes dn the unique winner in the election (C ∪ D ∪ E, ΠV unionmulti ΠS). It is
easy to verify that |ΠS| = n, since otherwise, at least one of C would be a winner;
thus, the final score of dn is n and every c ∈ C can get at most one point from ΠS.
Therefore, no two votes in ΠS approve a common candidate of C, implying that ΠS
must be a set. Let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be a partition of ΠT where Pi contains all votes
corresponding to the intervals of Ti ∈+ T . Clearly, Pi is a set. We claim here that
|ΠS ∩ Pi| = 1 for every i ∈ [n]. Suppose this is not true, then there must be a certain
Pi with |ΠS ∩ Pi| ≥ 2. Let S1 = ΠS ∩ Pi (thus, |S1| ≥ 2), S2 = {piv ∈ ΠS ∩ Pi′ | i′ < i}
and S3 = {piv ∈ ΠS ∩Pi′ | i′ > i}. It is clear that |S1|+ |S2|+ |S3| = n. Since all votes
in S1 approve both di and di+n−1, all votes in S2 approve di but do not approve di+n−1,
and all votes in S3 approve di+n−1 but do not approve di, then,
SCVunionmultiS(di) + SCVunionmultiS(di+n−1)
= SCV(di) + |S1|+ |S2|+ SCV(di+n−1) + |S1|+ |S3|
= n− i− 1 + |S1|+ |S2|+ i− 2 + |S1|+ |S3|
= 2n− 3 + |S1|
≥ 2n− 1
Thus, at least one of di and di+n−1 has final score at least n, contradicting that dn
is the unique winner. The claim is true. It is now easy to see that the set of discrete
intervals corresponding to the votes in ΠS forms a solution for F .
The NP-hardness reduction for CCAV-r -Approval-NON is the same as for CCAV-
r -Approval-UNI with the difference in the construction of the registered votes. In
particular, we need to construct the registered votes so that the score of each candidate
in C ∪D is exactly one point greater than that in the above construction. This can
be done easily:
(1) for each xi ∈ C, create n− 1 votes defined as
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(xi,L[x′(n+3)i−n−2, x′i(n+3)],L(xi, x1],L(xi, x′(n+3)i−n−2),L(x′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(2) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ [n− 1], create n− i votes defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−n−2, d′i(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−n−2),L(d′i(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]);
(3) for each di ∈ D where i ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n− 1}, create i− n votes which
is defined as
(di,L[d′(n+3)i−2n−5, d′(i−1)·(n+3)],L(di, x1],L(di, d′(n+3)i−2n−5),L(d′(i−1)·(n+3), d′(|D|−1)·(n+3)]).
The control problem by deleting votes for r -Approval is polynomial-time solvable
in single-peaked elections for even non-constant r [113]. The following theorem shows
that by increasing the number of peaks only by one, this problem becomes NP-hard.
Theorem 2.3. Both CCDV-r -Approval-UNI and CCDV-r -Approval-NON in 2-peaked
elections are NP-hard for every constant r ≥ 3.
Proof. We first prove that CCDV-3-Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections is NP-hard by
a reduction from Vertex Cover on bounded degree-3 graphs which is NP-hard [130].
Then, we will show that the proof applies to CCDV-r -Approval-UNI for r ≥ 4 with a
slight modification.
An undirected graph is a tuple G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E is
the set of edges. We also use V (G) to denote the vertex set of G. For a vertex u ∈ V ,
NG(u) denotes the set of its neighbors in G, that is, NG(u) = {w | (w, u) ∈ E}. The
degree of a vertex u is the number of its neighbors. A graph is a bounded degree-3
graph if it contains at least one degree-3 vertex but no vertex having degree greater
than 3. A vertex cover for a graph G = (V,E) is a subset S ⊆ V such that every edge
in E has at least one of its endpoints in S.
Vertex Cover on Bounded Degree-3 Graphs (VC3)
Input: A bounded degree-3 graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does G have a vertex cover of size at most κ?
To prove the NP-hardness of CCDV-r -Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections, we
first introduce a property for bounded degree-3 graphs. This property may be of
independent interest since many graph problems are NP-hard when restricted to
graphs with bounded degree 3.
An interval over the real line is a closed set [a, b] = {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b} where
a and b are real numbers. An interval is trivial if a = b; otherwise, it is called a
non-trivial interval. For an interval I = [a, b], denote by l(I) and r(I) its left-point a
and right-point b, respectively. The endpoints of an interval are refereed to its left-point
and right-point. A b-interval is a set of b intervals over the real line. The endpoints
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of a b-interval are the union of the endpoints of the intervals included in it. A graph
G = (V, E) is a b-interval graph if there is a set TG of b-intervals and a bijection
f : V → TG such that for every u,w ∈ V , (u, w) ∈ E if and only if f(u) and f(w)
intersect. Here, TG is called a b-interval representation of G. For simplicity, we use
Iu = {I1u, I2u, ..., Ibu} to denote f(u), where each I iu is an interval. For two real numbers
a and b with a ≤ b, we define (a, b) = {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
The following lemma states that every bounded degree-3 graph has a 2-interval
representation such that (1) every vertex is represented by a 2-interval with one interval
is trivial; and (2) every two 2-intervals can only intersect at the endpoints.
Lemma 2.1. For every bounded degree-3 graph G there is a 2-interval representation
for G such that for every u ∈ V (G), Iu = {I1u, I2u} satisfies one of the following:
1. I1u = [x1, x1], I
2
u = [x2, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u′ ∈ V (G) \ {u} such that
r(I(u′)) ∈ (x2, x3) or l(I(u′)) ∈ (x2, x3);
2. I1u = [x1, x2], I
2
u = [x3, x3], x1 < x2 < x3 and @u′ ∈ V (G) \ {u} such that
r(I(u′)) ∈ (x1, x2) or l(I(u′)) ∈ (x1, x2),
for each I(u′) ∈ {I1u′ , I2u′}. Moreover, such a 2-interval representation can be found in
polynomial time. See Figure 2.5 for an example.
We defer the proof of Lemma to [252].
u3
u1
u2
u4
u1
u2 u3 u4
Figure 2.5: The figure on the left-side illustrates a 2-interval representation of the graph
on the right-side. Here, the 2-intervals from up to down represent the vertices u1, u2, u3 and
u4, respectively.
We now show the reduction. Let F = (G, κ) be an instance of VC3 and I(G)
be a 2-interval representation of G satisfying all conditions in Lemma 2.1. For
every Iu = {I1u, I2u}, let D(u) be the endpoints of I1u and I2u (due to Lemma 2.1,
|D(u)| = 3 for all u ∈ V (G)), and let Γ = ⋃u∈V (G) D(u). Let ~Γ = (x1, x2, . . . , x|Γ|)
be the order of Γ with xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1]. We construct an instance
E = ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV), R = κ, L) of CCDV-3-Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections as
follows.
Candidates: C = Γ∪{p, c1, c2, c3, c4} with c1, c2, c3, c4 being dummy candidates
which would never be winners.
2-Harmonious Order: L = (~Γ, p, c1, c2, c3, c4).
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Votes: There are two types of votes: votes disapproving p and votes approving p.
There are |V (G)| votes of the first type each of which corresponds to an Iu in I(G) for
u ∈ V (G). More specifically, for every Iu, let (xi, xj, xk) be the order of D(u) with xi <
xj < xk, then we create a vote piu = (xi, xj, xk,L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj, xk),L(xk, c4]).
Thus, piu approves D(u). Due to Lemma 2.1, either xi or xk lies consecutively with
xj in L, that is, one of xi =←−xj (1) and xk = −→xj (1) must hold, which implies that all
votes of the first type are 2-peaked with respect to L. There are only two votes of
the second type: (p, c1, c2, c3, c4,L(p, x1]) and (p, c3, c4, c1, c2,L(p, x1]). It is clear that
these two votes are 2-peaked with respect to L.
In the following, we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S is a vertex cover of size at most κ of
G. Then, we delete all votes in {piu | u ∈ S}. After deleting these votes, no two votes
of the first type approve a common candidate in C, since otherwise, V (G) \ S could
not be an independent set, contradicting the fact that S is a vertex cover. Thus, after
deleting these votes all candidates except for the distinguished candidate p have only
one point. Since p has two points, p is the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Observe that every yes-instance of CCDV-
3-Approval (both in general elections and in the 2-peaked elections) has a solution
containing only votes which do not approve p. Let ΠS be such a solution of size at
most κ, and E ′ be the election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠS. Due to
the above discussion, p has two points in E ′. Since p is the unique winner in E ′, every
other candidate can have at most one point in E ′, which implies that no two votes
of the first type approve a common candidate in C in E ′, further implying that the
vertices corresponding to the votes in ΠS form a vertex cover of size at most κ for G.
In order to prove that CCDV-r -Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections is NP-hard
for any constant r ≥ 4, we need to modify the above reduction slightly. First,
we add some dummy candidates. More specifically, there are r − 3 dummy can-
didates Xi = {x1i , x2i , ..., xr−3i } with the order (x1i , x2i , ..., xr−3i ) between xi ∈ Γ and
xi+1 ∈ Γ in the 2-harmonious order L, whenever there is a u ∈ V (G) such that
[xi, xi+1] ∈ Iu. Besides, we have 2r − 6 dummy candidates c5, c6, ..., c2r−2 lying after
c4 in L, with the order (c5, c6, ..., c2r−2). Thus, there are (r − 3) · |V (G)| + 2r − 6
new dummy candidates in total. We change the first type of votes as follows: for
every u ∈ V (G) with Iu = {[xi, xi+1], [xj, xj]} (resp. Iu = {[xi, xi], [xj, xj+1]}),
we create a vote defined as (L[xi, xi+1], xj,L(xi, x1],L(xi+1, xj),L(xj, c2r−2])
(resp. (xi,L[xj, xj+1],L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj+1, c2r−2])). As for the second
type of votes, we have still two votes defined as (L[p, c2r−2],L(p, x1]) and
(p,L[cr , c2r−2],L[c1, cr ),L(p, x1]), respectively. Then, with the same argument, we
can show that CCDV-r -Approval-UNI in 2-peaked elections is NP-hard for any r ≥ 4.
To prove the NP-hardness of CCDV-r -Approval-NON in 2-peaked elections for
every r ≥ 3, we adapt the above reductions in the following way: we create only the
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first vote in the second type of votes (so that the score of the distinguished candidate
is one in the given election) and remaining all the other parts unchanged.
2.2.2 3-Peaked Elections
In Section 2.2.1, we proved that control by adding votes in r -Approval is polynomial-
time solvable when restricted to 2-peaked elections and r being a constant. In this
section, we show that the tractability of the problem does not hold when extended to
3-peaked elections.
Theorem 2.4. Both CCAV-r -Approval-UNI and CCAV-r -Approval-NON in 3-peaked
elections are NP-hard for every constant r ≥ 4.
Proof. We first prove the NP-hardness of CCAV-4-Approval-UNI in 3-peaked elections
by a reduction from Independent Set on bounded degree-3 graphs which is NP-
hard [130]. An independent set in a graph G = (V,E) is a subset S ⊆ V such that
every edge in E has at most one of its endpoints in S.
Independent Set on Bounded Degree-3 graphs (IS3)
Input: A bounded degree-3 graph G = (V,E) and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does G have an independent set containing exactly κ vertices?
For an instance F = (G, κ) of IS3, let I(G) be a 2-interval representation of G
which satisfies all conditions in Lemma 2.1. Let D(u),Γ and ~Γ be defined as in the
proof for Theorem 2.3. We construct an instance E = ((C ∪ {p}, ΠV), ΠT , L, R = κ)
of CCAV-4-Approval-UNI in 3-peaked elections as follows.
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, c1, c2, c3}.
3-Harmonious Order: L = (~Γ, p, c1, c2, c3).
Registered Votes ΠV : The role of registered votes is to guarantee that all
candidates of Γ have the same score κ − 2. To this end, we first create κ − 2 votes
defined as (L[xi, xi+3],L(xi, x1],L(xi+3, c3]) for every i = 1, 5, . . . , 4b|Γ|/4c− 3. Then,
we create some further votes according to |Γ|.
Case 1. |Γ| ≡ 0 mod 4. We create no further vote.
Case 2. |Γ| ≡ 1 mod 4. We create additional κ − 2 votes defined as
(x|Γ|,L[c1, c3],L(x|Γ|, x1], p).
Case 3. |Γ| ≡ 2 mod 4. We create additional κ − 2 votes defined as
(x|Γ|−1, x|Γ|, c1, c2,L(x|Γ|−1, x1], p, c3).
40 2. Control in Multi-Peaked Elections
Case 4. |Γ| ≡ 3 mod 4. We create additional κ − 2 votes defined as
(L[x|Γ|−2, x|Γ|], c1,L(x|Γ|−2, x1], p, c2, c3).
Unregistered Votes ΠT : For each u ∈ V (G), let (xi, xj, xk) be
the order of D(u) with xi < xj < xk. We create a vote piu =
(xi, xj, xk, p,L(xi, x1],L(xi, xj),L(xj, xk),L(xk, p),L(p, c3]). Due to Lemma 2.1, ei-
ther xi or xk lies consecutively with xj in L; thus, all these unregistered votes have 3
peaks xα, xβ and p where {xα, xβ} ⊆ {xi, xj, xk} ({xα, xβ} depends on whether xj
lies consecutively with xi or with xk), with respect to L.
In the following, we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
It is easy to see that, in the election with registered votes, SCV(x) = κ − 2 for all
x ∈ C \ {p, c1, c2, c3}, SCV(p) = 0 and SCV(c) ≤ κ− 2 for all c ∈ {c1, c2, c3}.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S is an independent set of size κ. Then
we add all votes corresponding to S, that is, all votes in {piu | u ∈ S}, to the registered
votes. Since S is an independent set, no two added votes approve a common candidate
except p; thus, each candidate except p has a final score at most κ − 1. Since each
added vote approves p, it follows that p has a final score of κ points, implying that p
becomes the unique winner after adding all votes corresponding to S to the registered
votes.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠS is a solution. Let E ′ be the final
election obtained from E by adding all the unregistered votes in ΠS to the registered
votes. Clearly, p has a score of κ points in E ′. Since p is the unique winner in E ′, for
every c ∈ C \ {p}, there is at most one vote in ΠS approving c. Thus, no two votes
in ΠS approve a common candidate except p. Due to the construction, the vertices
corresponding to the votes in ΠS must form an independent set.
The proof applies to CCAV-r -Approval-UNI in 3-peaked elections for any constant
r ≥ 5 by a similar modification as discussed in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
To prove CCAV-r -Approval-NON in 3-peaked elections for every r ≥ 4, we adapt
the above reductions. In particular, we adapt the above reductions so that every
candidate in Γ has the same score κ− 1 other than κ− 2. This can be done easily:
replace all appearances of “κ− 2” with “κ− 1”, and all appearances of “κ− 1” with
“κ” in the above reductions.
Now we discuss control by modifying candidates. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and
Hemaspaandra [111] proved that control by deleting candidates in 1-Approval is NP-
hard when restricted to Swoon-SP elections, for both the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model. Since Swoop-SP elections are a subset of 2-peaked elections,
CCDC-1-Approval-UNI and CCDC-1-Approval-NON in k -peaked elections with k ≥ 2
are NP-hard. We strengthen this result by proving that both CCDC-1-Approval-UNI
and CCDC-1-Approval-NON in 3-peaked elections are W [1]-hard with the number of
deleted candidates as the parameter.
2.2. r -Approval Control 41
Theorem 2.5. Both CCDC-1-Approval-UNI and CCDC-1-Approval-NON are W [1]-
hard in 3-peaked elections, with respect to the number of deleted candidates.
Proof. We prove the theorem by FPT -reductions from Independent Set which
is W[1]-hard [87]. For a linear order ~A = (a1, a2, ..., an) over A = {a1, a2, ..., an}
and a subset B ⊆ A, denote by ~A \ B the linear order of A \ B obtained from
~A by deleting all elements in B. We first consider CCDC-1-Approval-UNI. For an
instance F = (G = (V,E), κ) of Independent Set we construct an instance E of
CCDC-1-Approval-UNI as follows.
Candidates: V ∪ {p, a, a1, a2, ..., aκ, b, b1, b2, ..., bκ}.
3-Harmonious Order: Let
−→
V = (c1, c2, ..., cn) be an (arbitrary
but fixed) order of V . Then, the 3-harmonious order L is given by
(bκ, bκ−1, ..., b1, b, p, a, a1, a2, ..., aκ, c1, c2, ..., cn).
Votes: There are seven types of votes.
(1) 2|E| − 1 votes defined as (L[a, cn],L[p, bκ]);
(2) 2|E| votes defined as (L[p, cn],L[b, bκ]);
(3) 2|E|+ κ− 1 votes defined as (L[b, bκ],L[p, cn]);
(4) for each edge {ci, cj} ∈ E(G) with i < j, create one vote defined as
(ci, cj,L[a, aκ],L[p, bκ],−→V \ {ci, cj});
(5) for each vertex ci, create one vote defined as (ci,L[p, aκ],L[b, bκ],−→V \ {ci})
and one vote defined as (ci,L[a, aκ],L[p, bκ],−→V \ {ci});
(6) κ+ 1 votes defined as (L[a1, cn],L[a, bκ]); and
(7) one vote defined as (L[b1, bκ],L[b, cn]).
It is easy to verify that all constructed votes are 3-peaked with respect to L.
Number of Added Candidates: R = κ.
(⇐:) It is easy to verify that F is a yes-instance implies E is a yes-instance: for
every independent set S of size κ, deleting the candidates S from the election clearly
make the distinguished candidate p become the unique winner.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and S ′ is a solution with |S ′| ≤ κ. We
first observe that b 6∈ S ′. This observation is true, since otherwise, all candidates
in {b1, b2, ..., bκ} must be deleted, contradicting that |S ′| ≤ κ. The same argument
applies to the candidate a. However, in order to make p have a strictly higher score
than that of b, exactly κ candidates from V must be deleted so that p can get extra κ
points from the constructed votes of type (5). Since |S ′| ≤ κ, S ′ must be a subset of V .
Moreover, no two candidates c1, c2 ∈ S ′ are adjacent to each other in the graph G, since
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otherwise, the candidate a would get at least one extra point from the constructed
votes of type (4), and p cannot be the unique winner. Thus, S ′ forms an independent
set of size κ of G.
CCDC-1-Approval-NON in 3-peaked elections can be proved W[1]-hard by an
FPT -reduction obtained from the above reduction by creating one less vote of the
second type. That is, we create one less vote defined as (L[p, cn],L[b, bκ]).
2.3 Condorcet, Copeland and Maximin Control
In this section, we study the parameterized complexity of the control problems in 3,4-
peaked elections under Condorcet, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin voting
correspondences. Recall that in the general case both the constructive control and the
destructive control by adding/deleting votes for Maximin and Copelandα for every
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 are NP-hard [110, 112]. Concerning Condorcet, the constructive control
by adding/deleting votes is NP-hard while the destructive control by adding/deleing
votes is polynomial-time solvable [157]. From the parameterized complexity point of
view, Liu and Zhu [184] proved that both the constructive control and the destructive
control by adding/deleting votes for Maximin are W [1]-hard in the general case, with
respect to the number of added/deleted votes. Moreover, Liu et al. [183] proved that
the constructive control by adding/deleting votes for Condorcet is W[1]-hard in the
general case, with respect to the number of added/deleted votes. However, their
reductions do not apply to 3,4-peaked elections. In this section, we complement their
results by proving a cluster of W[1]-hardness results for the control problems under
Condorcet, Maximin and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 in 3,4-peaked elections. Our
strategies to show these W [1]-hardness results in 3,4-peaked elections are technically
completely different from the ones used in [183, 184]. Our main results are summarized
in Table 2.2.
2.3.1 3-Peaked Elections
This section is devoted to the parameterized complexity of control problems in 3-
peaked elections under Maximin, Condorcet and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We
first examine the Maximin voting. It has been proved that both constructive and
destructive control by adding votes are NP-hard for Maximin in general [110]. The
following theorem shows that both NP-hardness hold even in 3-peaked elections. In
fact, from the parameterized complexity point of view, we prove that both problems
are W [1]-hard with respect to the number of added votes.
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Table 2.2: A summary of (parameterized) complexity of control problems under Condorcet,
Maximin and Copelandα in k -peaked elections. Here, “W[1]-h” stands for W[1]-hard and
“P” stands for polynomial-time solvable. Our results are in bold. Moreover, the results for
Copelandα apply to all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The W [1]-hardness results are with respect to the number
of added votes for the control by adding votes, and with respect to the number of deleted
votes for the control by deleting votes. Note that when k = m/2 + 1, k -peaked elections
are general elections, where m is the number of candidates. The polynomial-time solvability
results in single-peaked elections (1-peaked elections) are from [44]. The polynomial-time
solvability of the destructive control by adding/deleting votes for Condorcet is from [157].
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Theorem 2.6. DCAV-Maximin-UNI, DCAV-Maximin-NON, CCAV-Maximin-UNI
and CCAV-Maximin-NON in 3-peaked elections are all W [1]-hard with respect to the
number of added votes.
Proof. We first prove theW [1]-hardness for DCAV-Maximin-UNI in 3-peaked elections
by an FPT -reduction from Independent Set on 2-interval graphs which is W[1]-
hard [117]. For a given instance F = (I = (I1, I2, ..., In), κ) of the Independent Set
problem on 2-interval graphs, we construct an instance E for DCAV-Maximin-UNI in
3-peaked elections as follows. We denote by I1i and I
2
i the two intervals of Ii. Let D(Ii)
be the endpoints of Ii, and let Γ = ∪i∈[n]D(Ii). Moreover, let ~Γ = (x1, x2, ..., x|Γ|) be
the order of Γ with xi < xi+1 for all i ∈ [|Γ| − 1].
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, q} where q is the distinguished candidate. Concretely,
for each x ∈ Γ, we create a candidate. For ease of exposition, we still use x to denote
the candidate corresponding to the endpoint x.
3-Harmonious Order: L = (q , ~Γ, p).
Registered Votes: We create 3κ− 1 registered votes in total. Concretely, we
create 2κ − 1 registered votes defined as L[q , p], and κ registered votes defined as
(p,L[q , x|Γ|]). The comparisons between every two candidates, based on the registered
votes, are summarized in Table 2.3.
p q xj(i < j) xj(i > j)
p - κ κ
q 2κ− 1 - 3κ− 1
xi 2κ− 1 0 3κ− 1 0
Table 2.3: Comparisons between every two candidates in the W[1]-hardness reduction for
DCAV-Maximin-UNI in Theorem 2.6. Each entry with row indicated by candidate c and
column indicated by candidate c′ is N(c, c′), the number of registered votes ranking c above
c′. Here, the value of N(·) is based on the registered votes.
Unregistered Votes: The unregistered votes are created according to the
intervals in F . Precisely, for every 2-interval Ii = {I1i , I2i }, we create an unregistered
vote. Let xα and xβ with xα ≤ xβ denote the left endpoint and the right endpoint of
I1i respectively, and xγ and xδ with xγ ≤ xδ denote the left endpoint and the right
endpoint of I2i respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that I
2
i is on the right
side of I1i , that is xβ < xγ . The unregistered vote piIi corresponding to Ii is defined as
(L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ], p,L[xα−1, x1],L[xβ+1, xγ−1],L[xδ+1, x|Γ|], q). See Figure 2.6 for an
illustration.
Number of Added Votes: R = κ.
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Figure 2.6: An illustration of an unregistered vote corresponding to a 2-interval in the
NP-hardness reduction for DCAV-Maximin-UNI in 3-peaked elections in Theorem 2.6.
Now we come to show the correctness of the reduction. First observe that q is the
current winner with Maximin score 2κ− 1. Moreover, the Maximin score of q cannot
increase by adding unregistered votes to registered votes, since q is ranked below every
other candidate in every unregistered vote; and thus, q will have a Maximin score
2κ− 1 in the final election. Furthermore, every xi ∈ Γ cannot have a no less Maximin
score than that of q by adding at most κ votes. This is because N(xi, q) = 0 with
respect to the registered votes; and thus, the maximum Maximin score of every xi is
at most κ in the final election. Therefore, the only candidate which has chance to
have a no less score than q in the final election is the candidate p.
(⇒:) Suppose that F has an independent set S of size κ. We claim that q is
no longer the unique winner after adding all unregistered votes corresponding to S
to the registered votes. Let ΠS = {piI | I ∈ S} be the set of the unregistered votes
corresponding to S. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by adding all the
votes in ΠS to the registered votes. Due to the construction of the unregistered votes
and the fact that S is an independent set, we have that for every xi ∈ Γ there is at
most one vote in ΠS which ranks xi above p. This implies that NE ′(p, xi) ≥ 2κ − 1.
Moreover, since p is ranked above q in every unregistered vote, NE ′(p, q) = 2κ. It is
now easy to see q is no longer the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that q is not the unique winner after adding at most κ unregistered
votes to the registered votes. Let ΠS be the unregistered votes added to the registered
votes. Due to the above discussion, we know that p has a no less Maximin score than
that of q in the final election. Since q has a Maximin score 2κ− 1 in the final election,
for every candidate xi there has to be at least κ− 1 votes in ΠS which rank p above
xi. Due to the construction of the unregistered votes, this happens only if there is an
independent set of size κ in F .
The proof for DCAV-Maximin-NON is similar to the proof for DCAV-Maximin-
UNI with the difference that in the construction we have one less registered vote
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defined as L[q , p].
To prove the CCAV-Maximin-NON, we adopt exactly the same construction as
for DCAV-Maximin-UNI but with p being the distinguished candidate. The reduction
applies to CCAV-Maximin-NON since under the construction, p is the only candidate
who has chance to replace q as the winner by adding at most κ unregistered votes, as
discussed above.
To prove the CCAV-Maximin-UNI, we need to adopt the construction for DCAV-
Maximin-NON and set p as the distinguished winner. The reason why the reduction
works here is the same as for CCAV-Maximin-NON.
Now we examine Copeland control in 3-peaked elections. Both constructive and
destructive control by adding votes are NP-hard for Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
in general [112]. Same as the complexity we have proved for Maximin, we show that
both problems are indeed W[1]-hard even in 3-peaked elections, with respect to the
number of added votes.
Theorem 2.7. DCAV-Copelandα-UNI, DCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCAV-Copelandα-
UNI and CCAV-Copelandα-NON in 3-peaked elections are all W[1]-hard for every
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, with respect to the number of added votes.
Proof. We first show the proof for DCAV-Copeland0-NON in 3-peaked elections from
an FPT -reduction from the Independent Set problem on 2-interval graphs which is
W [1]-hard [117]. Given an instance F = (I = (I1, I2, ..., In), κ) of the Independent
Set problem on 2-interval graphs, we construct an instance E for DCAV-Copeland0-
NON in 3-peaked elections as follows. The notations I1i , I
2
i , D(Ii),Γ and ~Γ hereinafter
are defined in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, q , y} where q is the distinguished candidate.
3-Harmonious Order: L = (q , ~Γ, p, y).
Registered Votes: We create 3κ− 3 registered votes in total. Concretely, we
create 2κ− 3 registered votes defined as (q , y,L[x1, p]), and κ registered votes defined
as (p, q , y,L[x1, x|Γ|]). It is easy to verify that q is a Copeland0 winner (precisely, q is
the current unique winner). The comparisons between every two candidates, base on
the registered votes, are summarized in Table 2.4.
Unregistered Votes: The unregistered votes are created according to the
intervals in F . Precisely, for every 2-interval Ii = {I1i , I2i }, we create an unregistered
vote. Let xα and xβ with xα ≤ xβ denote the left endpoint and the right endpoint of
I1i respectively, and xγ and xδ with xγ ≤ xδ denote the left endpoint and the right
endpoint of I2i respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that I
2
i is on the right
side of I1i , that is xβ < xγ . The unregistered vote piIi corresponding to Ii is defined as
(L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ], p, y,L[xα−1, x1],L[xβ+1, xγ−1],L[xδ+1, x|Γ|], q).
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p q xj(i < j) xj(i > j) y
p - κ κ
q 2κ− 3 - 3κ− 3
xi 2κ− 3 0 3κ− 3 0
y 2κ− 3 0 3κ− 3 -
Table 2.4: Comparisons between every two candidates in the W[1]-hardness reduction for
DCAV-Copeland0-NON in Theorem 2.7. Each entry with row indicated by candidate c and
column indicated by candidate c′ is N(c, c′), the number of registered votes ranking c above
c′. Here, the value of N(c, c′) is based on the registered votes.
Number of Added Votes: R = κ.
Now we prove the correctness.
(⇒:) Suppose that F has an independent set S of size κ. Consider the election
E ′ obtained from E by adding all the unregistered votes in ΠS = {piI | I ∈ S}
corresponding to S to the registered votes. We have in total 4κ− 3 votes in E ′. Since
p is ranked above q and y in every unregistered vote, p beats both q and y in E ′. Due
to the construction of the unregistered votes and the fact that S is an independent
set, for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one unregistered vote in ΠS which ranks xi
above p. Therefore, NE ′(p, xi) ≥ 2κ− 1, implying that p beats every candidate xi ∈ Γ.
Summary all above, p beats every other candidate in E ′, implying that q is no longer
a Copeland0 winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that ΠS is the multiset of unregistered votes added to the registered
votes which makes q no longer a Copeland0 winner. Here, the index S is the set of
2-intervals corresponding to ΠS in F . Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by
adding all votes in ΠS to the registered votes. We first illustrate that the candidate p
is the only one which has chance to have a no less Copeland0 score than that of q in
E ′. Observe first that the comparisons between the candidates y and q , and between
every candidate xi and q cannot be changed by adding at most κ unregistered votes.
Therefore, the candidate q beats y and every xi in E ′. In this case, in order to prevent
q from being a Copeland0 winner, q has to be beaten by p in E ′, since otherwise, q
would beat every other candidate and thus remains the winner (actually remains as
the Condorcet winner). However, once q is beaten by p in E ′, y is also beaten by p in
E ′. Hence, y has no chance to have a strictly greater Copeland0 score than that of q .
Analogously, every xi ∈ Γ cannot have a strictly greater Copeland0 score than that of
q since every xi is beaten by y and q in E ′. Therefore, the only candidate which has
chance to have a no less score than that of q is the candidate p. Since q beats every
candidate except p, in order to make p have a no less score than that of q , p has to
beat every other candidate. This happens only if ΠS contains κ unregistered votes,
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x1 x3 x7 x8x2 x4 x6x5 Figure 2.7: An illustration of the restriction in the
W[1]-hardness reduction for DCAV-Copeland0-UNI
in Theorem 2.7. Once two 2-intervals intersect, they
intersect at more than one point.
and moreover, for every candidate xi there is at most one vote in ΠS ranking xi above
p. The latter condition directly implies that S, the set of 2-intervals corresponding to
the votes in ΠS, is an independent set, and the former condition implies that |S| = κ.
The proof for DCAV-Copeland0-NON is finished.
The above reduction does not apply to DCAV-Copeland0-UNI directly, since, in
this case, q could also become not a unique-winner when there is no independent set
of size κ for F . To check this, consider the situation where p is beaten by some x ∈ Γ
(but p beats every other candidate in Γ) in the final election. This can happen when
we add two unregistered votes corresponding to two 2-intervals which intersect only at
x to the election. In this situation, p beats every other candidate except x and q beats
every other candidate except p, implying that q is no longer a unique winner. In order
to prove the hardness of DCAV-Copeland0-UNI, we need to restrict the 2-intervals in
F in such a way that once two 2-intervals intersect, they do not intersect at only one
point, but in a non-trivial interval. See Figure 2.7 for an illustration. This restriction
does not change the W [1]-hardness of the Independent Set problem on 2-interval
graphs [117]. Under this restriction, once two unregistered votes corresponding to
two 2-intervals that intersect are added to the registered votes, p will be beaten by at
least two candidates in Γ, implying that p cannot prevent q from being the unique
Copeland0 winner if there is no independent set of size κ for F . Remaining other
parts of the proof the same as for DCAV-Copeland0-NON, the W[1]-hardness for
DCAV-Copeland0-UNI follows.
Now we move to the hardness of CCAV-Copeland0-UNI. The reduction is exactly
the same as for DCAV-Copeland0-NON with only the difference that we set p as the
distinguished candidate. We have argued in the proof for DCAV-Copeland0-NON that
if F is a yes-instance, p can be made the Copeland0 unique-winner in the final election.
Our argument for the other direction is also the same as for DCAV-Copeland0-NON.
Actually, the argument can be simpler here since we do not need to argue that y
and every x ∈ Γ have no chance to be the final winner, since we have set p as the
distinguished candidate.
The proof for CCAV-Copeland0-NON is exactly the same as for DCAV-Copeland0-
UNI with only the difference that p is the distinguished candidate. On the one
hand, if there is an independent set of size κ, we can make p a winner by adding the
unregistered votes corresponding to the independent set. On the other hand, if there
is no independent set of size κ, there must be at least two candidates in Γ, which
are ranked above p simultaneously in two unregistered votes that are added to the
registered votes, implying that p cannot be a winner in the final election. To check the
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latter argument, one should first observe that we cannot make p a winner by adding
at most κ− 1 unregistered votes: if this is the case, there must be no less than two
candidates from Γ which beat or tie p; however, q beats every other candidate except
p (if adding less than κ− 2 unregistered votes, q will beat every other candidate).
x1 x3 x7 x8x2 x4 x6x5
d 11−αe many candidates d 11−αe d 11−αe
Figure 2.8: An illustration of the dummy candidates in the W[1]-hardness reduction for
DCAV-Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 2.7. The figure on the left side shows two 2-intervals
(the black one above and the gray one below) which intersect in a non-trivial interval [x2, x3].
Moreover, there is no other 2-interval whose endpoint is in [x2, x3]. We create exactly d 11−αe
dummy candidates between x2 and x3 (including x2 and x3). The figure on the right side
shows four 2-intervals, with only one interval of each 2-intervals is showed. There are d 11−αe
candidates corresponding to the intersection (this is a minimal intersection since no other
2-interval has any of its endpoints in this intersection) of the second 2-interval and the fourth
2-interval, and d 11−αe candidates corresponding to the intersection (a minimal intersection)
of the first 2-interval and the third 2-interval.
Now we come to Copelandα control for every 0 < α < 1. In the following, let α
be a fixed real number with 0 < α < 1. We first consider DCAV-Copelandα-UNI. The
W [1]-hardness reduction is adapted from that for DCAV-Copeland0-UNI by creating
polynomially many dummy candidates. The role of these dummy candidates is to
enlarge the score gap between p and q to a certain extent, when two unregistered
votes corresponding to two intersected 2-intervals are added to the registered votes;
hence guarantees that q would be still the unique winner when a multiset of at most
κ unregistered votes corresponding to a non independent set are added. To this end,
we also adopt the same restriction on 2-intervals here as for DCAV-Copeland0-UNI:
every two 2-intervals either do not intersect or they intersect in a non-trivial interval.
Precisely, we create these dummy candidates in a way so that any intersection of
two 2-intervals corresponds to no less than d 1
1−αe such dummy candidates. To this
end, we do the following. We call an intersection [x1, x2] with x1 < x2 of two 2-
intervals a minimal intersection if there is no other 2-interval which has at least one
of its endpoints in [x1, x2]. Clearly, given a 2-interval representation of an instance
of Independent Set on 2-interval graphs, all minimal intersections can be found
in polynomial time. Apart from creating all the candidates as in the reduction for
DCAV-Copeland0-UNI, we create, for each minimal intersection [x1, x2], a set of d 11−αe
dummy candidates which lie in distinguished places in [x1, x2]. See Figure 2.8 for an
illustration. This construction ensures that p can prevent q from being the unique
winner only if p beats every other candidate in the final election. The observation
is that if p ties or be beaten by some candidate x ∈ Γ, then p also ties or be beaten
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by no less than d 1
1−α − 1e other candidates. The amount d 11−αe is enough to make
p have a strictly less score than that of q ; and hence cannot prevent q from being
the unique winner. However, p beats every other candidate if and only if there is
an independent set of size κ for F , implying the correctness of the reduction. The
proofs for other three problems DCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCAV-Copelandα-UNI and
CCAV-Copelandα-NON are adapted from DCAV-Copeland0-NON, CCAV-Copeland0-
UNI and CCAV-Copeland0-NON, respectively. The constructions are analogous to
the above reduction.
Finally we consider Copeland1. The reductions for the four problems DCAV-
Copeland1-UNI, DCAV-Copeland1-NON, CCAV-Copeland1-UNI, CCAV-Copeland1-
NON are adapted from DCAV-Copeland0-UNI, DCAV-Copeland0-NON, CCAV-
Copeland0-UNI, CCAV-Copeland0-NON, respectively. Precisely, each reduction is
different from the corresponding one in the way that we set R = κ − 1. Moreover,
instead of searching for an independent set of size κ, we search for an independent set
of size κ− 1.
Now we come to Condorcet. The following theorem summarizes our findings for
constructive control by adding votes for Condorcet in 3-peaked elections. Recall that
in general, the constructive control by adding votes for Condorcet is NP-hard, while
the destructive control by adding votes is polynomial-time solvable [157].
Theorem 2.8. CCAV-Condorcet-UNI and CCAV-Condorcet-NON in 3-peaked elec-
tions are W [1]-hard with respect to the number of added votes.
Proof. The proof for CCAV-Condorcet-UNI is exactly the same as for CCAV-
Copeland0-UNI. The proof for CCAV-Condorcet-NON is similar to the one for CCAV-
Condorcet-UNI with the difference that we create one more registered vote defined as
(q , y,L[x1, p]).
2.3.2 4-Peaked Elections
In the previous sections, we have discussed control by adding votes in 3-peaked
elections. In this section, we consider control by deleting votes in 4-peaked elections
for Condorcet, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin. We first examine the
Maximin voting. It is known that both constructive and destructive control by deleting
votes are NP-hard for Maximin in general [110]. The following theorem shows both
problems are W[1]-hard even in 4-peaked elections, with respect to the number of
added votes.
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Theorem 2.9. CCDV-Maximin-UNI, CCDV-Maximin-NON, DCDV-Maximin-UNI
and DCDV-Maximin-NON are W[1]-hard in 4-peaked elections, with respect to the
number of deleted votes.
Proof. Our FPT -reductions are again from Independent Set on 2-interval graphs
which is W[1]-hard [117]. Moreover, we adopt another restriction on the 2-intervals
(different from the one in the proof of Theorem 2.7). For two 2-intervals I and J , we say
I covers J if J ⊆ I. See Figure 2.9 for an illustration. We restrict the given instance
of Independent Set on 2-interval graphs in a way so that there is no 2-interval
which is covered by another 2-interval. This does not change the W [1]-hardness of the
problem [117].
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.9: This figure shows three different ways of how a red 2-interval covers a blue
2-interval. The two 2-intervals are draw on different levels for the sake of clarity. However,
they are actually both defined on the real line.
Let F = (I = (I1, I2, ..., In), κ) be a given instance of Independent Set on
2-interval graphs. The following construction applies to both CCDV-Maximin-UNI and
DCDV-Maximin-NON. We will discuss the construction for the other two problems
later. Hereby, I1i , I
2
i , D(Ii),Γ = ∪iD(Ii) and ~Γ = (x1, x2, ..., x|Γ|) are defined in the
same way as in the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Candidates: C = Γ∪{p, q , x0}, where p is the distinguished candidate in CCDV-
Maximin-UNI, while q is the distinguished candidate in DCDV-Maximin-NON.
4-Harmonious Order: L = (q , x0, ~Γ, p).
Votes: We create 4n − κ + 2 votes in total. Concretely, we first create the
following 2n− κ+ 2 votes (number of votes: votes represented by linear orders).
n : (L[x0, p], q)
n− κ : (L[p, x0], q)
2 : (p, q ,L[x0, x|Γ|])
Then, for every 2-interval Ii = {I1i , I2i } of F , we create two votes piI1i and piI2i as
follows. Let xα and xβ with xα ≤ xβ denote the left endpoint and the right endpoint
of I1i , respectively, and xγ and xδ with xγ ≤ xδ denote the left endpoint and the right
endpoint of I2i , respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that I
2
i is on the right
side of I1i , that is xβ < xγ. The two votes corresponding to Ii are defined as follows.
piI1i = (L[q , xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, p],L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ]);
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piI2i = (q ,L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ], p,L[x0, xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, x|Γ|]).
It is easy to check that piI1i has three peaks q , xβ, xδ, and piI2i has four peaks
q , xα, xγ, p. In the following, let Π1 = {piI1i | i = 1, 2, ..., n} and Π2 = {piI2i | i =
1, 2, ..., n}.
Number of Deleted Votes: R = κ.
We denote by E the above constructed election instance. The comparisons between
every two candidates are shown in Table 2.5.
p q xj(j > i) xj(j < i)
p - 2n− κ+ 2 2n− κ+ 2
q 2n - 2n+ 2
xi 2n 2n− κ × ×
Table 2.5: Comparisons between every two candidates for the W [1]-hardness reductions for
CCDV-Maximin-UNI and DCDV-Maximin-NON in Theorem 2.9. The comparisons between
xi and xj are marked with × since they cannot be exactly determined. However, they do
not play any role in the correctness argument. What is important for xi is the comparison
between xi and q , which implies that the final Maximin score of every xi can be at most
2n− κ.
It is clear that q has the maximum Maximin score 2n and is thus the unique
Maximin winner. We now show the correctness for the CCDV-Maximin-UNI.
(⇒:) Suppose that F has an independent set S of size κ. We claim that we can
make p the unique Maximin winner by deleting votes corresponding to S in Π1. Let
ΠS = {piI1 | I ∈ S} be the set of the votes corresponding to S in Π1, and let E ′ be the
final election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠS. Since S is an independent
set, we have that for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one vote in ΠS which ranks p above
xi. This implies that NE ′(p, xi) ≥ 2n − κ + 1 for every xi ∈ Γ. Moreover, since q is
ranked above p in every vote in ΠS, NE ′(p, q) = 2n − κ + 2 and NE ′(q , p) = 2n − κ.
Therefore, the Maximin score of p is at least 2n− κ+ 1 while the Maximin score of q
is at most 2n− κ. Finally, since q is ranked above every xi ∈ Γ in every vote in ΠS,
we have that NE ′(xi, q) = 2n− κ, implying that every xi has a Maximin score at most
2n− κ. Summary all above, we know that p is the unique winner with Maximin score
at least 2n− κ+ 1 in the final election.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let ΠS be a solution of E , and E ′ be
the final election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠS. Observe first that ΠS
contains no vote which ranks p above q , since otherwise, NE ′(p, q) ≤ 2n− κ+ 1 and
NE ′(q , p) ≥ 2n− κ+ 1, contradicting with the fact that p is the unique winner in E ′.
Since we can delete at most κ votes and the Maximin score of q is 2n in the original
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election E , the final Maximin score of q is at least 2n− κ. Since p is the unique winner
in the final election E ′, the Maximin score of p is at least 2n− κ+ 1 in E ′. Therefore,
for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one vote in ΠS which ranks p above xi. Due to the
fact, we have the following claim.
Claim. ΠS contains no vote in Π2.
(Proof of the Claim.) We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that
piI2i ∈ ΠS ∩Π2 is a vote corresponding to a 2-interval Ii. Let A be the set of candidates
which lie in the 2-interval Ii. Due to the construction, all the candidates in Γ \ A
are ranked below p. Let Ij be another 2-interval which corresponds to another vote
piIuj 6= piI2i (observe that ΠS contains at least two votes, since otherwise q would have a
too large Maximin score). Let B be the set of candidates which lie in the 2-interval
Ij. Due to the restriction of the instance, we know that B \ A 6= ∅. Therefore, u 6= 1,
since otherwise, both piIuj and piI2i rank p above every candidate in B \ A. However, it
also cannot be the case that u = 2, since otherwise, both piIuj and piI2i rank p above the
candidate x0
iii. See Figure 2.10 for an illustration.
q x0 xt p q x0 xt p
Figure 2.10: An illustration of the Claim in the proof of Theorem 2.9. Here, t = |Γ| In both
the left-hand figure and the right-hand figure. Most comparisons among the candidates in Γ
are not explicitly showed. Moreover, the figure on the left side shows the case that u = 1,
and the figure on the right side shows the case that u = 2. In either case, the candidates lie
in the green interval are ranked below p in the two votes corresponding to the red 2-interval
and the blue 2-interval.
Due to the above claim, we know that ΠS ⊆ Π1. Let S be the set of 2-intervals
corresponding to ΠS. Since for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one vote in ΠS which
ranks p above xi, there is no two 2-intervals in S which intersect, implying that F has
an independent set of size κ.
To check that the same reduction applies to DCDV-Maximin-NON, observe
first that no xi ∈ Γ can have a higher Maximin score than that of q in the final
election: since NE ′(xi, q) = 2n− κ,NE ′(q , p) = 2n and we can delete at most κ votes,
every xi would have a Maximin score at most 2n− κ and q would have a Maximin
score at least 2n − κ in the final election. Due to the above analysis, p is the only
candidate which can prevent q from being a winner. This turns the problem into
exactly CCDV-Maximin-UNI. The above argument for CCDV-Maximin-UNI then
works.
iiiThe dummy candidate x0 can be deleted from the construction without destroying the correctness.
However, the introducing of x0 simplifies the exposition of the proof.
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p q xj(j > i) xj(j < i)
p - 2n− κ+ 1 2n− κ+ 1
q 2n - 2n+ 1
xi 2n 2n− κ × ×
Table 2.6: Comparisons between every two candidates in the W[1]-hardness reductions for
CCDV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-UNI in Theorem 2.9. The comparisons between
xi and xj are marked with × since they cannot be exactly determined. However, they do
not play any role in the correctness argument. What is important for xi is the comparison
between xi and q , which implies that the final Maximin score of every xi can be at most
2n− κ.
Now we discuss the reductions for CCDV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-
UNI. Analogously, we adopt the same reduction as discussed above for CCDV-Maximin-
UNI, with only the difference that we create only one vote defined as (p, q ,L[x0, x|Γ|]),
other than two. Moreover, in CCDV-Maximin-NON we set p as the distinguished
candidate, while in DCDV-Maximin-UNI we set q as the distinguished candidate. The
comparisons between every two candidates are shown in Table 2.6. The correctness
argument for CCDV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-UNI is similar to that for
CCDV-Maximin-UNI and DCDV-Maximin-NON, respectively. The difference is that
for CCDV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-UNI, we argue that p can have a no
less Maximin score than that of q by deleting at most κ votes if and only if there is an
independent set of size κ, other than requiring p to have a strictly higher Maximin
score than that of q in the final election as for CCDV-Maximin-UNI and DCDV-
Maximin-NON. This difference is accurately reflected in the one less creation of the
vote defined as (p, q ,L[x0, x|Γ|]).
Now we study Copelandα control by deleting votes in 4-peaked elections. Recall
that in general, both the constructive control and the destructive control by deleting
votes for Copelandα are NP-hard, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 [112]. Our results concerning
the same problems in 4-peaked elections are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.10. CCDV-Copelandα-UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON and DCDV-
Copelandα-UNI and DCDV-Copelandα-NON for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 are W[1]-hard
in 4-peaked elections, with respect to the number of deleted votes.
Proof. Our reductions are again from the Independent Set problem on 2-interval
graphs. Moreover, we adopt the restriction on 2-intervals as in the proof of Theorem 2.7
that every two 2-intervals either do not intersect or intersect at more than one
point. This does not change the W [1]-hardness of the problem [117]. Given instance
F = (I = (I1, I2, ..., In), κ) of the Independent Set problem on 2-interval graphs,
we construct instances E for the problems stated in Theorem 2.10 as follows. We first
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consider CCDV-Copelandα-UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON and DCDV-Copelandα-NON.
Hereby, I1i , I
2
i , D(Ii),Γ = ∪i∈[n]Ii and ~Γ = (x1, x2, ..., x|Γ|) are defined in the same way
as in the proof of Theorem 2.6.
Candidates: C = Γ ∪ {p, q}.
4-Harmonious Order: L = (q , ~Γ, p).
Votes: We create 4n− κ+ 1 votes in total. Precisely, we first create 2n− κ+ 1
votes as follows (number of votes: votes represented by linear orders).
n− 1 : (L[x1, p], q)
n− κ+ 2 : (p,L[q , x|Γ|])
Then, for every 2-interval Ii = {I1i = [xα, xβ], I2i = [xγ, xδ]} of F we create two
votes. Without loss of generality, assume that I2i is on the right side of I
1
i , that is
xβ < xγ. The two votes corresponding to Ii are defined as follows.
piI1i = (L[q , xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, p],L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ]);
piI2i = (q ,L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ], p,L[x1, xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, x|Γ|]).
In the following, let Π1 = {piI1i | i = 1, 2, ..., n} and Π2 = {piI2i | i = 1, 2, ..., n}. It
is easy to verify that all votes have at most 4 peaks with respect to the 4-harmonious
order L.
Number of Deleted Votes: R = κ.
The comparisons between every two candidates are shown in Table 2.7.
p q xj(j > i) xj(j < i)
p - 2n− κ+ 1 2n− κ+ 2
q 2n - 3n− κ+ 2
xi 2n− 1 n− 1 × ×
Table 2.7: Comparisons between every two candidates in the W[1]-hardness reductions
for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON and DCDV-Copelandα-NON in Theo-
rem 2.10. The comparisons between xi and xj cannot be exactly determined. However, their
comparisons do not paly any role in the correctness argument.
Now we prove the correctness for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI.
(⇒:) Suppose that F has an independent set S of size κ. We claim that we can
make p the unique Copelandα winner by deleting votes corresponding to S in Π1. Let
ΠS = {piI1 | I ∈ S} be the set of the votes corresponding to S in Π1, and let E ′ be the
final election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠS. Since S is an independent
set, we have that for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one vote in ΠS which ranks p
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above xi. This implies that NE ′(p, xi) ≥ 2n − κ + 1 for every xi ∈ Γ, and hence, p
beats every xi ∈ Γ in E ′. Moreover, since q is ranked above p in every vote in ΠS,
NE ′(p, q) = 2n− κ+ 1. Therefore, p beats q in E ′. Summary all above, we know that
p beats every other candidate in E ′; and thus, p is the unique Copelandα winner (more
precisely, p is the Condorcet winner in E ′).
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let ΠS be a solution of E , and E ′ be the
final election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠS. Clearly, E ′ contains at least
4n− 2κ+ 1 votes. Since NE ′(q , xi) ≥ NE(q , xi)− κ = 3n− 2κ+ 2 and κ ≤ n, we know
that q beats every candidate xi ∈ Γ in the final election. Since p is the unique winner
in E ′, we know that ΠS contains no vote which ranks p above q (otherwise, q would
also beat p, contradicting with the fact that p is the unique winner in E ′). Moreover,
we know that p beats every candidate xi ∈ Γ in E ′. Since the final election contains at
least 4n− 2κ+ 1 votes and NE(p, xi) = 2n− κ+ 2, p beats every xi ∈ Γ in the final
election if there is at most one vote in ΠS which ranks p above xi. Due to the fact, we
have the following claim.
Claim. ΠS contains no vote in Π2.
The correctness of the above claim follows from the proof of the Claim in the proof
of Theorem 2.9. Due to the above claim, we know that ΠS ⊆ Π1. Let S be the set of
2-intervals corresponding to ΠS. Since for every xi ∈ Γ there is at most one vote in ΠS
which ranks p above xi, there is no two 2-intervals in S which intersect, implying that
F has an independent set of size κ. This finishes the proof for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI.
Now we argue why the same reduction applies to CCDV-Copelandα-NON. We
have showed above that if there is an independent set of size κ, we can make p a (unique)
winner. It remains to show the other direction. We begin with two observations. First,
observe that we have to delete exactly κ votes to make p a winner, since otherwise,
q would beat every other candidate. Second, observe that q beats every candidate
xi ∈ Γ in the final election no matter which κ votes are deleted (this observation has
been discussed above). Then, recall that every two 2-interval either do not intersect or
they intersect at more than one point. Therefore, if we delete two votes which rank p
above some candidate xi, there must be another candidate xj 6= xi which are ranked
below p in both of the two votes. This implies that p beats every candidate in xi ∈ Γ
in the final election (otherwise, p would be beaten by at least two candidates in Γ,
contradicting with the fact that p is a winner in E ′). However, p beats every candidate
in Γ only if there is an independent set of size κ for F as discussed above. This finishes
the proof for CCDV-Copelandα-NON.
To check that the same reduction applies to DCDV-Copelandα-NON, observe
first that no xi ∈ Γ can have a higher Copelandα score than that of q in the final
election—every xi is beaten by q in the final election. Due to this, p is the only
candidate which can prevent q from being a winner. This turns the problem into
exactly CCDV-Copelandα-UNI. The argument for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI then works.
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p q q′ xj(j > i) xj(j < i)
p - 2n− κ+ 1 2n− κ+ 1 2n− κ+ 2
q 2n - 4n− κ+ 1 3n− κ+ 2
q′ 2n 0 - 3n− κ+ 2
xi 2n− 1 n− 1 n− 1 × ×
Table 2.8: Comparisons between every two candidates in the W[1]-hardness reduction for
DCDV-Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 2.10. The comparisons between xi and xj cannot be
exactly determined. However, their comparisons do not paly any role in the correctness
argument.
Now we consider DCDV-Copelandα-UNI. The reduction is similar to the above
one with the difference that we create one more dummy candidate q′ which lies
immediately on the right side of q in the 4-harmonious order. That is, the candidate
set is Γ ∪ {p, q , q′} with q being the distinguished candidate, and the 4-harmonious
order is (q , q′, ~Γ, p). The role of the dummy candidate q′ is to guarantee that, in the
final election, every candidate in Γ is beaten by both q and q′; and thus, exclude the
possibility that some xi would have a higher score than that of q in the final election.
To achieve this goal, we rank q′ immediately after q in every vote and remains the
order of other candidates unchanged. Precisely, we create the following votes.
n− 1 : (L[x1, p], q , q′)
n− κ+ 2 : (p,L[q , x|Γ|])
Besides, for every 2-interval Ii = {I1i = [xαx,β ], I2i = [xγ, xδ]} with xβ < xγ, we
create two votes as follows.
(L[q , q′, xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, p],L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ]);
(q , q′,L[xα, xβ],L[xγ, xδ], p,L[x1, xα−1],L(xβ, xγ),L(xδ, x|Γ|]).
The comparisons between every two candidates are shown in Table 2.8.
We have discussed that if there is an independent set of size κ, the candidate p can
prevent q from being the unique winner by deleting κ votes. For the other direction,
observe first that no candidate xi ∈ Γ can have a higher score than that of q since
every xi is beaten by both q and q′ in the final election. Clearly, q′ also cannot prevent
q from being the unique winner since every vote ranks q above q′. Therefore, the only
candidate which can prevent q from being the unique winner is p, and moreover, this
happens only if p beats every candidate in Γ. The remaining argument is the same as
for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI.
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The last problems we consider are constructive control by deleting votes for
Condorcet in 4-peaked elections. Recall that the constructive control by deleting votes
for Condorcet is NP-hard in general, while destructive control by deleting votes is
polynomial-time solvable [157].
Theorem 2.11. CCDV-Condorcet-UNI and CCDV-Condorcet-NON are W [1]-hard in
4-peaked elections with respect to the number of deleted votes.
Proof. The proof for CCDV-Condorcet-UNI is exactly the same as for CCDV-
Copelandα-UNI, and the proof for CCDV-Condorcet-NON is exactly the same as
for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 2.10.
2.4 Conclusion
In this section, we have studied k -peaked elections which generalize the single-peaked
elections by allowing at most k -peaks in each vote. We derived a dichotomy of the
complexity of control problems for r -Approval voting in k -peaked elections with respect
to k . Several of our results apply to approval voting and SP-AV as well. Furthermore,
we have studied control problems for Maximin, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
Condorcet from the parameterized complexity point of view. We proved that, except
the destructive control by adding/deleting votes for Condorcet which is polynomial-
time solvable in general, the constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes
for all these three voting systems are W[1]-hard in k -peaked elections with k = 3, 4,
with respect to the number of added/deleted votes. In particular, control by adding
votes turned out to be W [1]-hard in 3-peaked elections, while control by deleting votes
turned out to be W[1]-hard in 4-peaked elections. All our results apply to both the
unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. Our results are summarized
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Several challenging and intriguing questions remain open. Among them are the
complexity of control by adding votes in 2-peaked elections and control by deleting
votes in 2,3-peaked elections. See Table 2.2 for further details. It is well-known that
determining whether an election is single-peaked is polynomial-time solvable [81, 103,
158]. However, we do not know whether the polynomial-time solvability holds in
checking whether an election is 2-peaked elections. More generally, we do not know
the complexity of checking whether an election is k -peaked with k being a constant.
3
Control in Elections with
Bounded Single-Peaked Width
The concept of single-peaked width provides another prominent approach to generalize
single-peaked elections. It can arise in the settings where the candidates are divided into
groups, with each including the candidates which are similar each other. The similarity of
the candidates in the same group leads to the fact that every voter ranks them together.
Therefore, in these settings, preferences of voters over the candidates can be determined in
two steps. First, voters present their preferences over the groups. Then, the voters present
their preferences over all the candidates in every group. Elections with single-peaked with
k are the elections where each group contains at most k candidates, and moreover, the
preferences over the groups are single-peaked with respect to a harmonious order over the
groups. In this chapter, we study control problems in elections with bounded single-peaked
width.
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we mainly study control problems in elections with bounded single-
peaked width. Intuitively, in an election with single-peaked width k , the candidates
can be grouped together, where the size of each group is bounded by k , and for each
group, every voter has the same preferences over all candidates in this group compared
to candidates not in the group. Moreover, if considering each group as a candidate,
the election is single-peaked. Clearly, single-peaked elections have a width equal to
one. Cornaz, Galand and Spanjaard [70] first introduced single-peaked width into the
complexity study of voting problemsi. In particular, they considered a multi-winner
determination problem (the proportional representation problem) and proved that
this problem is FPT with respect to single-peaked width. Later, Cornaz, Galand and
Spanjaard [71] showed that the Kemeny winner determination is FPT with respect
to single-peaked width.
In this chapter, we study three concrete voting correspondences, namely, (weak)
Condorcet, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and Maximin. Recall that in the
general case, the following problems are all NP-hard: the constructive control by
adding/deleting votes for Condorcet [157], the constructive/destructive control by
adding/deleting votes for Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 [112], and the construc-
tive/destrutive control by adding/deleting votes for Maximin [110]. Our results are
summarized as follows. Concerning the constructive control problems, we achieved
NP-hardness for Copelandα with 0 ≤ α < 1 even with single-peaked width k = 2,
while for Copeland1 and Maximin, we show polynomial-time solvability with k = 2 but
NP-hardness with k = 3. In contrast, the constructive control problems for (weak)
Condorcet turn out to be polynomial-time solvable for every fixed k . More precisely,
we prove that for (weak) Condorcet, the constructive control problems are FPT with
respect to single-peaked width. In the destructive control case, both Copelandα for all
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin behave in the same way, that is, for both correspondences, the
destructive control problems are FPT with respect to single-peaked width, implying
polynomial-time solvability with every fixed k . Note that the destructive control
problems for (weak) Condorcet are polynomial-time solvable, even in general (i.e., with
unbounded k ) [157]. Our results concerning the above problems are summarized in
Table 3.1.
In addition to these concrete voting correspondences, we provide a general char-
acterization for a broad class of voting correspondences to identify the ones for which
the control problems are FPT with respect to single-peaked width. The considered
class contains all correspondences passing the Smith-IIA criterion. The Smith set in
iCornaz, Galand and Spanjaard defined in [70] the single-peaked width as k − 1, the size of the
maximum group minors one.
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an election is a subset S of candidates with minimum size, such that every candidate
in S is preferred by more voters than every candidate outside S. Clearly, every election
has a unique Smith set. A voting correspondence passes the Smith-IIA criterion (“IIA”
stands for “independence of irrelevant alternatives”), if deleting any candidate outside
the Smith set does not change the winners. Several voting correspondences have
been found passing the Smith-IIA criterion, for instance, Ranked pairs, Schulze’s,
and Kemeny. The characterization considers elections with odd number of votes and
states that, if a control problem for a correspondence in the above class is FPT with
the number of candidates as parameter, then the same holds for the single-peaked
width being the parameter. This characterization applies to both constructive and
destructive cases. We remark that all our results in this chapter apply to both the
unique-winner and the nonunique-winner models.
The following definitions and notations are essential for presenting this chapter.
A voting correspondence is said to be weakCondorcet-consistent, if on every input
that has at least one weak Condorcet winner, the winners, according to the voting
correspondence, are exactly the set of weak Condorcet winners [44].
Single-Peaked Width. A subset C ⊆ C is called an intervalii if all candidates in
C are ranked contiguously in every vote. For example, for the election with candidates
{a, b, c, d, e} and votes with preferences {a 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e, d 2 c 2 b 2 e 2
a, a 3 e 3 b 3 d 3 c}, {b, c, d} is an interval. Contracting an interval C is the
operation that first adds a new candidate c′ to the election such that C ∪ {c′} forms a
new interval and the preference between any two candidates of C in each vote preserves
the same as before, and then deletes all candidates in C. For example, after contracting
the interval {b, c, d} in the above example, we get the new election with candidates
a, c′, e and votes with preferences {a 1 c′ 1 e, c′ 2 e 2 a, a 3 e 3 c′},
where c′ is the newly introduced candidate. Intuitively, contracting is to assign a new
candidate to an interval which can represent the interval properly in the sense that
the information of the preference between every candidate in the interval and every
candidate outside the interval is preserved.
Let P = (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be an ordered partition of C with each Ci being an
interval. We say P is a single-peaked partition if contracting all intervals in P results
in a single-peaked election with the harmonious order (c1, c2, ..., cω), where each ci is
the new candidate introduced for the interval Ci. We say a vote has its peak at Ci
with respect to P if the interval Ci is ranked above every other interval in the vote.
iiThe term “interval” used in this chapter is different from that of previous chapter. The term
“interval” used in this chapter follows from the latest paper concerning single-peaked width by
Cornaz, Galand and Spanjaard [71] who first introduced the concept of single-peaked width in
the context of computational social choice. In an earlier paper by the same authors [70], they also
implicitly used the term “cluster”. The term “interval” here is also equal to “clone set” studied
by Tideman [235]. Besides, it is also related to the notion of component on profile studied by
Laffond [173].
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The width of P is defined as max1≤i≤ω{|Ci|}. The single-peaked width of an election is
the minimum width among all its single-peaked partitions.
Median Group: Let P = (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be a single-peaked partition of the
election (C,ΠV), and let (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) be an order of ΠV such that for i < j the peak
of pii does not lie on the right-side of the peak of pij in P . The set of all intervals
lying between the peak Ci of pidn/2e and the peak Cj of pibn/2+1c, together with Ci and
Cj, denoted by G[Ci, Cj], is called the median group. Furthermore, Ci is called the
left boundary of the median group and Cj is the right boundary of the median group.
If there is only one interval in the median group, we call it a median interval. See
Figure 3.1 for an example.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Single-peaked partition
peakpeak
Median group
Figure 3.1: An illustration of median
group. There are two votes, where the first
vote has preference C2  C1  C3, ...,
C7 over the intervals, and the second vote
has the preference C4  C3  C5  C6 
C2  C1  C7. The peak C2 of the first
vote is on the left side of the peak C4 of
the second vote.
This chapter studies control by adding/deleting votes for Condorcet, Maximin
and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as in Chapter 2, but with the input elections
having bounded single-peaked width. Moreover, we assume that optimal single-peaked
partitions is given alone with the input elections. This assumption is sound since
searching for an optimal single-peaked partition can be done in polynomial time [71].
In addition, we do not create new votes throughout handling the problems (we only
add/delete votes/canddiates which are given in advance). We remark that in the
(constructive/destructive) control by adding votes, the single-peaked partition is based
on the registered votes union the unregistered votes. Therefore, both the registered
votes and the unregistered votes have single-peaked width at most k with respect to
the given single-peaked partition.
All NP-hardness reductions in this paper are from the following NP-hard prob-
lem [131].
Exact 3 Set Cover (X3C)
Input: A universal set U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ} and a collection S of 3-subsets
of U .
Question: Is there an S ′ ⊆ S such that |S ′| = κ and each ci ∈ U appears
in exactly one set of S ′?
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3.2 Condorcet and Weak Condorcet Control
The constructive control by adding/deleting votes for (weak) Condorcet is NP-hard
in the general case [157] but turned out to be polynomial-time solvable when re-
stricted to single-peaked elections [44]. On the other hand, the destructive control
by adding/deleting votes is polynomial-time solvable even in the general case [157].
In this section, we study constructive control by adding/deleting votes in Condorcet
and weak Condorcet, restricted to elections with bounded single-peaked width. We
prove that both problems are polynomial-time solvable if the single-peaked width is a
constant. From the perspective of the parameterized complexity, our results indeed
show that these problems are FPT . The following observations are useful.
Observation 3.1. Every two candidates from different intervals in the median group
are tied.
Proof. Let (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be the single-peaked partition and G[Cl, Cr] be the median
group. Let Ci and Cj be two arbitrary intervals in G[Cl, Cr] with i < j, and c ∈
Ci, c
′ ∈ Cj be two candidates. Due to the definition of median group, all votes with
peaks at Cl or on the left-side of Cl (let Π
l
V denote the multiset of these votes) prefer
c to c′, and all votes with peaks at Cr or on the right-side of Cr (let ΠrV denote the
multiset of these votes) prefer c′ to c. Moreover, the size of ΠlV is equal to the size of
ΠrV . Therefore, c ties c
′.
Observation 3.2. Every weak Condorcet winner is from the median group.
Proof. This observation is correct since every candidate which is not in the median
group is beaten by at least one candidate in the median group. More precisely, suppose
that c is a candidate contained in an interval lying on the right-side (resp. left-side) of
the median group, then every candidate in Cr (resp. Cl) beats c, where Cl and Cr are
the left boundary and the right boundary of the median group, respectively.
Observation 3.3. If an election E has a Condorcet winner, then the median group
contains exactly one interval.
Proof. Suppose that the median group G contains more than one interval. Due to
Observation 3.1, every candidate in the median group ties at least one candidate
in a different interval in the median group, and thus, the Condorcet winner cannot
exist.
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In the following, “modifiable” votes refer to the registered votes in the case of
control by deleting votes, and refer to the unregistered votes in the case of control by
adding votes. For two subsets of candidates C and C ′ with C ⊆ C ′, we say two votes
with preferences 1 and 2, respectively, are consistent with respect to C and C ′ if
they have the same preference over all candidates in C, and for every two candidates
c ∈ C and c′ ∈ C ′ \ C, c 1 c′ if and only if c 2 c′.
Theorem 3.1. CCAV-Condorcet-UNI, CCAV-Condorcet-NON, CCDV-Condorcet-
UNI and CCDV-NON are FPT with respect to single-peaked width.
Proof. We first consider CCAV-Condorcet-UNI. Let ΠV1 be the multiset of registered
votes and ΠV2 be the multiset of the unregistered votes. Let Cp be the interval
containing the distinguished candidate p. Let k be the single-peaked width of the
given election. Due to Observation 3.3, to make p the Condorcet winner we need to
make the interval Cp the median interval and to make p beat all the other candidates
in Cp. To this end, we first divide the modifiable votes (in this case the modifiable
votes are unregistered votes) ΠV2 into three multisets: X containing the votes with
peaks on the left-side of Cp with respect to the single-peaked partition, Y the votes
with peaks on the right-side of Cp, and Z the votes with peaks at Cp. Then, we further
divide each of these three multisets into at most 2k−1 submultisets, each containing the
votes which are pairwise consistent with respect to {p} and Cp. By assigning to each
subset a variable (indicating how many votes from this subset are in the solution), the
election instance is reduced to an ILP instance which can be solved in FPT time based
on Lenstra’s theorem [177]. See Section 1.3.3 for a detailed discussion of Lenstra’s
theorem [177].
Let x¯, y¯ and z¯ be the numbers of votes in ΠV1 with peaks on the left-side of Cp
with respect to the single-peaked partition, with peaks on the right-side of Cp, and with
peaks at Cp, respectively. We will use xβ, yβ and zβ to denote the variables assigned
to the subsets of X, Y and Z, respectively, where β is a subset of Cp \ {p}. Here, for
each β, xβ (yβ, zβ) is assigned to the submultiset of X (Y, Z), which contains votes
ranking every candidate of β above p and ranking every candidate not in β below p.
Firstly, the ILP instance has the following constraints:
(1) x¯+
∑
β
xβ < y¯ + z¯ +
∑
β
yβ +
∑
β
zβ
(2) y¯ +
∑
β
yβ < x¯+ z¯ +
∑
β
xβ +
∑
β
zβ
(3)
∑
β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) ≤ R
Here, (1) and (2) together are to ensure that Cp is the unique interval in the
median group. In particular, (1) implies that there are less than half votes having
their peaks on the left side of Cp in the final election, and (2) implies that there are
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less than half votes having their peaks on the right side of Cp in the final election.
Moreover, (3) states that at most R votes are added. Then, for every c ∈ Cp \ {p},
there is a constraint:
N(p, c) +
∑
c6∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ)−N(c, p)−
∑
c∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) > 0
where N(.) is based on the registered votes ΠV1 .
These inequalities ensure that p beats every candidate in Cp \ {p}. Since we
formulate the control problems as decision problems, there is no optimization function
in the ILP.
Now we consider CCAV-Condorcet-NON, that is, the problem to determine
whether we can make the distinguished candidate a weak Condorcet winner by adding
limited votes. Due to Observations 3.1 and 3.2, to make the distinguished candidate
p a weak Condorcet winner, we have to make the interval Cp be included in the
median group and to make p the weak Condorcet winner among the candidates in Cp.
Therefore, we can use similar ILP technique as for CCAV-Condorcet-UNI to solve this
problem. Precisely, the constraints for CCAV-Condorcet-NON are the same as that
for CCAV-Condorcet-UNI with only the difference that the last constraint is replaced
by the following one.
N(p, c) +
∑
c6∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ)−N(c, p)−
∑
c∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) ≥ 0
Now we consider the control by deleting votes. We first consider CCDV-Condorcet-
UNI. Let E be the given election. The modifiable votes are divided and assigned with
variables in the same way as discussed in the case of CCAV-Condorcet-UNI. Let x¯, y¯
and z¯ be the numbers of votes in E with peaks on the left-side of Cp with respect to
the single-peaked partition, with peaks on the right-side of Cp, and with peaks at Cp,
respectively. The constraints are as follows.
(1) x¯+
∑
β
xβ < y¯ + z¯ +
∑
β
yβ +
∑
β
zβ
(2) y¯ +
∑
β
yβ < x¯+ z¯ +
∑
β
xβ +
∑
β
zβ
(3)
∑
β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) ≤ R
(4) For every c ∈ Cp \ {p},
NE(p, c)−
∑
c 6∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ)−NE(c, p) +
∑
c∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) > 0
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Finally, we come to CCDV-Condorcet-NON. We use the similar method here to
solve the problem. Precisely, the constraints for CCDV-Condorcet-NON are the same
as that for CCDV-Condorcet-UNI with only the difference that the last constraint is
replaced by the following one.
NE(p, c)−
∑
c 6∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ)−NE(c, p) +
∑
c∈β
(xβ + yβ + zβ) ≥ 0
Due to Theorem 3.1, we can directly get the following result for the Young winner
determination problem which is PNP|| -complete in general [221]. In an Young election,
each candidate c has a Young score defined as the minimum number of votes to be
deleted to make c the Condorcet winner. A Young winner is a candidate with the least
Young score. The Young winner determination problem can be reduced to the problem
of deciding whether a distinguished candidate can be made a Condorcet winner by
deleting R votes, equivalent to the problem control by deleting votes for Condorcet.
Corollary 3.1. Young winner determination is FPT with respect to single-peaked
width.
3.3 Copeland Control
In this section, we study control problems for Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Our
results are summarized in Table 3.2. In particular, we prove that both the constructive
control by adding votes and the constructive control by deleting votes are NP-hard
for Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α < 1 but polynomial-time solvable for Copeland1,
when restricted to elections with single-peaked width 2. Moreover, we prove that
the same problems become NP-hard for Copeland1 when restricted to elections with
single-peaked width 3. In the contrast, the destructive control by adding/deleting
votes for Copelandα for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 turns out to be FPT . Recall that the
problems constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes are all NP-hard
for Copelandα for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 [112].
Theorem 3.2. CCAV-Copelandα-UNI, CCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCDV-Copelandα-
UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON are NP-hard in elections with single-peaked with 2, for
every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof. We first consider CCAV-Copelandα-UNI. Let F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) be
an instance of X3C. We construct an instance E for CCAV-Copelandα-UNI in elections
with single-peaked width 2 as follows.
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Single-peaked width k
k = 2 k = 3 k : parameter
CCAV NP-hard: 0 ≤ α < 1 NP-hard: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
CCDV P : α = 1
DCAV P FPT
DCDV
Table 3.2: Complexity of constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes in
Copelandα. Here, “P” stands for polynomial-time solvable. All results apply to both the
unique-winner and the nonunique-winner models.
Candidates: There are in total 6κ + 2 candidates. More specifically, for each
cx ∈ U we create two corresponding candidates c′x and c′′x which form an interval
denoted by I(cx) in the election. In addition, we have two candidates p and p′ which
form an interval I(p). The distinguished candidate is p.
Single-Peaked Partition: (I(p), I(c1), I(c2), ..., I(c3κ)).
Registered Votes: There are κ − 1 registered votes defined as c′3κ  c′′3κ 
c′3κ−1  c′′3κ−1 , ..., p′  p. In addition, there is one vote defined as c′′3κ  c′3κ 
c′′3κ−1  c′3κ−1 , ..., p  p′. Clearly, with the registered votes, p has Copelandα score
0, p′ has Copelandα score 1, each c′x has Copeland
α score 2x + 1, and each c′′x has
Copelandα score 2x.
Unregistered Votes: The unregistered votes are created according to S. More
precisely, for each s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S, we create a vote pis with preference s as follows.
The peak of the vote piv is at the interval I(p) and p s p′. For every two candidates
a ∈ I(cx) and b ∈ I(cy) with x < y, we have a s b. Finally, in each interval I(cx), we
set c′x s c′′x if x ∈ {i, j, k} and c′′x s c′x otherwise.
Number of Added Votes: R = κ.
In the following, we show that F has an exact 3-set cover if and only if we can
add at most R = κ unregistered votes to make p the unique winner.
(⇒:) Let S ′ be an exact 3-set cover of F . We claim that adding all votes
corresponding to S ′, that is, the votes ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} (piv has preference s), will
make p the unique winner. Let E ′ be the election obtained from E by adding all the
votes in ΠV ′ to the registered votes. It is clear that p beats p′ in E ′. Since there are
exactly κ votes with peaks at I(p) and exactly κ votes with peaks at I(c3κ) in E ′, every
two candidates which are in different intervals are tied. Therefore, p has Copelandα
score 6α ·κ+ 1 and p′ has Copelandα score 6α ·κ in E ′. We now analyze the Copelandα
score of other candidates in E ′. Let c′x and c′′x be the two candidates in an interval
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I(cx) with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ. Since S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, due to the construction, there
is exactly one vote in ΠV ′ which prefers c′x to c
′′
x; thus there are exactly κ− 1 votes in
ΠV ′ which prefer c′′x to c
′
x. Together with the registered votes, c
′
x ties c
′′
x in the final
election E ′. Since each of c′x and c′′x ties all other candidates as stated above, the final
Copelandα score of c′x and c
′′
x are both α · (6κ+ 1). Since α < 1, p is the unique winner
in E ′.
(⇐:) Let ΠV ′ be a solution of E and S ′ be the subset of S corresponding to ΠV ′ ,
that is, S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠV ′}. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by adding
all votes in ΠV ′ to the registered votes. It is easy to see that ΠV ′ contains exactly κ
votes, since otherwise, one of c′3κ and c
′′
3κ would beat all the other candidates and thus
be a winner in E ′. Moreover, since all unregistered votes have their peaks at I(p),
every two candidates from different intervals are tied in the final election E ′. Since all
unregistered votes prefer p to p′, the Copelandα score of p is 6α · κ+ 1 in E ′. Since p is
the unique winner in E ′, c′x ties c′′x for all 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ (otherwise, at least one of c′x and
c′′x would have a Copeland
α score 6α · κ+ 1, contradicting that p is the unique winner
in E ′). Then, according to the construction, for each cx there is exactly one vote in
ΠV ′ preferring c′x to c
′′
x. This implies that S
′ contains exactly one subset containing cx;
thus, S ′ forms an exact 3-set cover of F .
The NP-hardness proof for CCAV-Copelandα-NON can be derived from the
above reduction by deleting the candidate p′ in E .
Now, we consider CCDV-Copelandα-UNI. Let F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) be an
instance of X3C. For each c ∈ U , let o(c) be the number of sets in S which contain
c, and let o¯(c) be the number of sets in S which do not contain c. We assume that
o¯(c) ≥ κ− 1 for all c ∈ U . This assumption does not change the complexity of X3C,
since any instance which does not satisfy the requirement must be a no-instance.
We construct an instance E for CCDV-Copelandα-UNI restricted to elections with
single-peaked width 2 as follows. The candidate set and the single-peaked partition
are the same as for CCAV-Copelandα-UNI.
Votes: There are in total 2|S| − κ votes with |S| − κ votes having peaks at I(p)
and all the other |S| votes (corresponding to S) having peaks at I(c3κ). The central
idea is to construct the votes such that all deleted votes are from the ones with peaks
at I(c3κ) whenever E is a yes-instance. Furthermore, after deleting these votes, every
two candidates c′x and c
′′
x in I(cx) are tied (x = 1, 2, ..., 3κ). Note that deleting one
vote with peaks at I(p) will make one of c′3κ and c
′′
3κ a winner. Recall that, if more
than half of the votes have peaks at I(c3κ), then each of c
′
3κ and c
′′
3κ beats all other
candidates. Thus, we delete only votes with peaks at I(c3κ).
We first create votes corresponding to S. For each s = (ci, cj, ck) ∈ S, we create a
vote pis with preference s. The peak of the vote pis is at I(c3κ) and the preference of
the vote between p and p′ is p s p′. Thus, for every two candidates a ∈ I(cx) and
b ∈ I(cy) with x < y, we have that b s a. Moreover, for each I(cx) with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ,
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we set c′x s c′′x if x ∈ {i, j, k} and c′′x s c′x otherwise. Thus, there are |o(cx)| votes
with preferences c′x  c′′x and |o¯(cx)| votes with preferences c′′x  c′x now.
We now construct the votes with peaks at I(p). There are in total |S| − κ such
votes each preferring p to p′. Our goal then is to create the votes such that for each
I(cx) with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, there are |o(cx)| − 1 votes with preferences c′′x  c′x and
o¯(cx)− κ+ 1 votes with preferences c′x  c′′x. To this end, we do the following: for each
cx with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, we set c′x  c′′x in arbitrary |o(cx)| − 1 votes, and in all others
(in total |S| − κ− |o(cx)|+ 1 = |o¯(cx)| − κ+ 1) we set c′′x  c′x. Since all these votes
have their peaks at I(p), the preference between every two candidates a ∈ I(cx) and
b ∈ I(cy) with x < y is a  b.
Number of Deleted Votes: R = κ.
In the following, we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. We claim that
deleting all votes corresponding to S ′, that is, all votes in ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} makes
p the unique winner. Since after deleting all votes in ΠV ′ , the number of votes with
peaks at I(p) is equal to that of votes with peaks at I(c3κ), and there is no vote with
peak between I(p) and I(c3κ), every two candidates from different intervals are tied.
Moreover, for each c′x with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, there are exactly |o¯(cx)| − κ+ 1 + |o(cx)| − 1 =
|S| − κ votes (exactly half of the remaining votes) preferring c′x to c′′x after deleting all
votes in ΠV ′ . Thus, c′x ties c
′′
x for all 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ. Thus, every candidate except p has a
Copelandα score α · (6κ + 1). Since p is preferred to p′ by all votes, the Copelandα
score of p is 6α · κ+ 1. Since α < 1, p becomes the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠV ′ is a solution. Let S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠV ′}.
We claim that S ′ is an exact 3-set cover for F . Clearly, ΠV ′ contains exactly κ votes
and all have peaks at I(c3κ), since otherwise, there will be more votes with peaks
at I(c3κ) than these votes with peaks at I(p), resulting in one of c′3κ and c
′′
3κ being
a winner. Therefore, after deleting all votes in ΠV ′ , every two candidates from two
different intervals are tied. Moreover, since p becomes the unique winner in the final
election, c′x must tie c
′′
x for all 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ. Therefore, for each cx with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ,
there is exactly one vote in ΠV ′ having the preference c′x  c′′x. This vote corresponds
to an s ∈ S ′ containing cx, implying that S ′ must be an exact 3-set cover of F .
The proof for CCDV-Copelandα-NON can be derived from the above reduction
by deleting the candidate p′.
In the following, we study the control problems for Copeland1. We first consider
elections with single-peaked width 2. Observe that every election with single-peaked
width 2 contains at least one weak Condorcet winner. More precisely, each interval
in the median group contains at least one weak Condorcet winner. Note that every
candidate in the median group beats or ties every candidate not in the median
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group. Furthermore, since Copeland1 is weakCondorcet-consistent and the problems
constructive control by adding/deleting votes are polynomial-time solvable for (weak)
Condorcet when restricted to elections with single-peaked width 2, as implied by
Theorem 3.1, the problems constructive control by adding/deleting votes for Copeland1
are polynomial-time solvable in elections with single-peaked width 2. This result is
summarized in Theorem 3.3. We remark that Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α < 1 is not
weakCondorcet-consistent even when restricted to single-peaked elections [44], and
thus, the following theorem does not apply to 0 ≤ α < 1.
Theorem 3.3. CCAV-Copeland1-UNI, CCAV-Copeland1-NON, CCDV-Copeland1-
UNI and CCDV-Copeland1-NON are polynomial-time solvable in elections with single-
peaked width 2.
Now we consider the problems restricted to elections with single-peaked width 3.
In contrast to the polynomial-time solvability as stated in Theorem 3.3, we show that
the constructive control problems become NP-hard in elections with single-peaked
width 3. We remark that, even though Copeland1 is weakCondorcet-consistent, the
argument for Theorem 3.3 does not hold in this case since there may not be a weak
Condorcet winner in elections with single-peaked width 3.
Theorem 3.4. CCAV-Copeland1-UNI, CCAV-Copeland1-NON, CCDV-Copeland1-
UNI and CCDV-Copeland1-NON are NP-hard in elections with single-peaked width 3.
Proof. We prove the theorem by reductions from X3C. We start with the reduction
for CCAV-Copeland1-UNI.
Let F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) be an instance of X3C. We assume that κ ≡
0 mod 6. This assumption does not change the hardness of X3C: if κ 6≡ 0 mod 6, we can
add some dummy elements to U , and add some 3-subsets to S which form an exact 3-set
cover of the dummy elements. We construct an instance E for CCAV-Copeland1-UNI
restricted to elections with single-peaked width 3 as follows.
Candidates: There are 9κ + 3 candidates in total. More specifically, for each
cx ∈ U we create three candidates c1x, c2x and c3x which form an interval denoted by
I(cx). In addition, we have three candidates p, p′ and p′′ which form an interval I(p).
The distinguished candidate is p.
Single-Peaked Partition: (I(p), I(c1), I(c2), ..., I(c3κ)).
Registered Votes: There are 7
3
κ registered votes. In particular, we have
(1) 5
6
κ votes with preference
c13κ  c23κ  c33κ  c13κ−1  c23κ−1  c33κ−1 , ..., p  p′  p′′
72 3. Control in Elections with Bounded Single-Peaked Width
(2) 5
6
κ votes with preference
c23κ  c33κ  c13κ  c23κ−1  c33κ−1  c13κ−1 , ..., p  p′  p′′
(3) 2
3
κ votes with preference
p  p′  p′′  c31  c11  c21 , ..., c33κ  c13κ  c23κ
Clearly, with the registered votes, p has Copeland1 score 2, p′ has Copeland1
score 1, p′′ has Copeland1 score 0, and each cγx with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ and γ = 1, 2, 3 has
Copeland1 score 3x+ 1.
Unregistered Votes: We create the unregistered votes according to S. Precisely,
for each s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S, we create a vote pis with preference s as follows: the
peak of the vote is at I(p) and p s p′ s p′′. For every two candidates a ∈ I(cx)
and b ∈ I(cy) with x < y, we have a s b. Finally, in each interval I(cx), we set
c2x s c3x s c1x if x ∈ {i, j, k} and set c3x s c1x s c2x otherwise.
Number of Added Votes: R = κ.
In the following, we show that F has an exact 3-set cover if and only if we can
add at most κ unregistered votes to make p the unique winner.
(⇒:) Let S ′ be an exact 3-set cover of F . We claim that adding all unregistered
votes corresponding to S ′, that is, the votes in ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′}, will make p
the unique winner. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by adding all votes
in ΠV ′ to the registered votes. It is clear that p beats p′ and p′′ in E ′. Since there
are exactly 5
3
κ votes with peaks at I(p) and exactly 5
3
κ votes with peaks at I(c3κ)
in E ′, every two candidates from different intervals are tied. Thus, p has Copeland1
score 9α · κ+ 2, p′ has Copeland1 score 9α · κ+ 1 and p′′ has Copeland1 score 9α · κ
in E ′. We now analyze the Copeland1 scores of other candidates in E ′. Due to the
construction and the fact that S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, for each cx there is exactly
one vote in ΠV ′ with preference c2x  c3x  c1x and exactly κ − 1 votes in ΠV ′ with
preference c3x  c1x  c2x. Together with the registered votes, where there are 56κ votes
with preference c1x  c2x  c3x, 56κ votes with preference c2x  c3x  c1x and 23κ votes with
preference c3x  c13  c2x, we know that for each cx, c1x beats c2x, c2x beats c3x and c3x
beats c1x in E ′. As discussed above, each of c1x, c2x and c3x ties any other candidate in E ′,
thus, the Copeland1 scores of c1x, c
2
x and c
3
x are all 9α · κ+ 1, for every 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ. It
is clear now that p becomes the unique winner in E ′.
(⇐:) Let ΠV ′ be a solution of E and S ′ be the subset of S corresponding to ΠV ′ ,
that is, S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠV ′}. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by adding all
votes in ΠV ′ to the registered votes. It is easy to see that ΠV ′ contains exactly κ votes,
since otherwise, each candidate in I(c3κ) would beat every other candidate not in
I(c3κ), and thus at least one of them is a winner in E ′. Moreover, since all unregistered
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votes have their peaks at I(p), every two candidates from different intervals are tied
in the final election E ′. Therefore, p has Copeland1 score 9α · κ + 2. Since p is the
unique winner in the final election E ′, for every cx with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, every candidate in
I(cx) must be beaten by at least one other candidate which is also in I(cx). Therefore,
for every cx ∈ U there is at least one vote pis in ΠV ′ with preference c2x s c3x s c1x
(Assume this is not true. Due to the construction, there will be in total 5
6
κ votes
with preference c1x  c2x  c3x, 56κ votes with preference c2x  c3x  c1x and 53κ votes
with preference c3x  c1x  c2x, implying c3x beats c1x and ties c2x, contradicting with
the fact that there is at least one candidate in I(cx) which beats c
3
x.). The vote pis
corresponds to an s ∈ S ′ with cx ∈ s. Since U contains exactly 3κ elements and due to
the construction every unregistered vote gives exactly three different cx with preference
c2x  c3x  c1x, the union of such subsets s (that is S ′) forms an exact 3-set cover of F .
The NP-hardness reduction for CCAV-Copeland1-NON can be modified from
the above construction by deleting the candidate p′′ from the election.
In the following, we show the NP-hardness for CCDV-Copeland1-UNI from X3C.
For each c ∈ U , let o(c) be the number of sets in S which contain c, and let o¯(c) be the
number of sets in S which do not contain c. We assume that o(c) ≥ 3 and o¯(c) ≥ κ− 1
for all c ∈ U and |S| ≥ κ + 2. For a given instance F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) of
X3C, we construct an instance E for CCDV-Copeland1-UNI restricted to elections with
single-peaked width 3 as follows. The candidate set and the single-peaked partition
are the same as for CCAV-Copeland1-UNI.
Votes: There are 2|S| − κ votes in total. Precisely, we create |S| − κ votes with
peaks at I(p), and |S| votes (corresponding to S) with peaks at I(c3κ). The central
idea is to construct the votes in such way that all deleted votes have peaks at I(c3κ)
whenever E is a yes-instance. Furthermore, after deleting these votes, each candidate
except p, is beaten by at least another candidate which is from the same interval.
We first create the votes corresponding to S. For each s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S,
we create a vote pis with preference s. The peak of the vote pis is at I(c3κ) and
p s p′ s p′′. For every two candidates a ∈ I(cx) and b ∈ I(cy) with x < y, we have
that b s a. With regard to the preference in each I(cx) with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, we set
c2x s c3x s c1x if x ∈ {i, j, k} and set c3x s c1x s c2x otherwise. Thus, there are in total
o(cx) votes with preference c
2
x  c3x  c1x and o¯(cx) votes with preference c3x  c1x  c2x.
We now construct the votes with peaks at I(p). There are |S| − κ such votes in
total, all of which prefer p to p′ to p′′. Since all these votes have their peaks at I(p),
the preference between every two candidates a ∈ I(cx) and b ∈ (cy) with x < y is
a  b. Concerning the preference in each interval I(cx), we set c1x  c2x  c3x in 12 · o(cx)
arbitrary votes. In the remaining votes, we set c2x  c3x  c1x in o¯(cx)− κ many of them
and set c3x  c1x  c2x in the rest. Clearly, |S| − κ− 12 · o(cx)− o¯(cx) + κ = 12 · o(cx).
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In summary, for each cx, there are in total
1
2
· o(cx) votes with preference c1x 
c2x  c3x, |S| − κ votes with preference c2x  c3x  c1x and 12 · o(cx) + o¯(cx) votes with
preference c3x  c1x  c2x. Moreover, all votes prefer p to p′ to p′′.
Number of Deleted Votes: R = κ
Now we come to the correctness.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. We claim
that deleting all votes corresponding to S ′, that is, all votes in ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′},
makes p the unique winner. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by deleting
all votes in ΠV ′ . Since in the final election E ′ the number of votes with peaks at I(p)
is equal to the number of votes with peaks at I(c3κ), and there is no vote with peak
between I(p) and I(c3κ), any two candidates from different intervals are tied. Moreover,
for each cx with 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, c1x beats c2x, c2x beats c3x and c3x beats c1x in E ′ (to see this,
observe that NE ′(c1x, c
2
x)−NE ′(c2x, c1x) = 2, NE ′(c2x, c3x)−NE ′(c3x, c2x) = o(cx)− 2 > 0 and
NE ′(c3x, c
1
x)−NE ′(c1x, c3x) = |S|+ o¯(cx)− 2κ > 0). Thus, each candidate except p has
Copeland1 score at most 9α · κ+ 1 in E ′ (p′′ has Copeland1 score 9α · κ in E ′). Since p
is preferred to p′ and p′′ by all votes, p has Copeland1 score 9α · κ+ 2 in E ′, implying
that p is the unique winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠV ′ is a solution. Let E ′ be the final
election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠV ′ . Observe first that all votes in
ΠV ′ must have their peak at I(c3κ), since otherwise, at least one of I(c3κ) would be
a winner. Let S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠV ′}. We claim that S ′ is an exact 3-set cover of F .
Clearly, ΠV ′ contains exactly κ votes with peaks at I(c3κ), since otherwise, there would
be more votes with peaks at I(c3κ) than votes with peaks at I(p) in E ′, resulting in at
least one of c13κ, c
2
3κ and c
3
3κ being a winner in E ′. Therefore, after deleting all votes in
ΠV ′ , every two candidates from two different intervals must be tied. Moreover, since
p is the unique winner in the final election E ′, every candidate in an interval I(cx)
must be beaten by at least one candidate from the interval I(cx) in E ′. Therefore,
for every cx ∈ U , there is at least one vote, corresponding to an s ∈ S ′ containing cx,
in ΠV ′ having the preference c2x  c3x  c1x (since otherwise, there would be in total
1
2
|o(cx)| votes with preference c1x  c2x  c3x, |S| − κ votes with preference c2x  c3x  c1x
and 1
2
|o(cx)|+ |o¯(cx)| − κ votes with preference c3x  c1x  c2x in E ′, implying that c2x
beats c3x and ties c
1
x). Since U contains exactly 3κ elements and each vote in ΠV ′ gives
exactly three different cx with preference c
2
x  c3x  c1x, S ′ must be an exact 3-set cover
of F .
The proof for CCDV-Copeland1-NON can be modified from the construction for
CCDV-Copeland1-UNI by deleting the candidate p′.
Now, we discuss destructive control by adding/deleting votes for Copelandα.
In contrast to the NP-hardness of constructive control by adding/deleting votes in
Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 when restricted to elections with single-peaked width 3,
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we show that the destructive counterparts can be solved in polynomial time, if the
single-peaked width is bounded by a constant. More precisely, from the parameterized
complexity perspective, we prove that destructive control by adding/deleting votes for
Copelandα with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 are FPT with respect to single-peaked width. Recall that
all these problems are NP-hard in the general case [112].
To present the FPT -algorithm, we first introduce the following lemmas. Intu-
itively, the first lemma states that the closer a candidate outside the median group to
the boundary of the median group is, the greater the Copelandα score it has.
Lemma 3.1. Let G[Cl, Cr] be the median group of an election with respect to the
single-peaked partition (C1, C2, ..., Cω). Let a1 ∈ Cz1 , a2 ∈ Cz2 , b1 ∈ Cx1 , b2 ∈ Cx2 be
four candidates with z2 < z1 ≤ l ≤ r ≤ x1 < x2. Then, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the
Copelandα score of b1 is strictly greater than that of b2, and the Copeland
α score of a1
is strictly greater than that of a2.
Proof. Due to symmetry, we need only to prove the claim for b1 and b2. Recall that in
a Copelandα election, every candidate c is compared with every other candidate. In
each comparison, the candidate c gets 1 point if it beats its rival, and gets α point
if it ties with its rival, otherwise, it gets 0 points. Let C1 be the set of candidates
contained in the intervals on the right-side of Cx1 . Clearly, b2 ∈ C1. Moreover, b1 beats
every candidate b′ in C1, since all votes with peaks at Cr or on the left-side of Cr,
which amount to more than half of the votes, prefer b1 to b
′. Thus, even b2 also beats
every candidate in C1 \ {b2}, the candidates in C1 contribute one more point to b1 than
to b2. Now consider the candidates in C2 = C \ (C1 ∪ Cx1). These candidates are in
intervals on the left-side of Cx1 . Due to the definitions of single-peaked election and
single-peaked partition, for every candidate c ∈ C2, every vote which prefers b2 to c
also prefers b1 to c. Thus, if b2 beats (resp. ties) a candidate c ∈ C2, so does b1 (resp.
b1 beats c or ties c). Thus, the candidates in C2 contribute to b1 at least as the same
points as to b2. Since every candidate in Cx1 beats b2, the lemma follows.
Due to Lemma 3.1, we know that for every candidate c which is not in the median
group, there exists at least one candidate who has a strictly greater Copelandα score
than that of c. This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. All Copelandα winners, for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, are in the median group.
The correctness of the following lemma follows from the fact that the candidates
in every interval are ranked together by every vote.
Lemma 3.3. For every two intervals Cx and Cy. If a candidate in Cx beats a candidate
in Cy, then every candidate in Cx beats every candidate in Cy.
The following lemma is also useful.
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Lemma 3.4. Let E = {C,ΠV} be an election with single-peaked partition P =
(C1, C2, ..., Cω). Let G[Cl, Cr] be the median group. Let Cz1 , Cz2 , Cx1 , Cx2 be four
intervals with z2 < z1 < l ≤ r < x1 < x2. Let Cy be an arbitrary interval in the median
group. If every candidate in Cy beats every candidates in Cz1, then every candidate in
Cy beats every candidate in Cz2. Symmetrically, if every candidate in Cy beats every
candidates in Cx1, then every candidate in Cy beats every candidate in Cx2.
Proof. Due to symmetry, we only need to prove the lemma for Cz1 , Cz2 . Let c be a
candidate in Cy and c
′ be a candidate in Cz1 . Since all of the half votes with peaks on
the right-side of Cl prefer c to c
′, and all votes with peaks at Cz1 or on the left-side of
Cz1 prefer c
′ to c, c beats c′ if and only if there is at least one vote, with peak between
Cr and Cz1 , which prefers c to c
′. Due to the definition of single-peaked partition, such
a vote must also prefer c to every candidate in Cz2 . Therefore, if c beats c
′, c must
also beats every candidate in Cz2 . Due to Lemma 3.3, the lemma is proved.
Recall that every candidate in the median group beats or ties with every candidate
not in the median group. Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 together imply that for every
candidate c in some interval in the median group, there are two integers 1 ≤ z ≤ l
and r ≤ x ≤ ω such that c beats all candidates in ∪i∈[1,z]∪[x,ω]Ci and ties with all the
remaining candidates that are not in the median group.
Theorem 3.5. DCAV-Copelandα-UNI, DCAV-Copelandα-NON, DCDV-Copelandα-
UNI and DCDV-Copelandα-NON are FPT with respect to single-peaked width, for
every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
Proof. Let P = (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be the single-peaked partition, and k be the single-
peaked width. We derive FPT -algorithms for the problems stated in the theorem.
Recall that a Copelandα winner must be included in the median group according to
Lemma 3.2. Thus, to make p not a winner, there are two possibilities:
(1) make p outside the median group; or
(2) make p inside the median group but simultaneously make another candidate
in the median group have a Copelandα score higher (nonunique-winner model) or no
less (unique-winner model) than that of p.
Our algorithms firstly consider the former case. Thus, for all the problems stated
in the theorem, we first calculate the minimum number β of votes to be added or
deleted to make p outside the median group. Clearly, this can be done in polynomial-
time. Moreover, if β ≤ R , we are done. However, if it turns out that β > R , then
we cannot make p outside the median group by modifying at most R votes. In this
case, we consider the latter case of making p in the median group. Precisely, we do
the following.
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First, we enumerate all possible candidates p′ which can prevent p from being the
winner by modifying at most R votes. Then, for each p′, we enumerate all possible
median groups G[Cl, Cr] which can appear by modifying at most R votes; clearly
G[Cl, Cr] must contain the interval Ci containing p and the interval Cj containing
p′. Next, we enumerate all possible combinations of four integers χl, χr, φl, φr with
χl, φl < l and χr, φr > r. Here χl (resp. χr) indicates the right-most interval on the
left-side (resp. the left-most interval on the right-side) of the median group in which
all candidates are beaten by p. Due to Lemma 3.4, p also beats every candidate in the
interval on the left-side (resp. right-side) of Cχl (resp. Cχr). The two integers φl and
φr indicate the similar meaning but with respect to p
′. Finally, we consider all possible
partitions (C1i , C
α
i , C
0
i ) of Ci \ {p}, and all possible partitions (C1j , Cαj , C0j ) of Cj \ {p′}
such that |C1i |+ α(|Cαi |+ |Cj|) + score(p) ≤ |C1j |+ α(|Cαj |+ |Ci|) + score(p′) (for the
unique-winner case) or |C1i |+α(|Cαi |+|Cj|)+score(p) < |C1j |+α(|Cαj |+|Ci|)+score(p′)
(for the nonunique-winner case). Here, score(p) and score(p′) are the Copelandα scores
of p and p′ contributed by the candidates outside the median group. These scores can
be calculated in polynomial time for fixed values of χl, χr, φl, φr, due to Lemma 3.4.
Moreover, C1i , C
α
i , C
0
i (resp. C
1
j , C
α
j , C
0
j ) are the sets of prospective candidates in Ci
(resp. Cj) that p (resp. p′) beats, ties and be beaten in the final election, respectively.
Clearly, if both p and p′ are in the median group, p′ has a higher score (resp. a no less
score) than that of p if and only if |C1i |+ α(|Cαi |+ |Cj|) + score(p) < |C1j |+ α(|Cαj |+
|Ci|)+score(p′) (resp. |C1i |+α(|Cαi |+|Cj|)+score(p) ≤ |C1j |+α(|Cαj |+|Ci|)+score(p′).
This is due to the fact that every two candidates from different intervals in the median
group are tied.
The above enumeration results in at most m5 × (ω
2
)× 32k−2 subinstances, where
m is the number of candidates, ω is the number of intervals, and k is the single-peaked
width. Concretely, in each subinstance, we have, in addition to the original input, also
a candidate p′, two intervals Cl and Cr with l ≤ i, j ≤ r (note: p ∈ Ci, p′ ∈ Cj), four
integers χl, χr, φl, φr, a partition (C
1
i , C
α
i , C
0
i ) of Ci \ {p} and a partition (C1j , Cαj , C0j )
of Cj \ {p′}. We are asked to add/delete at most R votes such that
(1) the median group is G[Cl, Cr];
(2) p beats all candidates in C1i ∪ Cχl ∪ Cχr , ties all candidates in Cαi and be
beaten by all candidates in C0i ; and
(3) p′ beats all candidates in C1j ∪ Cφl ∪ Cφr , ties all candidates in Cαj and be
beaten by all candidates in C0j .
Clearly, the first condition can be easily checked in polynomial time. Thus, all such
subinstances which we cannot make G[Cl, Cr] the median group by adding/deleting at
most R votes are discarded immediately. We focus on the remaining subinstances. To
solve them, we reduce each subinstance to an ILP instance with bounded number of
variables (bounded by a function of the parameter k ). For this purpose, we divide the
modifiable votes into several parts. Recall that modifiable votes refer to unregistered
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votes in the case of control by adding votes, but refer to registered votes in the case of
control by deleting votes. In control by adding votes, we divide the modifiable votes
into two parts: votes with peaks on the left-side of Cl+1; and votes with peaks on the
right-side of Cr−1. Moreover, we distinguish between two cases: l 6= r and l = r. For
control by deleting votes, however, we divide the modifiable votes into three parts:
votes with peaks on the left-side of Ci, votes with peaks at Ci and votes with peaks
on the right-side of Ci. Then, for both the former case and the latter case, each part
is further divided in to many subparts each containing all votes which are consistent
with respect to {p, p′} and Ci∪Cj ∪{a1, a2, b1, b2}, where a1, a2, b1, b2 are any arbitrary
candidates from Cχl , Cχr , Cφl , Cφr , respectively. According to Lemma 3.3, if p (resp. p
′)
beats a1 and a2 (resp. b1 and b2), then p (resp. p′) beats every candidate in Cχl ∪ Cχr
(resp. Cφl ∪ Cφr).
There are at most 2× 2× 32k +2 = 36× 9k subparts for control by adding votes
and at most 54× 9k subparts for control by deleting votes. By assigning each subpart
a variable, we reduce the problems to ILP’s with bounded number of variables, which
can be solved in FPT -time with respect to k . Here, each variable specifies how many
votes from the corresponding subpart are in the solution. The constrictions should
serve the three conditions stated above.
3.4 Maximin Control
In this section, we focus on control problems for Maximin. It is known that con-
structive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes are for Maximin NP-hard in
the general case [110]. Moreover, all these problems are W[1]-hard with respect to
the number of added/deleted votes as the parameter in the general case [184]. Our
main results of this section are summarized in Table 3.3. Even though Maximin
and Copeland1 are two different voting correspondences, our results show that the
complexity of the control problems studied in this section for Maximin behave in the
same way as Copeland1.
The next theorem follows from the facts that
(1) Maximin is weakCondorcet-consistent [44];
(2) there is at least one weak Condorcet winner in every election with single-peaked
width 2; and
(3) the constructive control by adding/deleting votes for (weak) Condorcet are
polynomial-time solvable in elections with single-peaked width 2 (implied by Theo-
rem 3.2).
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Single-peaked width k
k = 2 k = 3 k : parameter
CCAV P NP-hard
CCDV
DCAV P FPT
DCDV
Table 3.3: Complexity of the contructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes for
Maximin. All results shown in the table apply to both the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model. Here, “P” stands for polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 3.6. CCAV-Maximin-UNI, CCAV-Maximin-NON, CCDV-Maximin-UNI
and CCDV-Maximin-NON are polynomial-time solvable in elections with single-peaked
width 2.
Then, we consider elections with single-peaked width 3. The following theorem
shows that the polynomial-time solvability for these constructive control problems do
not hold any more in elections with single-peaked width 3.
Theorem 3.7. CCAV-Maximin-UNI, CCAV-Maximin-NON, CCDV-Maximin-UNI
and CCDV-Maximin-NON are NP-hard in elections with single-peaked width 3.
Proof. We first consider CCAV-Maximin-UNI. Given an instance F = (U =
{c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) of X3C, we construct an instance E of CCAV-Maximin-UNI as
follows.
Candidates: For each cx ∈ U , we create three candidates c1x, c2x, c3x which form
an interval denoted by I(cx). In addition, we have three candidates p, p′ and p′′ which
form an interval denoted by I(p). The distinguished candidate is p.
Single-Peaked Partition: (I(p), I(c1), I(c2), ..., I(c3κ)).
Registered Votes: Let η be an integer with η ≥ 3κ and η ≡ 0 mod 3. We create
2η + 1 registered votes. Precisely, we have
(1) 2
3
· η − κ+ 1 votes defined as
p  p′  p′′  c11  c21  c31 , ..., c13κ  c23κ  c33κ
(2) κ votes defined as
p′  p  p′′  c11  c21  c31 , ..., c13κ  c23κ  c33κ
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(3) 1
3
η votes defined as
p′  p′′  p  c21  c31  c11 , ..., c23κ  c33κ  c13κ
(4) 1
3
η votes defined as
c23κ  c33κ  c13κ , ..., c21  c31  c11  p′  p′′  p
(5) 2
3
η votes defined as
c33κ  c13κ  c23κ , ..., c31  c11  c21  p′′  p  p′
It is easy to verify that p′ is the current unique winner.
Unregistered Votes: For each s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S, we create a vote pis with
preferences and with peak at I(p). Moreover, in the interval I(p), we set p s p′ s p′′.
For every I(cx), we set c
2
x s c3x s c1x if x ∈ {i, j, k}, and set c1x s c2x s c3x otherwise.
Number of Added Votes: R = κ.
In the following, we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Let S ′ be a solution of F . We claim that the set of unregistered votes
corresponding to S ′, that is, ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} form a solution for E . Since S ′ is
an exact 3-set cover, for each I(cx), there is exactly one vote in ΠV ′ with preference
c2x  c3x  c1x and exactly κ − 1 votes with preference c1x  c2x  c3x. Then, it is
easy to calculate that, after adding all votes in ΠV ′ to the registered votes, c1x has
the highest Maximin score 2
3
η + κ among all candidates in I(cx) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 3κ.
Moreover, since all unregistered votes prefer p to p′ to p′′, p has the highest Maximin
score 2
3
η+ κ+ 1 among all candidates in I(p), which is also the highest Maximin score
among all candidates in the final election. Hence, p becomes the unique winner.
(⇐:) Let ΠV ′ be a solution of E , and let E ′ be the final election obtained from
E by adding all votes in ΠV ′ to the registered votes. We claim that the subset S ′
corresponding to ΠV ′ , that is S ′ = {s | pis ∈+ ΠV ′}, is an exact 3-set cover of F .
We first observe that ΠV ′ contains exactly κ votes, since otherwise, p′ would have a
Maximin score no less than that of p in E ′. Since all unregistered votes prefer p to p′ to
p′′, p has a final Maximin score 2
3
η+κ+1 in E ′. Therefore, for every cx ∈ U , there is at
least one vote pis in ΠV ′ with preference c2x s c3x s c1x, since otherwise, c1x would have
a Maximin score no less than that of p in E ′. Since U contains exactly 3κ elements and
every unregistered vote have for three different cx preference c
2
x  c3x  c1x, S ′ must be
an exact 3-set cover.
The reduction for the CCAV-Maximin-NON is the same as the above reduction
with only the difference that we create one less registered vote of the first type.
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Now we study CCDV-Maximin-UNI. Our reduction is again from X3C. However,
in this case, we assume that each element ci ∈ U occurs in exactly three different
3-subsets of S. Therefore, we have that |S| = 3κ. Let F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S) be
an instance of X3C, we construct an instance E of CCDV-Maximin-UNI as follows.
Candidates: For each cx ∈ U , we create three candidates c1x, c2x, c3x which form
an interval denoted by I(cx). In addition, we have the distinguished candidate p which
forms an interval denoted by I(p) = {p}.
Single-Peaked Partition: (I(p), I(c1), I(c2), ..., I(c3κ)).
Votes: We create in total 2|S| − κ votes with |S| of them having peak at the
interval I(c3κ) and |S| − κ having peak at the interval I(p). In particular, we create
the following votes with peak at the interval I(p).
(1) 2 votes defined as
p  c11  c21  c31 , ..., c13κ  c23κ  c33κ
(2) |S| − κ− 3 votes defined as
p  c21  c11  c31 , ..., c23κ  c13κ  c33κ
(3) 1 vote defined as
p  c31  c11  c21 , ..., c33κ  c13κ  c23κ
The votes with peak at the interval I(c3κ) correspond to the subsets in S. In
particular, for each s = {ci, cj, ck} ⊆ S, we create a vote pis with preference s. Since
the peak of the vote is at I(c3κ), for every two candidates a ∈ I(cx) and b ∈ I(cy) with
x < y, we have that b s a. Moreover, p is ranked in the last. With regard to the
preference in each I(cx) for every 1 ≤ x ≤ 3κ, we set c2x  c3x  c1x if x ∈ {i, j, k} and
set c3x  c1x  c2x otherwise.
In summary, for each cx, there are in total 2 votes with preference c
1
x  c2x  c3x,
|S| − κ− 3 votes with preference c2x  c1x  c3x, 3 votes with preference c2x  c3x  c1x
and |S| − 2 votes with preference c3x  c1x  c2x. The comparisons between candidates
in the same interval I(cx) are summarized as follows.
• NE(c1x, c2x) = |S| and NE(c1x, c3x) = |S| − κ− 1.
• NE(c2x, c1x) = |S| − κ and NE(c2x, c3x) = |S| − κ+ 2.
• NE(c3x, c1x) = |S|+ 1 and NE(c3x, c2x) = |S| − 2.
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Now it is easy to verify that c33κ is the current winner.
Number of Deleted Votes: R = κ.
In the following, we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. We claim
that deleting all votes corresponding to S ′, that is, all votes in ΠV ′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′},
makes p the unique winner. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from E by deleting
all votes in ΠV ′ . Since in the final election E ′ the number of votes with peaks at I(p)
is equal to the number of votes with peaks at I(c3κ), and there is no vote with peak
between I(p) and I(c3κ), any two candidates from different intervals are tied, that is
NE ′(a, b) = NE ′(b, a) = |S| − κ, for every two candidates a, b who come from different
intervals. Moreover, since S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, for each cx there is exactly one
s ∈ S ′ with c ∈ S ′, which corresponds to a vote in ΠV ′ with preference c2x  c3x  c1x,
and exactly κ− 1 many 3-subsets s ∈ S ′ with c 6∈ s, which correspond to exactly κ
votes in ΠV ′ with preference c3x  c1x  c2x. According to this, for each candidates in
each I(cx) we have the following facts.
• NE ′(c1x, c2x) = |S| − κ+ 1 and NE ′(c1x, c3x) = |S| − κ− 1.
• NE ′(c2x, c1x) = |S| − κ− 1 and NE ′(c2x, c3x) = |S| − κ+ 1.
• NE ′(c3x, c1x) = |S| − κ+ 1 and NE ′(c3x, c2x) = |S| − κ− 1.
Therefore, all candidate except p have Maximin score |S| − κ − 1 in the final
election E ′. Since none of the |S| − κ votes with peak at I(p) is deleted, we know that
the Maximin score of p is |S| − κ, and thus, p becomes the unique winner in the final
election.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠV ′ is a solution. Let E ′ be the final
election obtained from E by deleting all votes in ΠV ′ . Observe first that none of the
votes in ΠV ′ has peak at I(p), since otherwise, c33κ would be a winner. Therefore, the
votes that are deleted must from the votes corresponding to the 3-subsets in S. Let
S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠV ′}. We claim that S ′ is an exact 3-set cover of F . Clearly, ΠV ′
contains exactly κ votes with peaks at I(c3κ), since otherwise, either c
2
3κ or c
3
3κ would
be a winner in E ′. Therefore, after deleting all votes in ΠV ′ , every two candidates from
two different intervals must be tied, that is NE ′(a, b) = NE ′(b, a) = |S| − κ, for every
two candidates a, b who come from different intervals. Moreover, the Maximin score of
p is |S| − κ. Since p is the unique winner in E ′, for every cx ∈ U and the candidate c2x,
there must be at least one vote pis in ΠV ′ which prefers c2x to c
1
x (this is due to that
NE(c2x, c
1
x) = |S| − κ). Due to the construction, such a vote corresponds to an s ∈ S
with cx ∈ s. Since |S ′| = κ, each s ∈ S ′ is a 3-subset of U and |U | = 3κ, S ′ must be
an exact 3-set cover of F .
The proof for CCDV-Maximin-NON can be modified from the construction for
CCDV-Maximin-UNI by creating one less vote defined as
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p  c11  c21  c31 , ..., c13κ  c23κ  c33κ.
By doing so, the Maximin score of p will be |S| − κ− 1 in the final election. The
correctness argument is similar to the one for CCDV-Maximin-UNI.
From the parameterized point of view, the above theorem implies that the con-
structive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes for Maximin are beyond XP
when we take the single-peaked width as the parameter.
Now we study the destructive control problems for Maximin. Before proceeding
further, we introduce some properties of Maximin elections with bounded single-peaked
width. These properties are also helpful in understanding the behavior of the Maximin
correspondence. The first property is formally stated in Lemma 3.5. In an informal way,
it states that for each candidate c, the closer another candidate c′ lies to c according
to the single-peaked partition, the less is the number of voters who prefer c to c′. For
a positive integer n, let [n] be the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
Lemma 3.5. Let (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be the single-peaked partition of a given election and
c be a candidate in a certain interval Ci. Then, N(c, b1) ≤ N(c, b2) for all b1 ∈ Cx1
and b2 ∈ Cx2 with i < x1 < x2 ≤ ω, and N(c, a1) ≤ N(c, a2) for all a1 ∈ Cz1 and
a2 ∈ Cz2 with 1 ≤ z2 < z1 < i.
Proof. We first prove the first part of the claim. Let b1 and b2 be the two candidates
as stated in the lemma. For all j ∈ [ω], we denote the multiset of votes with peaks
at Cj or on the right-side of Cj by Vrj , and denote the multiset of votes with peaks
at Cj or on the left-side of Cj by V lj. It is obvious that all votes in V li prefer c to
b1 to b2 and all votes in Vrx1 prefer b1 to c. Let Vcb1i,x1 be the multiset of votes with
peaks between Ci and Cx1 and prefer c to b1. Thus, N(c, b1) = |V li |+ |Vcb1i,x1 |. Due to
the definition of single-peaked partition, all votes in Vcb1i,x1 prefer c to b2. Therefore,
N(c, b2) ≥ |V li |+ |Vcb1i,x1 | = N(c, b1).
Due to symmetry, the second part is also correct.
Recall that the Maximin score of a candidate c is equal to N(c, c′) where c′ achieves
the minimum value of N(c, ·). Let c be a candidate from a certain interval Ci. Let
MIN(c) be the set of candidates that achieve the minimum value of N(c, ·); hence,
we have that Maximin(c) = N(c, c′) for every c′ ∈ MIN(c), where Maximin(c)
is the Maximin score of the candidate c. According to Lemma 3.5, we have that
(Ci−1∪Ci∪Ci+1)∩MIN(c) 6= ∅. Therefore, to determine the Maximin score of c, it is
sufficient to consider the election restricted to Ci−1 ∪ Ci ∪ Ci+1 whose size is bounded
by 3k , where k is the single-peaked width. In the following, we introduce another
property which helps to improve the upper bound.
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Lemma 3.6. Let c be a candidate and C ′ be an interval with c 6∈ C ′. Then, N(c, a) =
N(c, b) for every two candidates a, b ∈ C ′.
Proof. Since C ′ is an interval, all votes rank the candidates in C ′ contiguously. There-
fore, each vote either prefers c to all candidates in C ′ or prefers all candidates in C ′ to
c, implying that for every two candidates a, b ∈ C ′, N(c, a) = N(c, b).
According to Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, the Maximin score of a candidate c is determined
by all candidates in the interval including c, together with any two arbitrary candidates
from the two neighbor intervals of the interval including c, one from each. With
Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we arrive at the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let E be an election with single-peaked partition P = (C1, C2, ..., Cω)
and c be a candidate in an interval Ci. Then the Maximin score of c in E , denoted by
MaximinE(c), is
MaximinE(c) = MaximinE|Ci∪{a,b}(c)
Here, a and b are any two arbitrary candidates in Ci−1 and Ci+1, respectively (only b
appears if i = 1 and only a appears if i = ω).
Now we are ready to show the some FPT results.
Theorem 3.8. DCAV-Maximin-UNI, DCAV-Maximin-NON, DCDV-Maximin-UNI
and DCDV-Maximin-NON are FPT with respect to single-peaked width.
Proof. Let P = (C1, C2, ..., Cω) be the single-peaked partition. Based on Lemma 3.7,
we derive FPT -algorithms for the problems stated in the theorem as follows. Let’s
consider the nonunique-winner model first. Let m be the number of candidates.
To make the distinguished candidate p not a winner, we need to make at least one
other candidate p′ have a higher Maximin score than that of p. The algorithms firstly
enumerate all such candidates p′. This results in at most m subinstances, each seeks for
at most R votes addition/deletion to make p′ have a higher Maximin score than that
of p. Let Ci and Cj be the intervals which contain p and p′, respectively. Note that
Ci and Cj could be the same interval. Due to Lemma 3.7, we can limit our attention
to the election restricted to Ci ∪ Cj ∪ {ai, bi, aj, bj}, where az, bz with z ∈ {i, j} are
any two arbitrary candidates in the intervals Cz−1 and Cz+1, respectively. Then, we
can use ILP to solve the problem in FPT -time. To this end, we further enumerate
all possible candidates p¯ ∈ Ci ∪ {ai, bi} \ {p} and p¯′ ∈ Cj ∪ {aj, bj} \ {p′} which are
the prospective candidates that achieve the minimum values of N(p, ·) and N(p′, ·),
respectively. Then we divide the modifiable votes (recall that the modifiable votes refer
to the unregistered votes in the adding votes case, and refer to all votes in the given
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election in the deleting votes case) into at most (2k + 4)! parts each containing all
votes with the same preference over the candidates Ci ∪ Cj ∪ {ai, bi, aj, bj}. Each part
then is assigned a variable x, where the index  indicates the preference of all votes
in this part over all candidates in Ci ∪ Cj ∪ {ai, bi, aj, bj} . For DCAV-Maximin-NON,
the ILP is subject to the following constraints.
(1) for all c ∈ Ci ∪ {ai, bi} \ {p}∑
pc
x +N(p, c)−
∑
pp¯
x −N(p, p¯) ≥ 0
(2) for all c ∈ Cj ∪ {aj, bj} \ {p′}∑
p′c
x +N(p′, c)−
∑
p′p¯′
x −N(p′, p¯′) ≥ 0
(3) In addition, we have the following two restrictions.
∑

x ≤ R∑
p′p¯′
x +N(p′, p¯′)−
∑
pp¯
x −N(p, p¯) > 0
In all above three constraints, the value of N(, ·, ) is counted solely based on the
registered votes. Moreover, (1) is to ensure that p¯ is the candidate in Ci ∪ {ai, bi} that
achieves the minimum value of NE ′(p, ·) in the final election E ′; (2) is to ensure that p¯′
is the candidate in Cj ∪ {aj, bj} that achieves the minimum value of NE ′(p′, ·) in the
final election E ′; and (3) is to ensure that we add at most R votes and the Maximin
score of p′ is strictly greater than that of p in the final election.
For DCDV-Maximin-NON, the ILP subjects to the following constraints.
(1) for all c ∈ Ci ∪ {ai, bi} \ {p}
N(p, c)−
∑
pc
x −N(p, p¯) +
∑
pp¯
x ≥ 0
(2) for all c ∈ Cj ∪ {aj, bj} \ {p′}
N(p′, c)−
∑
p′c
x −N(p′, p¯′) +
∑
p′p¯′
x ≥ 0
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(3) In addition, we have the following two restrictions.
∑

x ≤ R
N(p′, p¯′)−
∑
p′p¯′
x −N(p, p¯) +
∑
pp¯
x > 0
Notice that in DCDV-Maximin-NON, we have only one multiset of votes. The
value of N(, ·, ) is based on all the given votes.
The algorithms for DCAV-Maximin-UNI and DCDV-Maximin-UNI are similar to
DCAV-Maximin-NON and DCDV-Maximin-NON, respectively, with only the difference
that, in both cases, the last inequations are indicated by ≥ other than >.
3.5 A General Framework
In this section, we consider elections containing an odd number of votes. Elections
with an odd number of votes have been studied in different context [44, 113, 201, 233].
In such elections, there is no tie, while comparing two candidates. In addition, several
theorems have been achieved for such elections, for example, see page 5 for May’s
theorem, page 234 for Sen’s theorem and page 239 for Black’s theorem in [233].
Especially, the Black’s theorem implies that the Condorcet winner always exists in
single-peaked elections with odd number of votes. Moreover it must be the top
candidate of the median vote. The following lemma implies that with the odd-votes
elections, the Smith set must be included in the median interval. Observe that if the
number of votes is odd, the median group contains exactly one interval.
Lemma 3.8. For every election with the median group containing only one interval,
the median interval is a superset of the Smith set.
Proof. To check the correctness of the lemma, observe that every candidate in the
median interval beats every other candidate not in the median interval.
Our main contribution of this section is a general theorem which can be used to
derive FPT results for the constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes
problems in odd-votes elections, that is, adding/deleting votes resulting in elections
with odd number of votes.
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Theorem 3.9. For an odd-votes election with a voting correspondence passing the
Smith-IIA criterion, if a constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes
problem is FPT with the number of candidates as parameter, then the same problem
is also FPT with single-peaked width as parameter. This claim holds for both the
unique-winner and the nonunique-winner models.
Proof. We first consider the constructive control. Since there are odd number of votes
in the final election, the median group contains only one interval (the median interval).
Due to Lemma 3.8, all voting correspondences passing the Smith-IIA criterion always
select winners from the median interval. Thus, to solve the problems stated in the
theorem, we have two objectives. One is to make the interval Ci containing the
distinguished candidate p the median interval. The other objective is then to make
p a winner. By the Smith-IIA criterion, we can focus on the election restricted to
Ci, once the first objective has been reached. These observations motivate us to
propose a general reduction rule, which significantly shrinks the size of the candidate
set. The main idea of the reduction rule is to replace the “irrelevant candidates” by
only two candidates x and y, where {x} will be an interval and be placed on the
left-side of Ci, and {y} will also be an interval and be placed on the right-side of Ci
in the single-peaked partition P . The role of the two candidates is to preserve the
information of the peaks of all votes. More precisely, the reduction rule replaces each
vote with a new vote containing only the candidates Ci ∪ {x, y}. In particular, if a
vote has its peak on the left-side (resp. right-side) of Ci, the new vote will have its
peak at {x} (resp. {y}). If the vote has its peak at Ci, the new vote will also have its
peak at Ci. In all three cases, the new vote preserves the preference of the original one
over the candidates in Ci. A formal description of the reduction rule is as follows.
Reduction Rule. Let P = (C1, C2, ..., Ci, ..., Cω) be a single-peaked partition of the
given election E . We do the following operations (for control by adding votes, the
operations should be implemented on both the registered votes and the unregistered
votes) to get a new election E ′.
1. Add two new intervals C0 = {x} and Cω+1 = {y} such that C0 is in the leftmost
position of P and Cω+1 is in the rightmost position of P ;
2. Replace each vote with preference  whose peak is on the left-side (resp. right-
side) of Ci with a new vote with preference ′ such that x ′ Ci ′ y (resp.
y ′ Ci ′ x), where for every two candidates a, b ∈ Ci it holds that a ′ b if
and only if a  b;
3. Replace each vote with preference  whose peak is at Ci with a new vote with
preference ′ such that ( (Ci)) ′ x ′ y, where for every two candidates
a, b ∈ Ci it holds that a ′ b if and only if a  b; and
4. Delete all intervals except Ci, C0 and Cω+1.
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It is clear that the single-peaked width of the resulting election E ′ is bounded by
k . After applying the reduction rule, each instance contains at most k + 2 candidates.
If a control problem can be solved in O(f(m) · |E|O(1)) time for m being the number of
candidates, then it admits an O(f(k ) · |E|O(1))-time algorithm as well. The correctness
of Theorem 3.9 follows.
Now we discuss the destructive case. In this case, we first check whether we can
make the distinguished candidate p not in the median interval by adding/deleting
at most R votes. This can be done in polynomial time. If we can do so, the given
instance is a yes-instance, and we are done. Otherwise, p will be in the median interval.
In this case, we can use the above Reduction Rule to reduce the size of the candidates
to k +2. Clearly, if a control problem can be solved in O(f(m) · |E|O(1)) time for m
being the number of candidates, then it admits an O(f(k ) · |E|O(1))-time algorithm as
well.
Theorem 3.9 requires that the voting correspondence must pass the Smith-IIA
criterion and the considered problems must be FPT with respect to the number of
candidates as the parameter. At first glance, it seems that the conditions, especially
the second one, are very restrictive. However, we show several voting correspondences
which satisfy both conditions.
The following voting correspondences pass the Smith-IIA criterion [227]: Ranked
Pairs, Schulze’s, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Condorcet, Kemeny, and Slater’s. One
can modify a voting correspondence ϕ which does not pass the Smith-IIA criterion to
a new one passing the Smith-IIA criterion by restricting the election to the candidates
in the Smith set. We use ϕ-Smith to denote the new correspondence.
Faliszewski et al. [112] showed that Copelandα satisfy the second condition.
In addition, Hemaspaandra, Lavaee and Menton [148] showed both Ranked pairs
and Schulze’s correspondences satisfy the second condition. Xia[246] and Yang[249]
independently prove that many common voting correspondences, including all the
above ones and many others, satisfy the second condition. Due to these, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. In an odd-votes election, the constructive/desctructive control by
adding/deleting votes problem for both the unique-winner and the nonunique-winner
models are FPT with single-peaked width as parameter for the following voting cor-
respondences: Ranked Pairs, Schulze’s, Copelandα, Kemeny, Slater’s, and ϕ-Smith,
where ϕ can be many voting correspondences such as a positional scoring correspon-
dence, Bucklin’s, Maximin, Nanson’s or Baldwin’s.
We remark that Theorem 3.9 can be extended to control by partition of votes
problems. The definition of the problems can be found in [112].
3.6. Conclusion 89
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied the (parameterized) complexity of control problems in
elections with bounded single-peaked width under the prominent Condorcet, Maximin
and Copelandα voting correspondences. Our main results are summarized in Table 3.1
and Theorem 3.9. In particular, we proved that, with respect to the parameter single-
peaked width, the constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes under
Condorcet, and the destructive control by adding/deleting votes under Maximin and
Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 are FPT . Moreover, we derived a general framework
for identifying FPT control problems under voting correspondences passing the Smith-
IIA criterion. In contrast to the FPT -solvability of the destructive control problems,
we proved that the constructive control by adding/deleting votes for both Copelandα
and Maximin become NP-hard even in elections with a small constant single-peaked
width, implying that these problems cannot be FPT with respect to single-peaked
width. In particular, the constructive control by adding/deleting votes for Maximin
and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 become NP-hard in elections with single-peaked
width 3. In elections with single-peaked 2, the constructive control by adding/deleting
votes problems are polynomial-time solvable for both Maximin and Copeland1, while
remains NP-hard for Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α < 1.
Apart from elections with bounded single-peaked width, many of our results apply
to other restricted elections. In the flowing, we discuss these restricted elections.
3.6.1 Single-Crossing Width
Single-crossing domain was first studied by Mirrelees [198] and Roberts [218]. It has
been widely studied due to its importance in the area of income redistribution, coalition
formation, local public goods and stratification, etc [7, 8, 52, 77, 94]. Intuitively, An
election is single-crossing if there is an order of the voters such that for every pair of
candidates there is a demarcation line such that all voters in each side have the same
preference over these two candidates. The formal definition is as follows.
Single-Crossing. An election E = (C,ΠV) is a single-crossing election if there is
an order L = (pi1, pi2, ..., pin) of the votes ΠV so that for every pair of candidates a, b
there is an x ∈ [n] so that
(1) all votes pii with i ≤ x have the same preference over a and b; and
(2) all votes pii with i > x have the same preferences over a and b.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 3 4 4 4 5 5
2 4 3 5 5 4 4
3 5 5 3 3 3 3
4 1 1 1 1 2 2
5 2 2 2 2 1 1
Figure 3.2: An example of a single-crossing election with five candidates {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and seven votes with preferences 1,2, ...,7, respectively. The left vertical line is the
demarcation for the pair {3, 5}. We can see that all the voters on the left-side of this line
prefer 3 to 5 while all the voters on the right-side of the line prefer 5 to 3. The right vertical
line is the demarcation for the pair {1, 2} and the pair {4, 5}.
An example of a single-crossing election is shown in Figure 3.2.
Single-Crossing Width. The single-crossing width of an election is defined in a
similar way as of single-peaked width. Precisely, the single-crossing width of an election
is the minimum integer k so that the candidates can be grouped into intervals of size at
most k each. Moreover, if we contract every interval the election is single-crossing.
Recently, strategic voting problems in single-crossing elections and elections with
bounded single-crossing width were studied [71, 188]. We remark that all our NP-
hardness results in this chapter apply to elections with small constant single-crossing
width.
Theorem 3.10. CCAV-ϕ-UNI, CCAV-ϕ-NON, CCDV-ϕ-UNI and CCDV-ϕ-NON are
NP-hard in elections with single-crossing width 3, for ϕ being Maximin and Copelandα
for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Moreover, CCAV-Copelandα-UNI, CCAV-Copelandα-NON,
CCDV-Copelandα-UNI and CCDV-Copelandα-NON for every 0 ≤ α < 1 are NP-hard
in elections with single-crossing width 2.
Proof. Check that in all the NP-hardness reductions in this chapter, we create only
two types of votes: the votes with peaks at the left-most interval and the votes with
peak at the right-most interval. After contracting all intervals, the elections constructed
in the reductions are clearly single-crossing.
Magiera and Faliszewski [188] studied control problems in single-crossing elec-
tions recently. They proved that constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting
votes/candidates are polynomial-time solvable for Plurality (1-Approval) and Condorcet
in single-crossing elections. The above theorem complements their results.
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In fact, our reductions apply to further restricted domain: elections with bounded
single-peaked and single-crossing width. Elections that is both single-peaked and
single-crossing (SPSC for short) has been recently studied by Elkind, Faliszewski and
Skowron [95]. The SPSC width of an election is defined as the minimum integer k so
that the candidates can be grouped into intervals, and moreover, if all the intervals
are contracted, the election is an SPSC election. Since the NP-hardness reductions
of the control problems studied in this chapter apply to both elections with bounded
single-peaked width and elections with bounded single-crossing width simultaneously,
the reductions also apply to elections with bounded SPSC width.
3.6.2 Euclidean Elections
Euclidean domain is another well studied restriction on preferences. In this scenario,
both the voters and candidates are mapped to points in a d-dimension Euclidean
space. Moreover, each voter ranks the candidates according to the Euclidean distances
between the candidates and himself. In particular, a candidate with small Euclidean
distance to the voter is ranked higher than a candidate with great Euclidean distance.
It is easy to check that 1-dimension Euclidean elections are SPSC elections [140].
According to this fact, the complexity of strategic voting problems in single-peaked
elections directly apply to 1-dimension Euclidean elections (see [44, 111, 113] for the
results in single-peaked elections). Recently, Elkind, Faliszewski and Skowron [95]
showed that 1-dimension Euclidean domain is a proper subset of SPSC domain by
showing a voting profile which is SPSC but not 1-dimension Euclidean election.
We mark that many of our results apply to d-dimension Euclidean elections. In
the following, we assume that every voter ranks the candidates which have the same
Euclidean distance to himself in his own favor.
Theorem 3.11. CCAV-Copelandα-UNI, CCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCDV-Copelandα-
UNI and CCDV-Copelandα-NON for every 0 ≤ α < 1 are NP-hard in d-dimension
Euclidean elections for every d ≥ 2.
Proof. To check this theorem, recall that in the reduction for CCAV-Copelandα-
UNI, CCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCDV-Copelandα-UNI and CCDV-Copelandα-NON
(in Theorem 3.2), we created only two types of votes: votes with peaks on the left-most
interval and votes with peaks at the right-most interval. Furthermore, each interval
contains only two candidates. Therefore, we can map the votes and candidates in
2-dimension Euclidean space, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Several of our results also apply to 3-dimension Euclidean elections.
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Votes A I(p) I(c1) I(c3κ)
Candidates
Votes B
Figure 3.3: An illustration of how to extend the results in Theorem 3.2 to 2-dimension
Euclidean elections. Here, “Votes A” are all the votes that have peak at the left-most interval
(that is, I(p)), and “Votes B” are all the votes that have peak at the right-most interval (that
is, I(c3κ)). The order of the votes within “Votes A” and “Votes B” is arbitrary. Moreover,
every vote has the same Euclidean distance to both candidates in each interval. Clearly,
every vote in “Votes A” ranks the interval I(p) in the highest position, and ranks every I(ci)
above I(cj) for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3κ. Furthermore, every vote in “Votes B” ranks the interval
I(c3κ) in the highest position, and ranks every I(ci) above I(cj) for all 3κ ≥ i > j ≥ 1.
x
yz
I(p) I(c1) I(c3κ)
Votes A Votes B
Candidates
Figure 3.4: An illustration of how to extend the results in Theorems 3.4 and 3.7 to the
3-dimension Euclidean elections. Here, “Votes A” are all the votes that have peak at the
left-most interval (that is, I(p)), and “Votes B” are all the votes that have peak at the
right-most interval (that is, I(c3κ)). The orders of the votes within “Votes A” and “Votes
B” are arbitrary. All three candidates in the same interval are mapped on a plain which
is perpendicular to the x-axis. Moreover, they are mapped to three vertices which form
a equilateral triangle. Therefore, all three candidates in the same interval have the same
distance to every vote. Clearly, every vote in “Votes A” ranks the interval I(p) in the highest
position, and ranks every I(ci) above I(cj) for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3κ. Furthermore, every vote
in “Votes B” ranks the interval I(c3κ) in the highest position, and ranks every I(ci) above
I(cj) for all 3κ ≥ i > j ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.12. CCAV-Copelandα-UNI, CCAV-Copelandα-NON, CCDV-Copelandα-
UNI, CCDV-Copelandα-NON for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, CCAV-Maximin-UNI, CCAV-
Maximin-NON, CCDV-Maximin-UNI and CCDV-Maximin-NON are NP-hard in
3.6. Conclusion 93
d-dimension Euclidean elections for every d ≥ 3.
Proof. The NP-hardness for Copelandα is from the reductions in Theorem 3.4, and the
NP-hardness for Maximin is from the reductions in Theorem 3.7. Figure 3.4 depicted
how we map the voters and candidates so that the reductions in Theorems 3.4 and 3.7
can apply to the d-dimension Euclidean elections.
We remark in the last that Theorems 3.11 and 3.12 rely on the assumption that
ties are allowed, in the sense that for a voter there might be more than one candidate
which has the same Euclidean distance to himself. Moreover, ties are broken in the
voter’s favor. It is interesting to investigate whether those NP-hardness results stated
in Theorems 3.11 and 3.12 still hold if we discard these two assumptions.

4
Bribery with Restricted
Distances
Bribery is another type of strategic behavior that has been widely studied in COMSOC. In
this setting, an external agent distributes valuable resources (e.g., money, gifts, shopping
cards, politic promises, etc.) to voters, and in return to ask them to recast their votes in his
favor. For the external agent who wants to bribe the voters, the complexity of determining
whether he can reach his goal (e.g., making a given distinguished candidate win or lose
an election) by distributing a limited number of resources is of particular importance. In
many real-world settings, the voters who are bribed do not want to deviate too far from
their original opinions. We take this natural assumption into account in the study of the
bribery problem. In order to measure the similarities between different votes, we adopt
several prominent distance concepts such as the Hamming distance and the Kendall-Tau
distance.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the complexity of the distance restricted bribery problems
under several prominent voting systems.
4.1.1 Motivation
We have studied control behavior in previous chapters where an external agent has
incentives to influence the result of a given election by adding or deleting votes or
candidates. In addition to the control settings, there also exist other circumstances
where an external agent may alter some of the already submitted votes, or the votes
that the voters intend to submit. One example scenario is when a candidate can
attempt to change the voter’s preferences by running a campaign, which may be
targeted at a particular group of voters or in more extreme case where this strategy
involves paying voters to change their votes, or bribing election officials to get access
to already submitted votes in order to modify them.
In this chapter, we study the model in which an external agent attempts in
switching the voter’s preferences in his own favor. The external agent’s capacity is
bounded by a budget constraint. We observe that, while the voter is willing to recast
a new vote persuaded by an external agent, he may nevertheless prefer to submit a
preference that deviates as little as possible from his true preference. Indeed, if voting
is public, he may be worried that switching his preference completely may harm his
reputation, yet he will not be caught out if his final preference is sufficiently similar to
his true preference. We call this model distance restricted bribery. Analogous to the
control problems, we distinguish between the constructive case and the destructive case,
the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model. To quantify the amount of
deviation of the new recast vote and the original vote of a bribed voter, we use two
distance measures. Particularly, we consider what is arguably the most prominent
distances on votes, namely, the Hamming distance (see, e.g., [38, 97, 171, 175, 195] for
interesting discussions of Hamming distance in the context of voting) and Kendall-Tau
distance (see,. e.g., [17, 23, 24, 40] for interesting discussions on Kendall-Tau distance).
The definitions of these two distances are in Section 4.1.2. We obtain a broad range of
results showing that the complexity of bribery depends closely on the settings. Our
results are summarized in Table 4.1.
Related Works. Our model is clearly related to the bribery problems which have
been widely studied in COMSOC. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [107]
introduced the bribery problem, where is to decide whether a distinguished candidate
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can become a winner (constructive) or be prevented from being a winner (destructive)
by recasting at most R (a given integer) votes. In their paper, they also considered
the $bribery where each voter has a price to change its vote. Later Faliszewski [106]
proposed a new notion of bribery, which he called nonuniform bribery where a voter’s
price may depend on the nature of changes she is asked to implement. A similar
notion called mictrobribery was considered in [112]. Elkind, Faliszewski and Slinko [98]
introduced the framework of swap bribery where the briber can ask a voter to perform
a sequence of swaps; each swap changes the relative order of two candidates that
are currently adjacent in this voter’s preference list. Moreover, each swap may have
a different price; and the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps
that it involves. In the same paper [98], the authors also studied the shift bribery
problem, which is a restricted variant of swap bribery. In particular, in the shift bribery
problem, only swaps involving the distinguished candidate are allowed. Parameterized
complexity studies of the swap bribery problem and the shift bribery problem can be
found in [50, 84]. Recently, Pini, Rossi and Venable [208] investigated the complexity
of bribery in voting with soft constraints, where each candidate is an element of
the Cartesian product of the domains of some variables, and agents express their
preferences over the candidate via soft constraints. Mattei et al. [190] studied the
complexity of bribery in CP-nets.
Our study is highly related to Obraztsova and Elkind’s work [205] where a
manipulator aims to make a distinguished candidate win or loss the election by casting
an untruthful vote. Here, the untruthful vote should be as close as to the truthful vote
of the manipulator. They examined this problem for several voting correspondences
with the adoption of three prominent distances, namely, the KT-distance, the footrule
distance, and the maximum displacement distance. Our model differs from theirs in
the following aspects. First, in our settings, at most R voters might be bribed, however,
they considered only one such voter. Second, their problems ask the manipulator to
cast an untruthful vote which is as close as possible to the truthful vote. However, we
mainly focus on the settings where the bribed voters must cast their votes which have
a small constant discrepancy from their original votes.
4.1.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the distance measurements and formal definitions of the
problems concerned in this chapter.
Distance. A distance on a space X is a mapping D : X ×X 7→ R such that:
(1) D(v, u) ≥ 0 for every two v, u ∈ X;
(2) D(v, u) = 0 if and only if v = u;
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(3) D(v, u) = D(u, v) for every v, u ∈ X; and
(4) D(v, u) +D(u,w) ≥ D(v, w) for every three v, u, w ∈ X.
This chapter mainly focuses on distances over votes, i.e., mappings of the form
D : L(C)× L(C) 7→ R, where L(C) is the set of all linear orders over the candidates
in C.
Hamming distance. The Hamming distance, named after Richard Hamming,
is initially defined on strings [144]. In particular, the Hamming distance between two
strings of equal length is the number of positions at which the corresponding symbols
are different. For example, the Hamming distance between the string “a 1 b b” and
the string “a b 1 b” is two since there are two positions (the second and the third
positions) where the symbols are different. In the context of Hamming distance in
this chapter, we regard each vote as a string with each element being (the name of) a
candidate. For example, the vote with preference a  b  c  d will be considered
as the string “a b c d”. Hence, the Hamming distance between every two votes with
preferences 1,2, denoted as DHAM(1,2), is the Hamming distance between the
two strings from the two votes, respectively. In fact, votes (linear orders) over a fixed
set of candidates C can be also considered as permutations over C. Hamming distance
on permutations has been widely studied in the literature [193, 226]. We remark that
any two different permutations (and thus votes defined as linear orders) has Hamming
distance at least two.
Kendall-Tau distance (KT-distance for short). The KT-distance was coined by
Maurice Kendall [165]. In particular, it counts the number of pairwise disagreements
between two linear orders (votes). In a formal way, the KT-distance between two
linear orders 1 and 2 over a set C is defined as follows.
DKT (1,2) = |{(a, b)|a, b ∈ C, a 1 b and b 2 a}|
Equivalently, the KT-distance between two linear orders can be defined as the
minimum number of swaps of adjacent candidates needed to transform one into the
other [22]. In addition, the KT-distance also turns out to be equal to the number
of exchanges needed in a bubble sort (see [6] for an introduction to bubble sort) to
convert one full ranking to the other [104]. Due to this fact, the KT-distance is also
referred to as bubble-sort distance in the literature [35, 61, 104, 105].
Problem Definitions. We mainly study the following problems under different
voting correspondences. In the following, let τ be a voting correspondence and “DIST”
a distance function. In this chapter, “DIST” can be KT-distance and Hamming
distance. For two votes with preferences 1,2 and a distance “DIST”, we say these
two votes are DIST(d )-close if DDIST (1,2) ≤ d .
4.1. Introduction 99
Constructive Distance Restricted Bribery under τ (C-DIST(d )-τ -UNI/NON)
Input: An election (C ∪ {p},ΠV), and two integers R ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0. Here, p is
not the unique winner/a winner under the voting correspondence τ .
Question: Is it possible to make p the unique winner/a winner by replacing
(recasting) at most R votes, under the voting correspondence τ? Here, a vote can
only be replaced with a DIST(d )-close vote.
Destructive Distance Restricted Bribery under τ (D-DIST(d )-τ -UNI/NON)
Input: An election (C ∪ {p},ΠV), and two integers R ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0. Here, p is
the unique winner/a winner under the voting rule τ .
Question: Is it possible to prevent p from being the unique winner/a winner by
replacing (recasting) at most R votes, under the voting correspondence τ? Here, a
vote can only be replaced with a DIST(d )-close vote.
We give either polynomial-time algorithms or NP-hardness reductions for the
above problems. Our hardness proofs in this chapter are reduced from the Xd C
problem which is defined as follows.
Exact d -Set Cover (Xd C)
Input: A universal set U = {c1, c2, ..., cd ·κ} and a collection S =
{s1, s2, ..., sm} of d -subsets of U .
Question: Is there an S ′ ⊆ S such that |S ′| = κ and each ci ∈ U appears
in exactly one set of S ′?
It is clear that when d = 3, we get the X3C problem. In the following, we show
the NP-hardness of the Xd C problem for every d ≥ 4.
Lemma 4.1. Xd C is NP-hard for every constant d ≥ 3.
Proof. It is well known that the X3C problem is NP-hard [138]. In the following, we
show how to reduce from X(d − 1)C to Xd C to prove the NP-hardness of Xd C for
every d ≥ 4.
Let (U, S) be an instance of X(d − 1)C, where U = {c1, c2, ..., c(d−1)·κ} is the
universal set and S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} is the collection of (d − 1)-subsets of U . We
construct an instance (U ′, S ′) of Xd C as follows.
Let W = {1, 2, ..., κ}. Then, we set the universal set of Xd C as U ′ = U ∪W .
Now we construct the subsets in S ′. In particular, for each si ∈ S and each j ∈ W , we
create a d -subset sji = si ∪ {j} in S ′. Therefore, we have in total |S| · κ subsets in S ′.
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Now we show the correctness. Suppose that S¯ is an exact set cover of the instance
(U,X). Let (si1 , si2 , ..., siκ) be any arbitrary but fixed order of S¯. Then it is easy to see
that S¯ ′ = {sjij | j = 1, 2, ..., κ} is an exact d -set cover of (U ′, S ′). The other direction
is analogous.
Since X3C isNP-hard, we can conclude that Xd C isNP-hard for every d ≥ 3.
A different NP-hardness reduction for the X4C problem can be found in [20, 21].
In particular, the reduction in [20, 21] implies that the X4C problem remains NP-hard
even when every element from the universal set occurs in exactly three subsets in the
collection. Recall that under the same restriction, the X3C problem is also NP-hard.
Moreover, in both problems under this restriction, we have that |S| = 3κ.
The two words “promote” and “degrade” are often used inNP-hardness reductions
and description of polynomial-time algorithms with specific meanings in this chapter.
In particular, for a vote pi and a candidate c, promoting the candidate c by ` positions
means recast the vote pi as follows. First, rank c in the (pospi(c)− `)-th position. Then,
rank every candidate c′ with pospi(c) > pospi(c′) ≥ pospi(c)− ` in the (pospi(c′) + 1)-th
position. Finally, rank all the remaining candidates in their original positions. See
Figure 4.1 for an example.
a b c d e f     a e b c d f    
Figure 4.1: This figure shows how to recast a vote by promoting the candidate e by three
positions. The left-hand is the preference of the original vote and the right-hand is the recast
vote after promoting e by three positions.
Degrading the candidate c by ` positions means recast the vote pi as follows.
First, rank c in the (pospi(c) + `)-th position of pi. Then, rank every candidate c
′ with
pospi(c) < pospi(c
′) ≤ pospi(c) + ` in the (pospi(c′)− 1)-th position. Finally, rank all the
remaining candidates in their original positions. See Figure 4.2 for an example.
a b c d e f     a c d b e f    
Figure 4.2: This figure shows how to recast a vote by degrading the candidate b by two
positions. The left-hand is the preference of the original vote and the right-hand is the recast
vote after degrading b by two positions.
It is easy to see that the recast vote obtained from the original vote by promoting
or degrading a candidate by ` positions has KT-distance ` from the original vote.
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4.2 Kendall-Tau Distance Restricted Bribery
In this section, we investigate the bribery problem with KT-distance restrictions. In
the following, we summarize our results in several theorems. We begin with some
polynomial-time solvability results.
Theorem 4.1. All the following problems are polynomial-time solvable: C-KT(d )-
Condorcet-UNI, C-KT(d )-Condorcet-NON for d = 1, 2, D-KT(d )-Borda-UNI,
D-KT(d )-Borda-NON for every possible d , D-KT(d )-Condorcet-UNI, D-KT(d )-
Condorcet-NON for every possible d , D-KT(1)-Maximin-UNI and D-KT(1)-Maximin-
NON.
Proof. We prove this theorem by deriving polynomial-time algorithms for the problems
stated in the theorem. For simplicity, the following algorithms are based on the unique-
winner model. The algorithms for the nonunique-winner model can be easily adapted
from the algorithms for the unique-winner model. In the following, let E = (C∪{p},ΠV)
be the given election, where p is the distinguished candidate. Moreover, let m be the
number of candidates and n the number of votes, that is, m = |C ∪ {p}| and n = |ΠV |.
C-KT(d )-Condorcet-UNI for d = 1, 2. The C-KT(1)-Condorcet-UNI can be
easily solved with the following greedy algorithm: for each candidate c which is not
beaten by p, recast up to R votes (we also adjust the value of R as R := R − x, where
x is the number of votes that are recast for c) which rank c immediately above p by
swapping p and c until p beats c. If p becomes the Condorcet winner after doing so,
return “Yes”; otherwise, return “No”. To solve C-KT(2)-Condorcet-UNI, we reduce
the problem to the Simple b-Edge Cover of Multigraphs problem which is
polynomial-time solvable [180]. The definition of the problem is as follows.
Simple b-Edge Cover of Multigraphs
Input: An undirected multigraph G = (U,E) where U is the set of vertices
and E is the set of edges, a function f : U → Z+ and a positive integer κ.
Question: Does there exist a subset of at most κ edges E ′ ⊆ E such that
every vertex u ∈ U is incidents to at least f(u) edges in E ′?
Now we show how to reduce C-KT(2)-Condorcet-UNI to the Simple b-Edge
Cover of Multigraphs problem. For each candidate c which is not beaten by p,
we create a vertex. For simplicity, we still use c to denote the vertex corresponding
to the candidate c. We define ←−p v for a vote piv where p is not ranked in the top as
follows: if p is not ranked in the top 2 positions in piv, then ←−p v is the set containing
the two candidates which are ranked immediately above p in piv; if p is ranked in
the second-highest position in piv, then
←−p v is the set containing the candidate that
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ranked in the highest position in piv. For example, for a vote piv with preference
a  b  c  p  d,←−p v = {b, c}, while for a vote piu with preference a  p  c  b  d,←−p u = {a}. The edges are created according to the votes.
Precisely, for each vote piv with |←−p v| = 2, if both candidates of ←−p v = {c, c′} are
not beaten by p, we create an edge between c and c′. On the other hand, if only one of
←−p v is not beaten by p, we introduce a new degree-1 vertex adjacent to the vertex in←−p v that is not beaten by p. For each vote piv with |←−p v| = 1, if the candidate in ←−p v is
not beaten by p, we introduce a new degree-1 vertex adjacent to the candidate in ←−p v.
Now we come to the capacities of the vertices. Each vertex corresponding to a
candidate c has a capacity f(c) = (N(c, p)−N(p, c))/2+1 whenever N(c, p)−N(p, c) ≡
0 mod 2, and has a capacity f(c) = (N(c, p) + 1−N(p, c))/2 otherwise. Moreover,
each newly introduced degree-1 vertex has capacity 0. The value of the capacity f(c)
indicates the minimum number of votes which rank c to p, that are needed to be
replaced with votes which rank p above c in order to make p beat c.
Now we get an instance of the Simple b-Edge Cover of Multigraphs
problem which is solvable in polynomial time [180]. Moreover, given a solution E ′
of Simple b-Edge Cover of Multigraphs, we can get a solution for C-KT(2)-
Condorcet in polynomial time. In particular, we recast the votes according to the
edges in E ′: if there is an edge (c, c′) ∈ E ′ where none of {c, c′} is a newly introduced
degree-1 vertex, then we recast the corresponding vote by promoting p by two positions;
if there is an edge (c, c′) ∈ E ′ where one of {c, c′} is a newly introduced degree-1 vertex,
we recast the corresponding vote by promoting p by one position.
D-KT(d )-Condorcet. The algorithm first guesses a candidate p′ which is not
beaten by p in the final election. This leads to at most m subinstances, each determining
whether we can replace at most R votes with R many KT(d )-close new votes so that
p′ is not beaten by p. Now we focus on solving each subinstance. Observe first that we
will not replace any vote which has ranked p′ above p. Moreover, due to the distance
restriction, for a vote that ranks p above p′, if there are more than d − 1 candidates
ranked between them, we will not replace this vote. Let A be the multiset of the votes
which rank p above p′, and where there are no more than d − 1 candidates ranked
between them. Let n′ = |A|. If min{R , n′}+N(p′, p) ≥ n
2
, we terminate the algorithm
and return “Yes”, since we can get a solution by the following way: arbitrarily choose
min{R , n′} votes in A and replace each of them with a new vote obtained from the
original vote by promoting p′ to the position immediately above p. On the other hand,
if min{R , n′}+N(p′, p) < n
2
, we cannot make p′ beat or tie p by replacing at most R
votes; and thus, in this case we discard the current subinstance and proceed to the
next one. If none of the subinstances leads to a “Yes” answer, then return “No”.
D-KT(1)-Maximin: The algorithm first carries out a polynomial number of
guesses. In particular, the algorithm guesses a candidate p′ which prevents p from
being the unique winner, an integer s which plays the role as an upper bound of the
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Maximin score of p in the final election and a lower bound of the Maximin score of p′
in the final election, and a candidate q with N(p, q) ≤ s in the final election. These
lead to at most m2× n subinstances where m is the number of candidates and n is the
number of votes. To make it clear, we give the formal definition of the subproblem.
Sub-D-KT(1)-Maximin
Input: An election E = {C ∪ {p, p′, q},ΠV}, and two integers s and R .
Question: Is there a submultiset ΠT v ΠV of votes such that
(1) ΠT contains at most R votes; and
(2) we can replace every vote piv ∈ ΠT with a new vote obtained from piv by
swapping two consecutively ranked candidates so that N(p, q) ≤ s in the
final election, and the Maximin score of p′ is at least s in the final election?
Now we focus on solving the subproblem. Let Πp be the multiset of votes which
rank p immediately above q. Let A = {c ∈ C | NE(p′, c) < s}. For each c ∈ A, let
Πc v ΠV ∪-- Πp be the multiset of votes that rank c immediately above p′. Clearly,
for every two candidates c, c′ ∈ A, Πc ∩ Πc′ = ∅. Moreover, for every c ∈ A, let
f(c) = s − NE(p′, c). The algorithm works as follows. For each c ∈ A, arbitrarily
choose min{f(c), |Πc|} votes in Πc, and replace each of them with a new vote obtained
from the original vote by swapping c and p′; then, set f(c) := f(c)−min{f(c), |Πc|}
and R := R − min{f(c), |Πc|}. If R < 0 after doing so, we cannot make p′ have a
Maximin score at least s by replaying at most R votes; and thus, the algorithm returns
“No”. Otherwise, let B = {c ∈ A | f(c) > 0}. Then, for each c ∈ B, let Π¯c be the
multiset of votes in Πp that rank c immediately above p
′. If |Π¯c| < f(c), the given
instance is a no-instance (since we cannot make p′ have a Maximin score at least s
in the final election); and thus, we return “No”. Otherwise, we arbitrarily choose
min{f(c), |Π¯c|} votes in Π¯c, and
(1) replace each of them with a new vote obtained from the original vote by
swapping c and p′;
(2) remove them from the multiset Πp; and
(3) set R := R −min{f(c), |Π¯c|}.
Again, if R < 0 after doing so, we return “No”. Otherwise, if min{|Πp|,R } <
NE(p, q)− s, the given instance is a no-instance, and we return “No”. Otherwise, we
return “Yes” since we can get a solution by replacing arbitrary NE(p, q)− s votes in
Πp by new votes obtained from the original votes by swapping p and q.
D-KT(d )-Borda. The algorithm first guesses a candidate p′ which prevents p
from being the unique winner. This leads to at most m subinstances, each determining
whether we can make p′ have a no less score than that of p by replacing at most R
votes with R many KT(d )-close new votes. We focus on the subinstances. It is clear
that for any vote, promoting p′ by one position has the same effect as degrading p by
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one position, in the sense that both cases increase the score gap between p′ and p by
one. Therefore, the algorithm can choose up to R specific votes and replace them with
new votes which are obtained from the original votes by promoting p′ or degrading
p by a total number of at most d positions. Precisely, we first order the votes piv
according to the non-increasing order of posv(p
′)− posv(p). Then, we choose the first
R votes. Then, for every piv of the chosen votes, we replace it with a KT(d )-close
vote obtained from piv by promoting p
′ by h = min{d , posv(p′) − 1} positions, and
degrade p by min{d − h,m− posv(p)} positions. After all these replacements, if p is
no longer the unique winner, then we return “Yes”. Otherwise, we discard the current
subinstance and proceed to the next one. If none of the subinstances leads to a “Yes”
answer, we terminate the algorithm and return “No”. The above algorithm applies to
every natural integer d .
Now we discuss the NP-hardness results. We first investigate the constructive
distance restricted bribery for Borda. We have seen from the above theorem that the
destructive counterpart turned out to be polynomial-time solvable for every possible
values of d . The following theorem shows, however, that the constructive distance
restricted bribery for Borda is NP-hard even when the distance is bounded by a small
constant. Before proceeding further, we define some notations which will be used in
this chapter.
For an order X = (x1, x2, ..., xi) over the set {x1, x2, ..., xi}, we denote by ←−X the
reverse order of X, that is,
←−
X = (xi, ..., x2, x1). For a subset Y ⊆ {x1, x2, ..., xi}, X \Y
is the order obtained from X by deleting all the elements in Y . For example, for
X = (1, 4, 3, 8, 5) and Y = {4, 8}, X \ Y = (1, 3, 5).
For two candidate subsets X and Y and a vote with preference , X  Y means
that every candidate in X is ranked above every candidate in Y in the vote.
Theorem 4.2. C-KT (d )-Borda-UNI and C-KT (d )-Borda-NON are NP-hard, for
every d ≥ 3.
Proof. We first consider C-KT(3)-Borda-NON. The reduction is from X3C. Given an
instance F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}) of X3C, we create an instance
E for C-KT(3)-Borda-NON as follows.
Candidates: For each c ∈ U , we create a corresponding candidate. For con-
venience, we still use c to denote the corresponding candidate. We create 6m − 6
dummy candidates Y = {y1, y2, ..., y6m−6} each of which has considerably less Borda
score than that of any other candidate not in Y . For ease of exposition, we divide the
dummy candidates into subsets Z1, Z2, ..., Zm. To be precise, for each i = 1, 2, ...,m−2,
Zi = {y6i−5, y6i−4, y6i−3, y6i−2, y6i−1, y6i}. Moreover, Zm−1 = {y6m−11, y6m−10, y6m−9}
and Zm = {y6m−8, y6m−7, y6m−6}. Finally, we create a distinguished candidate p. In
summary, the candidate set is U ∪ {p} ∪ Y , where Y = ∪i=1,2,...,mZi.
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Votes: We create 2m + 2 votes in total. In the following, we do not distin-
guish between the terms “set” and “order”. Thus, U is also considered as an order
(c1, c2, ..., c3κ), and every s = {xi, xj, xk} ∈ S is considered as an order (xi, xj, xk) with
i < j < k. In the following votes, the candidates in each Zi are ranked arbitrarily.
For each sj ∈ S with j = 1, 2, ...,m− 2, we create two votes as follows (notation
of the vote: preference of the vote).
pisj : sj  p  Zj  U \ sj  Y \ Zj
pi′sj :
←−−−
U \ sj  Zj  p  ←−sj  Y \ Zj
Note that with the above 2(m− 2) votes, all candidates in U ∪ {p} have the same
Borda score. The following four votes are created according to the last two 3-subsets
sm−1, sm ∈ S.
pism−1 : sm−1  p  Zm ∪ Zm−1  U \ sm−1  Y \ (Zm ∪ Zm−1)
pi′sm−1 :
←−−−−−
U \ sm−1  Zm−1  p  Zm  ←−−sm−1  Y \ (Zm ∪ Zm−1)
pism : sm  p  Zm ∪ Zm−1  U \ sm  Y \ (Zm ∪ Zm−1)
pi′sm :
←−−−−
U \ sm  Zm−1  p  Zm  ←−sm  Y \ (Zm ∪ Zm−1)
With the above two votes and the previously created 2(m− 2) votes, p has exactly
6 more points than every candidate c ∈ U .
Finally, we have two votes defined as follows.
U  Zm  p  Y \ Zm
←−
U  Zm  p  Y \ Zm
With all the 2m+ 2 votes created as above, p has exactly 3κ+ 1 less points than
every candidate c ∈ U .
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ
In the following, let A = {pi′sj | sj ∈ S} and B the set of the last two created
votes. Now we discuss the correctness of the reduction. Let’s first check the score gap
between every two candidates. As discussed above, in the election, all candidates in
U have the same Borda score. Moreover, p has exactly 3κ+ 1 less points than every
c ∈ U . Finally, every dummy candidate y has a considerably smaller Borda score than
every other nondummy candidate.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. Let
ΠS′ = {pisj | sj ∈ S ′} be the multiset of the votes of the first type corresponding to
S ′. Every vote in ΠS′ ranks the three candidates corresponding to a 3-subset sj above
p in pisj . Consider the election E ′ obtained from the original election E by replacing
each pisj ∈+ ΠS′ with a vote obtained from pisj by promoting p to the highest position.
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Precisely, for each pisj ∈ ΠS′ defined as sj  p  Zj  U \ sj  Y \ Zj, we replace
it with a vote defined as p  sj  Zj  U \ sj  Y \ Zj. Clearly, each replacement
increases the score of p by 3, and decreases the score of every candidate in sj by 1.
Since there are exactly κ votes in ΠS′ , the score of p is finally increased by 3κ. Since
S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, for every c ∈ U , there is only one vote in ΠS′ which ranks
c above p. Therefore, all replacements decrease the score of each candidate in U by
1. Since p has exactly 3κ+ 1 less points than every candidate c ∈ U in the original
election E , p has exactly the same score as every candidate c ∈ U in the final election
E ′. Therefore, p becomes a winner in E ′.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠS′ is the multiset of votes which are
replaced. We assume that ΠS′ does not contain any vote in A∪B. This assumption is
sound due to the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. If E is a yes-instance, there must be a solution wherein no vote in A∪B
is replaced.
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that it is always better to replace a vote not
in A ∪B than to replace a vote in A ∪B. Suppose that pi is a vote in A ∪B that is
replaced. Observe that promoting p is always better than degrading candidates in U ,
since promoting p by one position decreases the score gap between every candidate in
U and p by one, while degrading some candidate c ∈ U by one position only decreases
the score gap between c and p by one (sometimes even increases the score gap between
some other candidate c′ ∈ U and p). Moreover, the amount of points that can be
decreased in the score gap between every candidate in U and p by promoting p in pi,
can be also achieved by promoting p in any vote that is not in A ∪B. In fact, since
in every vote in A ∪B there is at least three dummy candidates ranked below some
candidates in U but ranked above p, replacing votes which are not in A∪B can always
do better: replacing a vote pis 6∈ A ∪ B with preference cx  cy  cz  p... (where
s = {cx, cy, cz}) with a vote with preference p  cx  cy  cz... does not only decrease
the score gap between every candidate in U \ s and p by 3, but better yet, decreases
the score gap between every candidate in s and p by 4.
Due to the above analysis, we assume that ΠS′ contains only the votes in {pisj |
sj ∈ S}, where S is the collection of 3-subsets in F . Let S ′ = {sj | pisj ∈ ΠS′} be
the subcollection corresponding to ΠS′ . First observe that for any vote pis ∈ ΠS′ ,
promoting p by three positions is always better than any other combinations: by doing
so, the score gap between every candidate in U and p is decreased by at least 3 (for
candidates in s, the score gaps decrease by 4). Therefore, we can assume that in the
solution, every vote in ΠS′ is replaced with a new vote obtained from the original vote
by promoting p by three positions. Since p has 3κ+ 1 less points than every candidate
in U in the original election E , and we can replace at most κ votes, every candidate in
U must be degraded by one position at least once. This implies that for every c ∈ U ,
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there must be a vote pis ∈ ΠS′ with c ∈ s, further implying that S ′ is an exact 3-set
cover of F .
Now we consider C-KT(3)-Borda-UNI. The reduction is similar to the above one
for C-KT(3)-NON, with the difference in the last created vote. Precisely, we remove
the last vote created in the reduction for C-KT(3)-UNI, and instead, we create a vote
defined as follows.
U  Zm ∪ {y6m−12}  p  Y \ Zm ∪ {y6m−12}.
By ranking the candidate y6m−12 between Zm and p, the score gap between every
candidate in U and p decreases to 3κ, one point less than that in the reduction for
C-KT(3)-Borda-NON. This ensures the correctness.
The NP-hardness of C-KT(d )-Borda-UNI and C-KT(d )-Borda-NON for every
d ≥ 4 can be proved via reductions from Xd C which is NP-hard as shown in
Lemma 4.1. The reductions are analogous to C-KT(3)-Borda-UNI and C-KT(3)-
Borda-NON, respectively (in both reductions, we need to add further 2(d − 3) dummy
candidates to each Zi).
Now we come to Condorcet. The C-KT(d )-Condorcet problem is related to
Dodgson voting. The Dodgson correspondence was introduced by Charles Lutwidge
Dodgson who is better known as Lewis Carroll [80]. In this setting, each candidate
has a Dodgson score which is defined as the minimum number of swaps of adjacent
candidates needed to make the candidate the Condorcet winner. Calculating the
Dodgson score of a candidate is proved NP-hard [145]. Recall that the KT-distance
between two votes is equal to the minimum number of swaps of adjacent candidates
needed to transform one into the other. Therefore, if a candidate can become the
Condorcet winner by recasting at most R votes with respect to KT-distance upper
bound d , then the Dodgson score of the candidate is at most R · d . In Theorem 4.1,
we have shown that both C-KT(1)-Condorcet and C-KT(2)-Condorcet are polynomial-
time solvable. In the following, we show that the polynomial-time solvability does not
hold for C-KT(d )-Condorcet for every d ≥ 3. Recall that in the general case, the
constructive bribery for Condorcet is NP-hard [110, 112].
In the following, we assume that in both the X3C problem and the X4C problem,
each element ci in the universal set occurs in exactly three subsets of the collection
S. This assumption does not change the NP-hardness of both problems [20, 21, 138].
Note that under this assumption, we have n = 3κ in both the X3C problem and the
X4C problem.
Theorem 4.3. C-KT (d )-Condorcet-UNI and C-KT (d )-Condorcet-NON are NP-hard
for every d ≥ 3.
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p cj y1 y2 y3
p - 3κ− 3 3κ
ci 3κ− 2 · · · 6κ− 5
y1 3κ− 5 0 - 3κ− 5
y2 3κ− 5 0 0 - 3κ− 5
y3 3κ− 5 0 0 0 -
Table 4.2: Comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
C-KT(3)-Condorcet-UNI in Theorem 4.3. There are 6κ− 5 votes in total. Entries with ’· · · ’
signifies that the comparison does no affect the correctness of the reduction.
Proof. We first consider C-KT(3)-Condorcet-UNI. The reduction is from the X3C
problem. Given an instance F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {s1, s2, ..., s3κ) of X3C, we
create an instance E for C-KT(3)-Condorcet-UNI as follows:
Candidates: For each c ∈ U , we create a corresponding candidate. For simplicity,
we still use the same notation c to denote this candidate. In addition, we have a
distinguished candidate p and three dummy candidates Y = {y1, y2, y3}.
Votes: For each s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S, we create a vote pis defined as s  p 
U \ s  Y . Here, the candidates in s, in U \ s and in Y are ranked according to
the increasing order of the indices. In addition, we create 3κ − 5 votes defined as
U  Y  p. Here, the candidates in U and in Y are ranked according to the increasing
order of the indices. In total, we have 6κ− 5 votes.
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ.
Now we discuss the correctness. First observe that c1 is the current Condorcet
winner, and no candidate in Y can become the Condorcet winner by replacing at most
κ votes with respect to the distance restriction. The comparisons between every two
candidates are shown in Table 4.2.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. Let
ΠS′ = {pisj | sj ∈ S ′} be the multiset of votes corresponding to S ′. Consider replacing
each vote pis ∈ ΠS′ by another vote which is obtained from pis by promoting p to the
highest position, that is, replacing each vote pis ∈ ΠS′ defined as s  p  U \ s  Y
with a vote defined as p  s  U \ s  Y . Since s is a 3-subset, the KT-distance
between the original vote and the new vote is 3. Since S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, for
every c ∈ U there is exactly one vote in ΠS′ which ranks c above p (and p is ranked
above c after the replacement). Therefore, after κ replacements as discussed above,
for every c ∈ U , there are exactly 3κ− 2 votes ranking p above c, implying that p is
the Condorcet winner in the final election.
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(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠS′ is the multiset of votes which are
replaced. Since |Y | = 3 and each vote can be replaced only with a vote which has
KT-distance at most 3 from it, replacing any of the last 3κ− 5 votes does not help
improving the wining status of p (In other words, replacing a vote in the last 3κ− 5
vote is not helpful for p to beat any candidate in U , since the dummy candidates
in Y are ranked between U and p; and thus, according to the distance restriction, p
cannot be ranked above any candidate in U via a replacement of a vote in the last
3κ − 5 votes.). Therefore, we know that ΠS′ contains only the votes corresponding
to S. Let S ′ = {s ∈ S | pis ∈ ΠS′} be the subcollection of S corresponding to S ′. In
order to make p the Condorcet winner, for every c ∈ U there must be at least one vote,
corresponding to some s with c ∈ s, which is replaced with a vote ranking p above c.
This implies that S ′ is an exact 3-set cover of F .
The above reduction directly applies to C-KT(3)-Condorcet-NON. This is because
that we created an odd number of votes in the above reduction; and thus, ties do
not occur in comparison between every two candidates, implying that the Condorcet
winner and the weak Condorcet winner coincide.
The NP-hardness of C-KT(4)-Condorcet-UNI and C-KT(4)-Condorcet-NON can
be proved via reductions from X4C (exact 4-set cover) which is NP-hard [20, 21]. The
reductions are analogous to C-KT(3)-Condorcet-UNI and C-KT(3)-Condorcet-NON,
respectively (in reductions for C-KT(4)-Condorcet-UNI and C-KT(4)-Condorcet-NON,
we need to create one more dummy candidate y4 and add it to Y ).
The NP-hardness of C-KT(d )-Condorcet-UNI and C-KT(d )-Condorcet-NON for
every d ≥ 5 is implied by the NP-hardness reduction in Theorem 3.2 in [112].
Now we come to Copelandα.
Theorem 4.4. C-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI and C-KT(d )-Copelandα-NON, D-KT(d )-
Copelandα-NON for every d ≥ 3, and D-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI for every d ≥ 5 are
NP-hard for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof. We first consider C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI. The reduction is from the X3C
problem with the restriction that every element of the universal set occurs in exactly
three subsets in the collection. For an instance F = (U = {c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S =
{s1, s2, ..., s3κ}) of X3C where each ci ∈ U occurs in exactly three 3-subsets of S, we
create an instance E for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI as follows.
Candidates: We have |U |+ 8 candidates in total. In particular, for each ci ∈ U ,
we create a candidate. For simplicity, we still use ci to denote this candidate. In
addition, we have 8 candidates p, y, Z = {z1, z2, z3} and Z ′ = {z′1, z′2, z′3}, where p is
the distinguished candidate.
Votes: Let n = |S| = 3κ. We create 2n+ 1 votes in total. In particular, for each
s = {ci, cj, ck} ∈ S, we create one vote pis defined as y  Z ′  s  p  U \ s  Z.
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Here, the candidates in Z,Z ′, s, U \ s are ranked according to the increasing order
of the indices, respectively. In addition, we create n − 2 votes each defined as
U  Z  p  y  Z ′. Finally, we create 3 votes each defined as p  y  Z ′  U  Z.
In the above n + 1 votes, the candidates in U,Z and Z ′ are ranked according to
the increasing order of the indices. It is easy to verify that the candidate y is the
current (unique) winner. The comparisons between every two candidates are shown in
Table 4.3.
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ.
p y ci zi z′i
p - n+ 1 n n+ 3 n+ 1
y n - n+ 3 n+ 3 2n+ 1
ci n+ 1 n− 2 ... 2n+ 1 n− 2
zi n− 2 n− 2 0 ... n− 2
z′i n 0 n+ 3 n+ 3 ...
Table 4.3: The comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction
for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 4.4. The distinguished candidate is p. The current
winner is y. The comparisons corresponding to entries filled with “...” mean that the
comparisons do not play any role in the correctness argument.
Now we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. Let
ΠS′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} be the set of votes corresponding to S ′. Consider the election after
replacing all the votes in ΠS′ in the following way: each vote pis ∈ ΠS′ with s ∈ S ′ is
replaced with a vote defined as y  Z ′  p  s  X \ s  Z. Clearly, the KT-distance
between these two votes is 3. Since S ′ is an exact 3-set cover, for each ci ∈ U there
is exactly one vote pis ∈ ΠS′ with ci ∈ s. Due to the construction, ci is ranked above
p in pis, while ranked below p in the new vote which replaces pis. Therefore, after κ
replacements as discussed above, for every ci ∈ U there are n+ 1 votes which rank p
above ci, implying that p beats every candidate ci ∈ U , further implying that p is the
unique Copelandα winner (holds for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1).
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and ΠS′ is the multiset of votes which are
replaced. Let E ′ be the final election obtained form E by replacing the votes in ΠS′
with κ many new votes (we discuss later what are the new votes). Observe that the
candidate y beats every other candidate except p in E . A deeper observation is that y
still beats those candidates in the final election E ′.
Lemma 4.3. The candidate y beats all the candidates in U ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ in E ′.
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Proof. Clearly, y beats every candidate in Z ′ in the final election E ′ since all votes
rank y above Z ′. Now we consider the candidates in U ∪ Z. Observe first that every
vote in E either ranks y above all candidates in U ∪ Z, or ranks all candidates in
U ∪ Z above y. Moreover, the votes that rank y above all candidates in U ∪ Z are
those that corresponding to S, and the last three created votes. However, in these
votes, the candidates in Z ′ (|Z ′| = 3) are ranked between y and every candidate in
U ∪ Z; thus, we cannot replace a vote which ranks y above a candidate a ∈ U ∪ Z by
a 3-KT-close vote which, however, ranks a above y. Therefore, the votes which rank
y above a candidate a ∈ U ∪ Z will still rank y above a in the final election E ′. The
lemma follows.
Due to the above lemma and the fact that p is the unique winner in the final
election E ′, we know that p beats every other candidate in E ′. Observe that in the
original election E , p is beaten by every candidate in U . Then, due to the distance
restriction, ΠS′ must be from the votes corresponding to S. Let S
′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠS′}
be the subcollection of 3-subsets corresponding to ΠS′ . Since p beats all candidates in
U in the final election E ′ and we can replace at most R = κ votes, for each ci there
must be a vote pis ∈ ΠS′ with ci ∈ s, which is replaced with a new vote obtained from
pis by promoting p by three positions. Since |S| = 3κ, it follows that S ′ must be an
exact 3-set cover.
The above reduction applies to D-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON if we set y as the
distinguished candidate. To check the correctness, observe that the candidate p is
the only candidate which can have a higher score than that of y by replacing at most
κ votes with κ many KT(3)-close votes: due to Lemma 4.3, a candidate which has
a higher score than that of y in the final election has to beat every other candidate.
Since y beats every candidate in U ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ in the final election (due to Lemma 4.3),
no candidate in U ∪ Z ∪ Z ′ can have a higher score than that of y in the final election.
Now we consider C-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON. The above reduction does not apply
here since in C-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON, p does not need to beat every other candidate
in the final election to become a winner (p could also become a winner even there is
no exact 3-set cover). In order to overcome this situation, we introduce a new dummy
candidate y′ which beats p, but is beaten by y in the original election. To this end, we
adopt the votes constructed as above together with the newly introduced candidate
y′. In particular, we rank y′ immediately after y in all the votes corresponding to S
and all the followed n− 2 votes. Moreover, we rank y′ above p in all the three votes
created in the last. The comparisons between every two candidates are summarized in
Table 4.4. Provided with the above votes, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. If p is a winner in the final election, then p is beaten by y′ in the final
election.
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p y y′ ci zi z′i
p - n+ 1 n− 2 n n+ 3 n+ 1
y n - 2n− 2 n+ 3 n+ 3 2n+ 1
y′ n+ 3 3 - n+ 3 n+ 3 2n+ 1
ci n+ 1 n− 2 n− 2 - 2n+ 1 n− 2
zi n− 2 n− 2 n− 2 0 - n− 2
z′i n 0 0 n+ 3 n+ 3 -
Table 4.4: The comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction
for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON in Theorem 4.4. The distinguished candidate is p. The current
winners are y and y′.
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that p becomes a winner, but
is not beaten by y′ in the final election. Then, we have to replace the last three votes
with three new votes obtained from the original votes by swapping the positions of y′
and p. Therefore, at most κ− 3 votes corresponding to S can be replaced, implying
that p would be beaten by at least 9 candidates in U in the final election, contradicting
that p is a winner in the final election.
Due to the above lemma, to make p a winner, p has to beat every candidate in U
in the final election. Then, we can use the argument for C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI to
check the correctness of the reduction.
The NP-hardness of C-KT(4)-Copelandα-UNI, C-KT(4)-Copelandα-NON and
D-KT(4)-Copelandα-NON can be proved via reductions from the X4C problem which
is NP-hard [20, 21]. The reductions are analogous to C-KT(3)-Copelandα-UNI,
C-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON, and D-KT(3)-Copelandα-NON, respectively.
The NP-hardness of C-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI, C-KT(d )-Copelandα-NON, D-
KT(d )-Copelandα-NON and D-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI for every d ≥ 5 is implied by
the NP-hardness reduction in Theorem 3.2 in [112].
We have just examined the NP-hardness of C-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI, C-KT(d )-
Copelandα-NON and D-KT(d )-Copelandα-NON for every d ≥ 3, and D-KT(d )-
Copelandα-UNI for every d ≥ 5, but left the complexity of D-KT(d )-Copelandα-UNI
for d = 3, 4 unexamined. We cannot simply adopt the reductions for C-KT(3)-
Copelandα-NON and C-KT(4)-Copelandα-NON to prove the NP-hardness of D-
KT(4)-Copelandα-UNI and D-KT(4)-Copelandα-UNI, since both candidates y and y′
win the election, and thus, no candidate is valid to be the distinguished candidate.
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Now we investigate the complexity of the distance restricted bribery problem
for Maximin. Before proceeding further, we examine a special kind of Maximin
voting profiles. These profiles will be useful in many of the NP-hardness reductions
concerning Maximin voting. In particular, these voting profiles contain votes which
cyclicly rank the candidates so that the Maximin score of every candidate is at most
dn/me, where n is the number of votes and m is the number of candidates. See the
example below.
Example: Three cyclic voting profiles with four candidates a, b, c, d.
1 : a  b  c  d
1 : b  c  d  a
1 : c  d  a  b
1 : d  a  b  c
2 : a  b  c  d
2 : b  c  d  a
2 : c  d  a  b
2 : d  a  b  c
k : a  b  c  d
k : b  c  d  a
k − 1 : c  d  a  b
k − 1 : d  a  b  c
Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 3
The voting profile 1 contains four votes which cyclicly rank the candidates with
each candidate being ranked in the first position once. It is easy to see that every
candidate has Maximin score one in the voting profile 1. In particular, Min(a) =
{d},Min(b) = {a},Min(c) = {b} and Min(d) = {c}, where for a candidate q
Min(q) = {q′ ∈ C | ∀(q′′ ∈ C)[N(q, q′) ≤ N(q, q′′)]}
is the set of candidates that achieves the minimum value of N(q, ·). That is, for every
candidate q, Min(q) is exactly the candidate which is ranked in the last position in
the vote where q is ranked in the first position. This rule applies to the voting profile 2
and the voting profile 3. The voting profile 2 is obtained from the voting profile 1 by
adding another copy of voting profile 1; thus every candidate is ranked in the first
position twice. It is easy to see that every candidate has Maximin score two in the
voting profile 2. Voting profile 3 contains n = 4k − 2 votes that cyclicly rank the
candidate so that every candidate is either ranked in the first position k times or k− 1
times. It is easy to check that every candidate has Maximin score k = dn
4
e = d4k−2
4
e.
Every cyclic voting profile, as the ones discussed above, with m candidates has
at most m different votes, corresponding to m linear orders over the candidates. We
call these m linear orders the rotate orders of the cyclic voting profile containing m
candidates.
Theorem 4.5. D-KT(d )-Maximin-UNI, D-KT(d )-Maximin-NON, C-KT(d )-
Maximin-UNI and C-KT(d )-Maximin-NON are NP-hard for every d ≥ 4.
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Proof. We first examine D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON. We prove its NP-hardness
by a reduction from the X3C problem. Given an instance F = (U =
{c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {x1, s2, ..., sn}) of X3C, we create an instance E for D-KT(4)-
Maximin-NON as follows. We assume that every ci occurs in exactly three subsets in
S, and thus, n = 3κ.
Candidates: The candidate set is U ∪ {p, q}, where q is the distinguished
candidate.
Votes: We create 2n− 5 votes in total. We first create n votes corresponding to
S. In particular, for each si ∈ S, we create one vote pisi defined as q  s˜i  p  U˜ \ si,
where s˜i and U˜ \ si are specific orders over si and U \ si, respectively, that are defined
as follows. Let Πcyclic be a list of 3κ linear orders over U that rank the candidates in
U cyclicly with respect to the rotate order (c1, c2, ..., c3κ), as discussed above. Let i
be the i-th linear order in Πcyclic. Then, i is defined as
ci i ci+1 i, ...,i c3κ i c1 i c2 i, ...,i ci−1.
Then, s˜i and U˜ \ si are defined as the linear order i restricted to si and U \ si,
respectively. That is, for every two candidates a, b ∈ si (resp. a, b ∈ U \ si), the vote
pisi has preference a  b if and only if a i b.
In addition to the above votes corresponding to S, we create n − 2κ + 1 votes
defined as U  p  q . Finally, we have κ− 3 votes defined as q  U  p, and κ− 3
votes defined as U  p  q . Moreover, the election restricted to U of the last n− 5
votes rank the candidates in U cyclicly with respect to the rotate order (c1, c2, ..., c3κ).
The comparisons between every two candidates are shown in Table 4.5. An example
of the construction is shown below.
Example. Let U = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9} and S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9}, where s1 = {c1, c2, c8}, s2 = {c1, c3, c5}, s3 =
{c1, c2, c9}, s4 = {c2, c5, c7}, s5 = {c3, c4, c9}, s6 = {c4, c5, c6}, s7 = {c3, c4, c7}, s8 =
{c6, c7, c8}, s9 = {c6, c8, c9}. We have that κ = 3 and n = 9.
The votes corresponding to S are defined as follows.
pis1 : q  c1  c2  c8  p  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c9
pis2 : q  c3  c5  c1  p  c2  c4  c6  c7  c8  c9
pis3 : q  c9  c1  c2  p  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8
pis4 : q  c5  c7  c2  p  c4  c6  c8  c9  c1  c3
pis5 : q  c9  c3  c4  p  c5  c6  c7  c8  c1  c2
pis6 : q  c6  c4  c5  p  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  c3
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pis7 : q  c7  c3  c4  p  c8  c9  c1  c2  c5  c6
pis8 : q  c8  c6  c7  p  c9  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5
pis9 : q  c9  c6  c8  p  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c7
The remaining n− 5 = 4 votes are defined as follows.
c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  p  q
c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  p  q
c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  p  q
c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  c3  p  q
In the above election, each candidate ci has Maximin score at most 5. In fact,
this holds for every candidate in U in the constructed E .
Lemma 4.5. Every candidate in U has Maximin score at most 5 in E.
Proof. Due to the definition of Maximin, the Maximin score of a candidate in an
election is no greater than the Maximin score of the candidate in a restricted election
to a subset of candidates including the candidate. Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is
sufficient to consider the election restricted to U . Let ci be any arbitrary candidate
in U . We consider the comparison between ci and ci−1 for every i = 1, 2, ..., 3κ (we
assume that c0 = c3κ). It is easy to see that in the last n− 5 = 3κ− 5 votes, there is
at most one vote that ranks ci above ci−1. Now we consider the votes corresponding to
S. Let Πcyclic be the list of the 3κ linear orders over U as discussed above. In Πcyclic,
there is only one vote which ranks ci above ci−1. Let sx, sy, sz be the 3 subsets in S
that contain ci. Due to the construction of the votes, in the three votes corresponding
to {sx, sy, sz}, the candidate ci is ranked in the top three positions. This gives three
additional votes that potentially rank ci above ci−1. Therefore, there are at most 4
votes which rank ci above ci−1 in the n = 3κ votes corresponding to S. Putting all
together, we know that there are at most 5 votes in total that rank ci above ci−1,
implying that the Maximin score of ci is at most 5. Since ci is arbitrarily chosen, the
lemma follows.
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ.
Now we prove the correctness of the reduction.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. Let
ΠS′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} be the set of votes corresponding to S ′. Consider the final election
obtained from E by replacing the votes in ΠS′ . In particular, each vote pis is replaced
with a vote obtained from pis by promoting p to the first position, that is, the vote
defined as p  q  s  U \s. It is easy to verify that in the final election p has Maximin
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q p cj
q - n+ κ− 3 n+ κ− 3
p n− κ− 2 - n− 3
ci n− κ− 2 n− 2 ≤ 5
Table 4.5: Comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON in Theorem 4.5. The comparisons between ci and cj with i 6= j
should be read as follows: “for every candidate ci ∈ U , there exists one candidate cj ∈ U
such that NE(ci, cj) ≤ 5”.
score n − 2 (Min(p) = U ∪ {q}) and q has Maximin score n − 3 (Min(q) = {p}),
implying that q is no longer a winner.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. As shown in Lemma 4.5, every candidate
in U has Maximin score at most 5. Given that κ is not a constant and n = 3κ, we
know that no candidate in U can have a higher score than that of q by replacing at
most κ votes. Therefore, p is the only candidate which can prevent q from being a
winner. This means that in the final election, p has a higher score than that of q .
Since NE(q , c) = n+ κ− 3 for every candidate c ∈ U ∪ {p}, the Maximin score of q in
the final election must be at least n− 3. Hence, the Maximin score of p in the final
election must be at least n − 2. Since NE(p, q) = n − κ − 2, there must be κ votes
ranking q above p that are replaced with κ new votes ranking p above q . Moreover,
these new votes should be KT(4)-close to their corresponding original votes. Due to
these, we know that the replaced votes must be from the votes corresponding to S.
Let ΠS′ be the replaced votes and S
′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠS′} be the subcollection of 3-subsets
corresponding to ΠS′ . Since for every candidate c ∈ U we have that NE(p, c) = n− 3,
there must be at least one vote ranking p above c that is replaced with a new vote
ranking c above p. Moreover, the new vote should be KT(4)-close to the original vote.
This can only be achieved by replacing a vote pis with c ∈ s with a vote defined as
p  q  s  U \ s. Hence, for every c ∈ U there is at least one vote pis ∈ ΠS′ with
c ∈ s. Since ΠS′ has κ votes and |U | = 3κ, S ′ must be an exact 3-set cover.
Now we consider D-KT(4)-Maximin-UNI. The reduction for D-KT(4)-Maximin-
UNI is similar to the above reduction with the difference that we create one more
vote defined as q  U  p, and create one more vote defined as U  p  q . The
comparisons between every two candidates are shown in Table 4.6.
The reductions for C-KT(4)-Maximin-UNI and C-KT(4)-Maximin-NON are simi-
lar to that for D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON and D-KT(4)-Maximin-UNI, respectively, with
only the difference that in both cases we set p as the distinguished candidate.
TheNP-hardness of D-KT(d )-Maximin-UNI, D-KT(d )-Maximin-NON, C-KT(d )-
Maximin-UNI and C-KT(d )-Maximin-NON for every d ≥ 5 is implied by the NP-
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q p cj
q - n+ κ− 2 n+ κ− 2
p n− κ+ 1 - n− 3
ci n− κ+ 3 n ≤ 5
Table 4.6: Comparison between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
D-KT(4)-Maximin-UNI in Theorem 4.5. The comparison between ci and cj with i 6= j should
be read as follows: “for every candidate ci ∈ U , there exists one candidate cj ∈ U such that
NE(ci, cj) ≤ 5”.
hardness reduction in Theorem 4.6 in [110].
4.3 Hamming Distance Restricted Bribery
In this section, we study bribery problems with Hamming distance restrictions. We
begin with several polynomial-time solvability results.
Theorem 4.6. D-HAM(d )-Condorcet-UNI, D-HAM(d )-Condorcet-NON, D-HAM(d )-
Borda-UNI, and D-HAM(d )-Borda-NON are all polynomial-time solvable, for every
possible integer d .
Proof. We prove the theorem by deriving polynomial-time algorithms for the problems
stated in the above theorem. We only describe the algorithms for the unique-winner
model in detail. The algorithms for the nonunique-winner model are similar. In
the following, let R be the number of votes that can be replaced, and let p be the
distinguished candidate.
D-HAM(d )-Condorcet. We first consider D-HAM(2)-Condorcet. The algo-
rithm first guesses a candidate p′ which is not beaten by p in the final election. This
leads to at most m subinstances, each asking whether we can make p′ not be beaten
by p by replacing at most R votes with R many HAM(2)-close votes. To solve each
subinstance, we need only to arbitrarily choose up to R votes which rank p above p′,
and replace each of them with a new vote obtained from the original vote by swapping
p and p′. After this, if p′ is not beaten by p, the subinstance is a yes-subinstance, and
thus, we return “Yes”; otherwise, the subinstance is a no-subinstance, and thus, we
discard the subinstance and proceed to the next one. If there is no subinstance that
leads to a “Yes” answer, we return “No”. The above algorithm directly applies to
D-HAM(d )-Condorcet for every possible d ≥ 2.
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D-HAM(2)-Borda. The algorithm first guesses a candidate p′ which prevents p
from being the unique-winner in the final election. This leads to at most m subinstances,
each asking whether we can make p′ have an equal or greater Borda score than that
of p by replacing at most R votes with R many HAM(2)-close votes. To solve each
subinstance, we order the votes piv according to the nonincreasing order of
max{posv(p′)− 1,m− posv(p), 2 · (posv(p′)− posv(p))}.
Here, posv(c) is the position of the candidate c in the vote piv and m is the number of
candidates. Let Π be the multiset of the first R votes according to this order. Then,
we replace every vote in Π in the following way. For each piv ∈ Π, if posv(p′) − 1 ≥
m−posv(p) and posv(p′)−1 ≥ 2 · (posv(p′)−posv(p)), then replace piv with a new vote
obtained from piv by swapping p
′ and the first ranked candidate in piv; otherwise, if
m− posv(p) ≥ posv(p′)− 1 and m− posv(p) ≥ 2 · (posv(p′)− posv(p)), replace piv with
a vote obtained from piv by swapping p and the last ranked candidate in piv; finally,
if 2 · (posv(p′) − posv(p)) ≥ posv(p′) − 1 and 2 · (posv(p′) − posv(p)) ≥ m − posv(p),
replace piv with a vote obtained from the original vote by swapping p and p′. After
doing this for every vote in Π, if p′ has an equal or greater Borda score than that
of p, the subinstance is a yes-subinstance, and thus, we return “Yes”; otherwise, the
subinstance is a no-subinstance, and thus, we discard this subinstance and proceed to
the next one. If there is no subinstance that leads to a “Yes” answer, we return “No”.
D-HAM(3)-Borda. The algorithm carries out at most m guesses as in the above
algorithm for D-HAM(2)-Borda. Now we restrict our attention to the subinstances.
We divide the votes into two multisubsets Π1 and Π2, where Π1 includes all votes
that rank p above p′, and Π2 includes all votes that rank p′ above p. Then, we
maintain two Stacks S1 and S2 to store the votes in Π1 and Π2, respectively
i. Precisely,
for each i = 1, 2, the votes piv in Πi are inserted into Si one by one, according to
the nondecreasing order of max{pos(p′) − 1,m − pos(p)} (therefore, a vote piu with
minimum max{posu(p′)−1,m−posu(p)} is at the button and a vote piu with maximin
max{posu(p′)−1,m−posu(p)} is at the top of the stack). Then, we call Algorithm 4.1
to deal with the subinstances. Clearly, the given instance of D-HAM(3)-Borda is a
yes-instance if and only if at least one of the subinstance is a yes-subinstance.
D-HAM(4)-Borda. Similar to the above algorithms for Borda, the algorithm for
D-HAM(4)-Borda first carries out at most m guesses, leading to at most m subinstances.
Now we restrict our attention to these subinstances. For each subinstance, we divide
the votes into two multisubsets Π1 and Π2, where Π1 includes all the votes that rank p
above p′ and Π2 includes all the votes that rank p′ above p. Then, we order the votes in
Π1 according to the nonincreasing order of pos(p
′)− pos(p). Then, we choose the first
iA stack is a collection of objects that are inserted and removed according to the last-in, first-out
(LIFO) principle [139]. The function pop() removes and returns the top element from the stack,
and the function top() returns the top element of the stack, without removing it. We refer
to Chapter 6 of [139] or Chapter 3 of [192] for further discussions on stacks.
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Algorithm 4.1: A procedure to deal with subinstances in the algorithm for D-HAM(3)-
Borda.
1 while R > 0 do
2 Let piv = S1.top();
3 Let piu = S2.top();
4 Let a = max{2 · posv(p′)− posv(p)− 1,m+ posv(p′)− 2posv(p)};
5 Let b = max{posu(p′)− 1,m− posu(p)};
6 if a ≥ b then
7 S1.pop();
8 if 2 · posv(p′)− posv(p)− 1 ≥ m+ posv(p′)− 2posv(p) then
9 replace piv with a vote obtained from piv by first swapping p and p′, and
then swapping p′ and the first ranked candidate;
10 else
11 replace piv with a vote obtained from piv by first swapping p and p′, and
then swapping p and the last ranked candidate;
12 end
13 else
14 S2.pop();
15 if posu(p
′)− 1 ≥ m− posu(p) then
16 replace piu with a vote obtained from piu by swapping p
′ and the first
ranked candidate;
17 else
18 replace piu with a vote obtained from piu by swapping p and the last ranked
candidate;
19 end
20 end
21 R := R − 1;
22 end
23 if p′ has a no less Borda score than that of p then
24 Return “Yes”;
25 else
26 Return “No”;
27 end
up to R votes, and replace each of them with a vote obtained from the original vote
by swapping p′ and the first ranked candidate, and swapping p and the last ranked
candidate. After doing so, if p′ has a no less score than that of p, we return “Yes”.
Otherwise, if p′ has a less score than that of p, we distinguish between two cases. If
|Π1| ≥ R , we return “No” immediately. In the case that |Π1| < R , we order the votes
in Π2 according to the nondecreasing order of pos(p)− pos(p′). Then, we choose the
first R − |Π1| votes, and replace each of them with a vote obtained from the original
vote by swapping p′ and the first ranked candidate, and swapping p with the last
ranked candidate. After doing this, if p′ has a no less score than that of p, we return
“Yes”; otherwise, return we discard the current considered subinstance and proceed to
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the next one. If no subinstance leads to a “Yes” answer, we return “No”.
D-HAM(d )-Borda. The algorithm for D-HAM(d )-Borda with d > 4 is exactly
the same as for D-HAM(4)-Borda.
Now we show our hardness results. We begin with the distance restricted bribery
problem for Copelandα. All NP-hardness in this section is reduced from the X3C
problem. In the following, we assume that in the X3C problem, each element ci in the
universal set occurs in exactly three subsets of the collection S. This assumption does
not change the NP-hardness of the problem [138]. Note that under this assumption,
we have that the size of the collection is |S| = 3κ.
Theorem 4.7. C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI, C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON, D-HAM(2)-
Copelandα-UNI and D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON are NP-hard for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof. We first consider C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI. Given an instance F = (U =
{c1, c2, ..., c3κ}, S = {s1, s2, ..., s3κ}) of X3C, we create an instance E for C-HAM(2)-
Copelandα-UNI as follows.
Candidates: We create 3κ+2 candidates in total. In particular, for each element
ci ∈ U , we create one candidate. For convenience, we still use ci to denote the candidate
corresponding to ci. In addition, we have two candidates p and q with p being the
distinguished candidate.
Votes: For each s ∈ S, we create a vote pis defined as q  U \ s  p  s. In
addition, we create κ − 1 votes defined as p  q  U , and two votes defined as
U  p  q . In total, we have 4κ + 1 votes. The comparisons between every two
candidates are summarized in Table 4.7. It is easy to verify the candidate q beats
every other candidate; and thus, q is the current unique winner.
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ.
q p cj
q - 3κ 4κ− 1
p κ+ 1 - κ+ 2
ci 2 3κ− 1 · · ·
Table 4.7: Comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 4.7. The comparisons between ci and cj for i 6= j do
not play any role in the correctness argument.
Now we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only if E is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and S ′ is an exact 3-set cover. Let
ΠS′ = {pis | s ∈ S ′} be the set of votes corresponding to S ′. Consider the final
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election E ′ obtained from E by replacing every vote pis with a vote obtained from pis
by swapping p and q . More precisely, each pis ∈ ΠS′ defined as q  U \ s  p  s is
replaced with the vote defined as p  U \ s  q  s. Clearly, the Hamming distance
between these two votes is two. Moreover, we have that NE ′(p, q) = 2κ+ 1. Now we
consider the comparison between p and every ci ∈ U . Since S ′ is an exact 3-set cover,
for every ci there are exactly κ− 1 votes pis ∈ ΠS′ with ci 6∈ s. All these votes rank ci
above p in E . However, these votes are replaced with κ− 1 votes which rank p above
ci as discussed above, in the final election E ′. Therefore, for every ci ∈ U , there are
(κ+ 2) + (κ− 1) = 2κ+ 1 votes which rank p above ci, implying that p beats every
ci ∈ U in E ′. Summary all above, p becomes the unique winner in E ′.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let E ′ be the final election obtained from
E by replacing at most κ votes. Since NE(q , ci) = 4κ− 1, we know that q beats every
candidate ci ∈ U in the final election E ′. Due to this, we know that q is beaten by p
in E ′, since otherwise, q would beat every other candidate in the final election E ′, and
thus, remains the unique winner. Moreover, since p is the unique winner in E ′, p must
beat every other candidate in the final election E ′. Since NE(p, q) = κ+ 1, in order to
make p beat q , there has to be κ votes ranking q above p that are replaced by κ new
votes ranking p above q . Due to this, we know that the replaced votes are from the
votes corresponding to S, since any other vote has already ranked p above q . Let ΠS′
be the replaced votes, and Let S ′ = {s | pis ∈ ΠS′} be the subcollection of 3-subsets
corresponding to ΠS′ . As discussed above, p beats every candidate ci ∈ U in E ′. Since
NE(p, ci) = κ+ 2, for every ci ∈ U , there must be at least κ− 1 votes in ΠS′ ranking
ci above p that are replaced by κ− 1 votes ranking p above ci. This happens only if
S ′ is an exact 3-set cover.
Now we consider C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON. The reduction is adapted from the
above one for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI by introducing another dummy candidate y
which beats p but is beaten by q in both the original election and the final election.
This ensures that p can become a winner only if p beats every candidate in U .
Precisely, we create the following votes. For each s ∈ S, we create a vote pis defined as
q  U \ s  y  p  s. In addition, we create κ− 1 votes defined as p  q  U  y,
and two votes defined as U  y  p  q . The comparisons between every two
candidates are summarized in Table 4.8.
Now we consider D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI and D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON.
The reduction for D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON is the same as for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-
UNI with only the difference that we set q as the distinguished candidate. The
correctness argument relies on the fact that no candidate in U can have a higher
score than that of q by replacing at most κ votes (since NE(ci, q) = 2). The reduction
for D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI is similar to the one for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON.
The differences are as follows. First, we set q as the distinguished candidate in the
reduction for D-HAM(2)-Copelandα-UNI. Second, we rank the candidates in U in a
cyclic way (as in the proof for D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON in Theorem 4.5) so that for
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q p cj y
q - 3κ 4κ− 1 4κ− 1
p κ+ 1 - κ+ 2 κ− 1
ci 2 3κ− 1 · · · 4κ+ 1
y 2 3κ+ 2 0 -
Table 4.8: Comparison between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON in Theorem 4.7. The comparisons between ci and cj for i 6= j
do not play any role in the correctness argument.
every candidate ci ∈ U there exists another candidate cj ∈ U with NE(ci, cj) ≤ Ω,
where Ω is a small constant (in fact, Ω ≤ 5). See below for an example. By doing so,
every candidate ci ∈ U is beaten by at least two candidates (q and some cj ∈ U with
NE(ci, cj) ≤ Ω) in the final election E ′. This ensures that the only candidate which
can prevent q from being the unique winner is p. Then, the correctness follows from
the argument for C-HAM(2)-Copelandα-NON.
Example. Let U = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9} and S =
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9}, where s1 = {c1, c2, c8}, s2 = {c1, c3, c5}, s3 =
{c1, c2, c9}, s4 = {c2, c5, c7}, s5 = {c3, c4, c9}, s6 = {c4, c5, c6}, s7 = {c3, c4, c7}, s8 =
{c6, c7, c8}, s9 = {c6, c8, c9}.
The votes corresponding to S are as follows.
pis1 : q  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c9  y  p  c1  c2  c8
pis2 : q  c2  c4  c6  c7  c8  c9  y  p  c3  c5  c1
pis3 : q  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  y  p  c9  c1  c2
pis4 : q  c4  c6  c8  c9  c1  c3  y  p  c5  c7  c2
pis5 : q  c5  c6  c7  c8  c1  c2  y  p  c9  c3  c4
pis6 : q  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  c3  y  p  c6  c4  c5
pis7 : q  c8  c9  c1  c2  c5  c6  y  p  c7  c3  c4
pis8 : q  c9  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  y  p  c8  c6  c7
pis9 : q  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c7  y  p  c9  c6  c8
The following κ− 1 = 2 votes are as follows.
p  q  c1  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  y
p  q  c2  c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  y
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The final two votes are as follows.
c3  c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  y  p  q
c4  c5  c6  c7  c8  c9  c1  c2  c3  y  p  q
Now we study Condorcet.
Theorem 4.8. C-HAM(2)-Condorcet-UNI and C-HAM(2)-Condorcet-NON are NP-
hard.
Proof. The reductions for both problems are exactly the same as for C-HAM(2)-
Copelandα-UNI in Theorem 4.7.
Finally, we consider Maximin. The following theorem summarizes our results.
Theorem 4.9. D-HAM(2)-Maximin-UNI, D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON, C-HAM(2)-
Maximin-UNI and C-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON are NP-hard.
Proof. We first consider D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON. We show the NP-hardness via a
reduction from a variant of Hitting Set problem which is also NP-hard.
Square Hitting Set
Input: A universal set X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} and a collection S =
{s1, s2, ..., sm} of κ-subsets of X.
Question: Is there a subset X ′ ⊆ X of size κ which hits each κ-subset in
S, that is X ′ ∩ si 6= ∅ for every si ∈ S?
The NP-hardness of Square Hitting Set can be reduced from the NP-hard
problem 3-Hitting Set [131]: for each 3-subset introduce κ − 3 new elements to
this 3-subset. Each of these new elements occurs in exactly one 3-subset (of original
instance). We assume that each element x ∈ X occurs in at most 3 subsets in S. This
does not change the NP-hardness of the problem, since the 3-Hitting Set problem
remains NP-hard when each element of the universal set occurs in at most 3 subsets
of the collection.
Given an instance F = (X,S, κ) of Square Hitting Set, we construct an
instance E for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON as follows.
Candidates: We have m+ 2 candidates S ∪ {p, q}, where p is the distinguished
candidate.
Votes: For an x ∈ X, let A(x) be the set of κ-subsets in S which contain x,
that is, A(x) = {s ∈ S | x ∈ s}. We create the votes as follows. For each x ∈ X, we
create a vote pix defined as p  A(x)  q  S \ A(x). In addition, we have n− 2κ+ 1
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votes each defined as S  q  p. Therefore, we have 2n− 2κ+ 1 votes in total. We
remark that among all these votes, we cyclicly changing the order of candidates in S,
as discussed in the proof for D-KT(4)-Maximin-NON in Theorem 4.5, so that each
candidate in S has Maximin score at most d2n−2κ+1
n+2
e + 3 ≤ 5, which is extremely
smaller than the Maximin score of p and q ; and thus, none of the candidates in S
can be a winner. The comparisons between every two candidates are summarized in
Table 4.9. Clearly, p is the current winner.
q p sj
q - n− 2κ+ 1 n− κ
p n - n
si n− κ+ 1 n− 2κ+ 1 5
Table 4.9: Comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON in Theorem 4.9.
Number of Replaced Votes: R = κ.
Now we prove the correctness.
(⇒:) Suppose that F is a yes-instance and X ′ is a hitting set of size κ. Let
ΠX′ = {pix | x ∈ X ′} be the votes corresponding to X ′. Let E ′ be the final election
obtained from E by replacing every vote pix ∈ ΠX′ with a new vote defined as
q  A(x)  p  S \A(x). It is easy to verify that NE ′(p, q) = n−κ; thus, the Maximin
score of p is at most n − κ. Now let’s calculate the Maximin score of q in the final
election E ′. Clearly, NE ′(q , p) = n− κ+ 1. It remains to examine NE ′(q , si) for every
si ∈ S. Since X ′ is a hitting set, for every si there must be at least one x ∈ X ′ with
si ∈ A(x). Therefore, for every si ∈ S, there is at least one vote in ΠX′ ranking si
above q that is replaced with a vote ranking q above si, in the final election E ′. It
follows that NE ′(q , si) ≥ n− κ+ 1 for all si ∈ S. Clearly, p is no longer a winner in
the final election E ′.
(⇐:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let E ′ be the final election wherein p is no
longer a winner. Observe that no candidate si ∈ S can have a higher score than that
of p in E ′, since the candidates in S are ranked cyclicly so that each of them has only a
constant Maximin score. This leaves only the possibility that q has a higher score than
that of p in E ′. Since p has Maximin score n in E , we know that the Maximin score of
p in E ′ is at least n− κ (since we can replace at most κ votes); therefore, the Maximin
score of q in E ′ must be at least n− κ+ 1. Since NE(q , p) = n− 2κ+ 1, there must be
κ votes ranking p above q in E that are replaced with κ votes ranking q above p in
the final election E ′. Due to this, we know that all replaced votes are from the votes
corresponding to X. Let ΠX′ be the replaced votes and X
′ = {x ∈ X | pix ∈ ΠX′}
be the subsets corresponding to ΠX′ . Since NE(q , si) = n− κ for all si ∈ S, we know
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that for every si ∈ S there must be at least one vote pix ∈ ΠX′ with si ∈ A(x) that is
replaced with a vote that ranks q above si. This happens only if X ′ is a hitting set.
The reduction for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-UNI is similar to the above reduction for
D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON with the following differences. First, we twist the Square
Hitting Set problem a bit. In particular, we require that every s ∈ S is a (κ+ 1)-
subset of X other than a κ-subset as in the Square Hitting Set problem defined
above (the question is still to determine whether there is a hitting set of size κ). This
does not change the complexity (the hardness can be reduced from the 3-Hitting set
problem, with similar method as for Square Hitting Set discussed above). Second,
we create one less vote defined as S  q  p. All the remaining parts remain the same.
The comparisons between every two candidates are summarized in Table 4.10.
q p sj
q - n− 2κ n− κ− 1
p n - n
si n− κ+ 1 n− 2κ ≤ 5
Table 4.10: Comparisons between every two candidates in the NP-hardness reduction for
D-HAM(2)-Maximin-UNI in Theorem 4.9. The comparisons between ci and cj with i 6= j do
not play any role in the correctness argument.
Now we consider the constructive case. The reductions for C-HAM(2)-Maximin-
UNI is the same as for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON with the only difference that we set
q as the distinguished candidate. The reduction for C-HAM(2)-Maximin-NON is the
same as for D-HAM(2)-Maximin-UNI with the only difference that we set q as the
distinguished candidate.
4.4 Conclusion
We have studied the complexity of distance restricted bribery problem which differs
from the traditional bribery problem in the sense that the bribed voters only recast
new votes which are “close” to their original votes. In particular, we adopted the
Hamming distance and the KT-distance to measure the closeness between two votes
(linear orders). Our results are summarized in Table 4.1.
There remain several open problems as shown in Table 4.1. Another possible
revenue of research would be to explore these problems from the parameterized
complexity viewpoint. Furthermore, exploring the same problems with respect to
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further distance measurements (see [92, 97, 165] for several distance measurements on
linear orders) is also an interesting direction for future research.

5
Possible Winners in Partial
Tournaments
Partial tournaments play a significant role in many areas linked to our daily life. For
example, in the group stage of the World Cup matches, every pair of the four teams in the
same group play against each other. In each match, the winner gets 3 points and the loser
gets 0 points. If they tie, both get 1 point. Equivalently, we can say that the winner gets
2 points, the loser −1 point, and both get 0 points if they tie. The two teams with the
highest and the second highest scores are qualified to compete in the second stage and
the remaining two teams are knocked out. This procedure can be represented by a partial
tournament: if team A wins in the compete with team B, introduce an arc from A to B
and label the arc with (2,−1), meaning that A gets 2 points and B gets −1 point in the
match between A and B. The score of a team is the sum of the first components of the
labels to the arcs leaving from the team, plus the sum of the second components of the
labels to the arcs arriving at the team.
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5.1 Introduction
A tournament can be expressed as a directed graph where between every pair of vertices
there is exactly one arc (for readers who are unfamiliar with directed graphs and
tournaments, we refer to the textbook by Bang-Jensen and Gutin [15]). Tournaments
play a significant role in voting systems due to their nice expression ability in many
winner determination problems. For example, tournaments can perfectly illustrate the
Condorcet winner determination problem (when the number of voters is odd, or more
generally when there is no tie in comparisons between every two candidates): create a
vertex for each candidate and add an arc (v, u) from the vertex v to the vertex u if
more than half of the voters prefer v to u. Then, the Condorcet winner is the candidate
who has an arc to every other candidate. Several other winner determination methods
are also based on tournaments, such as Banks, Slater, and Schwartz winners [48, 153].
However, in practical settings, we might not be able to access the full information of
an election to build the tournament. For example, the number of candidates is too
huge to give a full preference at once, or consider an online voting where in each time
only part of the votes is submitted. We refer to [170] for more detailed discussion.
In these cases, a partial tournament may be a useful tool, and thus, the problems of
deciding which candidates have positive possibility to win the election should be of
particular importance (A partial tournament is a tournament with some arcs missing).
Partial tournaments also appear in settings where ties occur in pairwise comparisons
between candidates. For example, we have an election to select the Condorcet winner.
If the number of voters is even, then, it is possible that for two candidates v and u,
exactly half of the voters prefer v to u and the others prefer u to v.
Tournament solutions have wide applications in decision-making problems and in
social choice area, and have received considerable attention recently [19, 42, 43, 46, 91,
200, 228]. Precisely, a tournament solution maps a tournament to a non-empty set of
vertices in the tournament. We refer to Chapter 3 of [47] for a survey of tournament
solutions. Banks set and Uncovered set are two of the most important tournament
solutions which have been extensively studied from the viewpoints of game theory,
economics, computational complexity, etc [45, 91, 132, 197]. Banks set is named by its
introducer Banks [16]. Given a tournament, a candidate (a vertex in the tournament)
v is a Banks winner, if there is a maximal transitive subtournament with v being the
0-indegree vertex. Here, “transitive” means that for every three vertices v, u, w in a
tournament D, the existence of arcs (v, u) and (u,w) in D implies that (v, w) is in
D. The Banks set then contains all Banks winners. Clearly, if the Condorcet winner
exists, then the Banks set contains exactly the Condorcet winner. The Uncovered set
of a tournament is a maximal subset C of candidates such that no candidate outside
C dominates a candidate in C. Here, a candidate v dominates a candidate u if all
out-neighbors of u are also out-neighbors of v. Thus, an Uncovered set includes exactly
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all vertices each of which can reach any other vertex in no more than two steps (a
precise definition is in Section 5.1.2). The vertices in an Uncovered set are called
kings from the viewpoint of graph theory. It is well-known that every tournament
contains at least one king [174]. Moreover, if the Condorcet winner exists, then the
Uncovered set contains only the Condorcet winner. It is a folklore that Banks set is
a subset of Uncovered set [115]. Nevertheless, Uncovered set has some advantages
compared with Banks set. For example, determining whether a candidate is a Banks
winner is NP-hard [242], while computing the Uncovered set is solvable in polynomial
time [153]. Selecting the elements from the Uncovered set as the winners of the given
tournament has been independently suggested by Fishburn [124] and Miller [196].
5.1.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we study some parameterized problems related to Uncovered set and
Banks set on partial tournaments. We first study the possible winners of Uncovered set
problem [12]: given a partial tournament and a subset X of vertices, we are seeking for
a completion of D such that all vertices in X become kings, or equivalently, all vertices
in X are in the Uncovered set. For convenience, in the following we use the terminology
“kings” instead of “Uncovered set”. We study the problem with the size of X as the
parameter. The motivation is based on the observation that in practical settings,
one is mostly interested in making few vertices, which correspond to candidates, to
become winners. We prove that this problem is in XP; thus, when the size of X is
bounded by a constant, it can be solved in polynomial time. In addition, we study
two variants of the problem where we are asked to make all vertices of X kings by
modifying few number of arcs. We study two kinds of modifications: adding arcs and
reversing arcs. In the “adding arcs” case we are allowed to add at most R arcs to the
partial tournament, while in the “reversing arcs” case we are allowed to reverse at
most R arcs in the partial tournament. For both problems, R is the parameter. These
two parameterized variants could illustrate a bribery strategic behavior. For example,
consider a politician in a political election who wants to make one of his accomplices
win the election. Then, the arc reversal and arc addition problems illustrate the case
where the politician has limited money and to bribe voters to change the pairwise
compared relationship between every two candidates needs a cost. We prove that,
somewhat surprisingly, both variants are W[2]-hard, even when X contains only a
single vertex. Furthermore, our W[2]-hardness proof for the “reversing arcs” case
applies to the special case where the input is a tournament and X contains only a
single vertex. These results imply that the problems of finding the minimum number
of arcs which are needed to add (resp. to reverse) to make all vertices of X kings
are beyond XP, when consider the size of X as the parameter. Finally, we study a
possible winner problem related to Banks set on partial tournaments, where we are
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Problems Parameterized Complexity Evidence
Pwu XP Thm. 5.1
Pwu-Add W [2]-h even when |X| = 1 Thm. 5.2
Pwu-Reverse W [2]-h even on tournaments and with |X| = 1 Thm. 5.3
Tw W [2]-h Thm. 5.4
Tw-Indegree W [1]-h Thm. 5.5
Tw-Outdegree FPT but no polynomial kernel unless PH = ∑3P Thm. 5.6
Table 5.1: A summary of our results concerning possible winner(s) problems in partial
tournaments. Here, “W[2]-h” stands for “W[2]-hard” and “W[1]-h” stands for “W[1]-hard”.
Moreover, “Thm. #” means that the corresponding result is from Theorem #. The precise
definitions of the problems can be found in Section 5.1.2.
given a partial tournament D and a distinguished vertex p, and asked whether D has a
maximal transitive subtournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex. This problem is
a natural generalization of Banks winner to partial tournaments. Here we study three
parameterizations. The first parameter we study is the size of the subtournament we
are looking for. We prove that this parameter leads to a W [2]-hardness result. Then,
we study the parameter defined as the number of candidates who defeat p. We show
that the problem is W[1]-hard with respect to this parameter. Finally, we consider
the Copeland0 score of p (the number of candidates defeated by p) as the parameter.
Different from the previous results, we show that the problem with the Copeland0
score of p as the parameter is FPT . However, we prove that the problem does not
have a polynomial kernel unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level.
Our main results of this chapter are summarized in Table 5.1.
5.1.2 Preliminaries
A directed graph D is a pair (V,A) where V is the set of vertices and A is the set
of arcs. An arc from a vertex v to a vertex u is denoted by (v, u). We say v is
the tail of (v, u) and u is the head of (v, u). For simplicity, we also use A(D) and
V (D) to denote the set of arcs and the set of vertices of D, respectively. For a
vertex v, we use N−D(v) and N
+
D(v) to denote the set of its in-neighbors and the set
of its out-neighbors in D, respectively, that is, N−D(v) = {u | (u, v) ∈ A(D)} and
N+D(v) = {u | (v, u) ∈ A(D)}. We drop the index D if it is clear from context. The
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in-degree and out-degree of v, denoted by d−(v) and d+(v), are the sizes of N−(v)
and N+(v), respectively. Meanwhile, we say that v is a d−(v)-indegree vertex or a
d+(v)-outdegree vertex. The subgraph induced by a subset S ⊆ V (D), denoted by
D[S], is D[S] = (S, {(u, v) | u ∈ S, v ∈ S, (u, v) ∈ A(D)}).
A partial tournament is a directed graph such that |{(v, u), (u, v)} ∩ A(D)| ≤ 1
for all v, u ∈ V and (v, v) 6∈ A(D) for all v ∈ V . If there is no arc between two
vertices v and u in D, then we call (v, u) and (u, v) missing arcs. A tournament is a
partial tournament without missing arcs. A tournament D is a completion of a partial
tournament D′ if V (D) = V (D′) and A(D′) ⊆ A(D).
A tournament D is transitive if there is an order (v1, v2, ..., vn) of V (D) such that
there is no arc (vj, vi) with j > i (or, equivalently, for every three vertices v, u, w,
(v, u) ∈ A(D) and (u,w) ∈ A(D) implies (v, w) ∈ A(D)). Clearly, there is a unique
0-indegree vertex in every transitive tournament. For a partial tournament and a
subset S ⊆ V (D), we say D[S] is a maximal transitive subtournament of D if D[S]
induces a transitive tournament and no other vertices outside S can be added to S to
form a bigger induced transitive tournament.
For two vertices v and u, we say v can reach u if (v, u) ∈ A(D) or there is a
w ∈ V (D) \ {v, u} with (v, w) ∈ A(D) and (w, u) ∈ A(D). In the former case we say
v reaches u directly, while in the latter case we say that v reaches u by (or through) w.
A king in a directed graph is a vertex which can reach all other vertices. For a subset
X ⊆ V (D) and a vertex v ∈ V (D), v is a serf with respect to X if v can be reached by
all vertices in X \ {v}.
In the following, when we say “adding an arc”, we mean to add an arc between two
vertices which have no arc between them in advance. Thus, adding an arc to a partial
tournament still results in a partial tournament. Reversing an arc (v, u) ∈ A(D) is
the operation that firstly deletes (v, u) from D, and then adds a new arc (u, v) to D.
The parameterized problems studied in this chapter are defined as follows.
Possible Winners of Uncovered Set (Pwu)
Input: A partial tournament D = (V,A) and a subset X ⊆ V .
Parameter: |X|.
Question: Is there a completion of D such that all vertices in X are kings?
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Pwu-Add (resp. Pwu-Reverse)
Input: A partial tournament D = (V,A) and a subset X ⊆ V .
Parameter: A positive integer R .
Question: Can we add (resp. reverse) at most R arcs such that all vertices in X
are kings?
Transitive Winner on Partial Tournaments (Tw)
Input: A partial tournament D = (V,A) and a vertex p ∈ V .
Parameter: A positive integer R .
Question: Is there a subset S ⊆ V of size R such that D[S] is a maximal transitive
tournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex?
Tw-Indegree (resp. Tw-Outdegree)
Input: A partial tournament D = (V,A) and a vertex p ∈ V .
Parameter: |N−(p)| (resp. |N+(p)|).
Question: Is there a subset S ⊆ V such that D[S] is a maximal transitive tourna-
ment with p being the 0-indegree vertex?
5.1.3 Related Works
Aziz et al. [12] studied possible and necessary winner(s) problems in partial tour-
naments for diverse tournament solution concepts. They mainly considered three
topics: deciding whether a given candidate is a possible (resp. a necessary) winner,
and deciding whether a given subset of candidates equals the set of winners in some
completion. For the possible winners of Uncovered set (Pwu)i defined as above, they
proved that this problem is NP-hard by a reduction from the satisfiability problem
(SAT). In contrast, the problems of deciding whether a given candidate is a possible
winner or a necessary winner for Uncovered set are both polynomial-time solvable [12].
Moreover, computing the Uncovered set of a partial tournament is polynomial-time
solvable [153].
As for the problems related to Banks set, in spite of the polynomial-time solvability
of computing a Banks winner, deciding whether a distinguished candidate is a Banks
iThe authors use PSWUC to denote the problem in [12].
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winner is NP-hard [152, 242]. The latter problem is also related to the Dual
Directed Feedback Vertex Set (Dual-Dfvs) problem [215]. In Directed
Feedback Vertex Set (Dfvs) [215], we are given a directed graph D and a positive
integer parameter κ, and asked to decide whether there is a subset of vertices of size κ
whose removal results in a directed graph without a cycle. In Dual-Dfvs, we are
given a directed graph and a positive integer parameter κ, and asked whether there is
a subgraph of size κ containing no cycle. Dfvs has been proved FPT [65] over a long
time of studying. In particular, when restricted to tournament, Dfvs has an O(κ3)
kernel [82]. By a dichotomy theorem from [216], Dual-Dfvs is W [1]-hard. However,
when restricted to tournaments this problem is FPT [215]. It is well-known that a
tournament contains no cycle if and only if it is transitive. These problems are also
related to Slater set problems, where the main task is to reverse minimum number
of arcs so that a given tournament become transitive. We refer to [153] for detailed
complexity results about problems on Slater set.
5.2 Uncovered Set in Partial Tournaments
It is easy to see that all problems except Pwu defined above are in XP : try all
possibilities of selecting a subset of size R in V (D), A(D) or {(v, u) | (v, u) 6∈ A(D)},
where R is the parameter of the corresponding problem. All these algorithms run in
O(|D|2R ) time, where |D| is the size of the given partial tournament and R is the
related parameter.
In the following, we show that Pwu is also in XP .
Theorem 5.1. Pwu is in XP.
Proof. We prove the theorem by giving an XP-algorithm. The following lemma is
useful. Let E = (D = (V,A), X) be an instance of Pwu.
Lemma 5.1. Let v ∈ X be a serf with respect to X in D and E ′ = (D′ = (V,A′), X)
be a new instance with A′ = A ∪ {(v, u) | {(v, u), (u, v)} ∩ A = ∅, u ∈ V \X}, then E
is a yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a yes-instance.
Proof. It is clear that if E ′ is a yes-instance, then E must be a yes-instance. To prove
the other direction, note that adding an arc from some vertex u ∈ V \X to v is to
make v reachable by some vertex w ∈ X \ {v} through u. However, since v is already
a serf with respect to X, such an arc addition is then unnecessary. However, adding
the arc (v, u) for u ∈ V \X to the partial tournament would make v reach further
vertices.
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Our algorithm first tries all possibilities of completions of D[X]. Clearly, there
can be at most 2|X|·(|X|−1)/2 such possibilities. In each of the completions, there may
have some pairs (u,w) with (u,w) ∈ A(D[X]) such that w does not reach u. For
all these pairs, we further try all possibilities of making w reach u by some vertex
v ∈ V \ X (thus, there are at most |V \ X| possibilities for each pair, and in total
at most |V \X||X|·(|X|−1)/2 possibilities for all pairs), by adding one or two new arcs
between {w, u} and v. Meanwhile, if there is no chance to make w reach u, then
we give up the possibility. Clearly, if the given instance is a yes-instance, then at
least one of the possibilities leads to a “Yes” answer. We have in total at most
2|X|·(|X|−1)/2 · |V \X||X|·(|X|−1)/2 possibilities to check. Now, in each case, D[X] induces
a tournament and every vertex v ∈ X is a serf with respect to X. Then, due to
Lemma 5.1, we can safely add all missing arcs between X and V \X with tails in X
and heads in V \X. It remains to add arcs between vertices in V \X to make the
vertices in X kings. For convenience, let’s give a formal definition of the remaining
part first.
PWU
Input: A partial tournament D = (V,A) and a subset X ⊆ V such that
D[X] induces a tournament, every vertex v ∈ X is a serf with respect
to X in D and there is no missing arcs between X and V \ X, that is,
{(v, u), (u, v)} ∩ A 6= ∅ for all v ∈ X and all u ∈ V \X.
Question: Is there a completion of D such that all vertices in X are kings?
In the following, we prove that PWU is solvable in polynomial time. We begin
with a useful observation.
Observation. Let v and u be two vertices in V \X with missing arcs between them.
If there is a vertex x ∈ X such that x can reach v directly but x cannot reach u, then
every yes-instance has a solution containing the arc (v, u).
The observation is correct. The reasons are as follows. First observe that adding
an arc (v′, u′) between v′, u′ ∈ V \X to the partial tournament is to make some vertex
w ∈ X reach u′ by v′. Since x cannot reach u, all vertices in X which can directly
reach u must also directly reach x. Therefore, no vertex in X needs an arc from u to
v to reach v; since all such vertices have already reached v by x. Thus, adding (v, u)
is the optimal choice.
Based on the above observation, we can solve PWU in polynomial time with
Algorithm 5.1.
In summary, Pwu is in XP ; since there are at most 2|X|·(|X|−1)/2 ·|V \X||X|·(|X|−1)/2
instances of PWU and PWU can be solved in polynomial time.
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Algorithm 5.1: A polynomial-time algorithm for PWU
1 forall the vertices x ∈ X do
2 Let Vx = {v ∈ V \X | (x, v) ∈ A(D)} be the set of vertices that x can reach
directly;
3 Let
Vx¯ = {v ∈ V \X | (v, x) ∈ A(D), @y ∈ V with (x, y) ∈ A(D) and (y, v) ∈ A(D)}
be the set of vertices that x cannot reach;
4 if Vx = ∅ and Vx¯ 6= ∅ then
5 Return “No”;
6 else
7 forall the v ∈ Vx and u ∈ Vx¯ with {(v, u), (u, v)} ∩ A(D) = ∅ do
8 Add (v, u) to D;
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 Return “Yes” if all vertices in X are kings and return “No” otherwise;
With the above theorem, we can trivially get the following result.
Corollary 5.1. Pwu is polynomial-time solvable if the size of the given subset X is
bounded by a constant.
Now we study the problems of deciding whether we can make all vertices of X
kings by adding (resp. reversing) at most R arcs. In particular, we prove that both
Pwu-Add and Pwu-Reverse are W [2]-hard even when X contains only one single
vertex. Furthermore, our W [2]-hardness proof for Pwu-Reverse applies to the case
that the input is a tournament and X contains only one single vertex. These results
imply that the problem of finding the minimum number of arcs which are needed to
add to the given partial tournament (resp. to reverse in the given (partial) tournament)
to make all vertices of X kings is beyond XP , in the case that |X| is the parameter.
Theorem 5.2. Pwu-Add is W [2]-hard even when |X| = 1.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT -reduction from the Set Cover problem
which is W [2]-hard (Theorem 13.29 of [203]).
Set Cover
Input: A base set S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and a collection C of subsets of S,
C = {c1, c2, ..., cm}, ci ⊆ S for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
⋃
1≤i≤m ci = S.
Parameter: A positive integer κ
Question: Is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size at most κ which covers all
elements in S, that is,
⋃
c∈C′ c = S?
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C
S
X
c
s s′
x
y
s ∈ c s′ 6∈ c
to all C
from all S
from all S
Figure 5.1: Illustration of
the W[2]-hardness reduction for
Pwu-Add in Theorem 5.2. Here,
D[S] and D[C] are made com-
plete arbitrarily. The thick arcs
labeled with “from all S” mean
that there is an arc (s, x) and
an arc (s, y) for all s ∈ S. The
thick arc labeled with “to all C”
means that there is an arc (y, c)
for all c ∈ C. Finally, there is
an arc (c, s) if s ∈ c and an arc
(s, c) otherwise, for every c ∈ C
and s ∈ S.
Given an instance E = (S,C, κ) of Set Cover, we construct an instance E ′ =
(D = (V,A), X,R ) of Pwu-Add as follows.
The partial tournament D contains n + m vertices one to one labeled by the
elements in S ∪ C together with further two vertices {x, y}. We further use S and C
to denote the sets of vertices labeled by the elements in S and C, respectively. For
each c ∈ C, there is an arc (y, c) ∈ A(D). For each s ∈ S, there is an arc (s, x) ∈ A(D)
and an arc (s, y) ∈ A(D). For each pair {s, c} where s ∈ S and c ∈ C, there is an arc
(c, s) ∈ A(D) if s ∈ c, and an arc (s, c) ∈ A(D) otherwise. In addition, there is an arc
(x, y) ∈ A(D). Finally, we add arbitrary arcs in D[S] and D[C] to make both D[S]
and D[C] complete. We set X = {x} and R = κ. See Figure 5.1 for an illustration.
Due to the construction, a vertex c ∈ C can reach a vertex s ∈ S only if c covers
s, that is, s ∈ c. Meanwhile, x can reach every vertex in C by y but cannot reach
any vertex in S. In order to make x a king, we must add some arcs from x to C to
make x reach all vertices in S. We prove that E is a yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a
yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let C ′ be a solution of E . Then, it is easy
to verify that we can make x a king by adding arcs (x, c) in D for all c ∈ C ′; thus, E ′
is a yes-instance.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a yes-instance and B is a solution for E ′. Let C ′ = {c |
(x, c) ∈ B} (Due to the construction, we have that C ′ ⊆ C). We claim that C ′ is a
solution for E : the only way to make x reach a vertex s ∈ S is to add an arc from x to
some vertex c ∈ C with s ∈ c. Since x is a king after adding all arcs in B to E , x can
reach every s ∈ S by at least one vertex c ∈ C ′ with s ∈ c, implying C ′ is a set cover
for E .
Now we study the parameterized complexity of the problem of determining whether
we can make a certain set of vertices kings by reversing at most R arcs.
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Theorem 5.3. Pwu-Reverse is W[2]-hard, even when the input is a tournament
and X contains only a single vertex.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT -reduction from Dominating Set on
Tournaments which is W [2]-hard [86].
Dominating Set on Tournaments (Dst)
Input: A tournament T .
Parameter: A positive integer κ.
Question: Does T have a dominating set of size at most κ? Here, a
dominating set C for a tournament T is a subset of the vertices of T such
that every vertex outside C has at least one of its in-neighbors in C.
Given an instance E = (T, κ) of Dst, we construct an instance E ′ = (T ′, X =
{x},R = κ) for Pwu-Reverse as follows. T ′ contains a copy of T , which is denoted
by T¯ , together with a further vertex x to which there is an arc from every vertex in T¯ ,
that is, (v¯, x) ∈ A(T ′) for all v¯ ∈ V (T¯ ). We use v¯ to refer to the copy of the vertex
v ∈ V (T ). This complete the construction.
It is easy to verify that if T has a dominating set C of size at most κ, then
reversing the arcs {(v¯, x) | v ∈ C} makes x a king. To check the other direction, first
observe that if E ′ is a yes-instance, then there is a solution such that all reversed
arcs are between x and V (T¯ ). The observation is correct since each reversal of an
arc (v¯, u¯) with v¯, u¯ ∈ V (T¯ ) can be replaced by a reversal of the arc (v¯, x) to form a
new solution. Now suppose that E ′ is a yes-instance and B is a solution (represented
by a set containing all reversed arcs) containing only arcs between x and V (T¯ ). Let
T ′′ be the tournament obtained from T ′ by reversing all arcs in B. We claim that
C = {v | (v¯, x) ∈ B} is a dominating set of T (the size of C is clearly at most κ). To
this end, we need to show that, in the tournament T , every vertex which is not in C
has at least one of its in-neighbors in C. Let u be any arbitrary vertex in V (T ) \ C.
Due to the construction, there is an arc (u¯, x) in T ′′. Since x is a king in T ′′, we know
that x reaches u¯ by some vertex v¯ with (x, v¯) ∈ T ′′. Due to the construction, (x, v¯)
is in T ′′ only if (v¯, x) is in B, or equivalently, v ∈ C. Since (v¯, u¯) ∈ A(T¯ ) and T¯ is a
copy of T , (v, u) ∈ A(T ). Therefore, we can conclude that every vertex u outside C
has at least one vertex v ∈ C with (v, u) ∈ A(T ), which completes the proof.
5.3 Banks Set in Partial Tournaments
In this section, we study problems of deciding whether a distinguished vertex p is
contained in a maximal transitive subtournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex.
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We first prove that Tw is W [2]-hard by an FPT -reduction from the Multicolored
Set Cover problem.
κ-Multicolored Set Cover, (κ-Msc)
Input: A base set S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and a collection C = {c1, c2, ..., cm} of
subsets of S, where each ci ∈ C has a color from {1, 2, ..., κ}, and moreover,⋃
1≤i≤m ci = S.
Parameter: κ
Question: Is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that C ′ includes exactly one
from the same colored subsets and C ′ covers all elements of S, that is,⋃
c∈C′ c = S? We call such a C
′ a κ-multicolored set cover.
Lemma 5.2. κ-Msc is W [2]-hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT -reduction from Set Cover. Given an
instance E = (S,C, κ) of Set Cover, we construct a collection C by taking κ copies
c1, c2, ..., cκ of each c ∈ C, and then color each ci with color i ∈ {1, 2, ..., κ}. The
constructed instance for κ-Msc is E ′ = (S,C, κ). It is straightforward to verify that E
has a set cover of size κ if and only if E ′ has a multicolored set cover of size κ.
With the W [2]-hardness of κ-Msc we now prove the W [2]-hardness of Tw.
Theorem 5.4. Tw is W [2]-hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT -reduction from κ-Msc. Given an instance
E = (C, S, κ) of κ-Msc where C is the colorful collection, S is the base set and κ is
the parameter, we construct an instance E ′ = (D = (V,A), p,R ) of Tw as follows. Let
Ci be the collection of subsets in C colored by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., κ}.
The partial tournament D contains n + m vertices one to one labeled by the
elements in S ∪ C together with the distinguished vertex p. We further use S and C
to denote the sets of vertices labeled by the elements in S and C, respectively. For
every s ∈ S and c ∈ C, there is an arc from c to s if s ∈ c and an arc from s to c
otherwise. In addition, there is an arc from s to p for all s ∈ S and an arc from p to c
for all c ∈ C. Finally, there is an arc (c, c′) for all c ∈ Ci and c′ ∈ Cj with i < j. The
parameter is R = κ+ 1. See Figure 5.2 for an illustration. We now prove that E is a
yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance. Let C ′ be a solution of E . Clearly, C ′∪{p}
induces a transitive tournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex. Due to the
construction, for each vertex s ∈ S, C ′ contains at least one of its in-neighbors; thus,
no vertex in S can be added to C ′ ∪ {p} to make a bigger transitive tournament (since
otherwise, there would be a triangle), implying that C ′ ∪ {p} is maximal in D.
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C
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C1 C2 Cκ
s 6∈ c s ∈ c p
from all S
to all C
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the W[2]-hardness reduction for Tw in Theorem 5.4.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a yes-instance. Let B ∪ {p} be a solution of E ′ which
induces a maximal transitive tournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex. Clearly,
B ⊆ C. Due to the maximality of D[B ∪ {p}], N−(s) ∩B 6= ∅ for all s ∈ S, implying
that at least one subset in B covers s; thus, B must be a set cover of E . Due to the
construction, there is no arc in D[Ci] for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., κ}; thus, exactly one from
each Ci can be in B. Therefore, B must be a κ-multicolored set cover for D.
In the following, we study two further parameterizations of the problem of finding
a Banks winner in a partial tournament. First, we study the parameter |N−(p)|, that
is, the number of candidates who beat p in a pairwise comparison. We show that this
problem is W [1]-hard.
Theorem 5.5. Tw-Indegree is W [1]-hard.
Proof. We prove the theorem by an FPT -reduction from κ-Multicolored Clique
which is W[1]-hard [117]. A clique Q (resp. An independent set I) of a graph G is a
subset of V (G) such that there is an (resp. no) edge between every pair of vertices in
Q (resp. I).
κ-Multicolored Clique
Input: A vertex-colored undirected graph G = (V,E), where each vertex
has a color from {1, 2, ..., κ}.
Parameter: κ.
Question: Does G have a clique including vertices of all κ colors?
Let E = (G, κ) be an instance of κ-Multicolored Clique. Let Vi be the
set of all vertices in G with color i. Due to the definition of the κ–Multicolored
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Clique, we can safely assume that each Vi form an independent set of the graph
G [117]. We construct an instance E ′ = (D = (N−(p) ∪N+(p) ∪ {p}, A), p, |N−(p)|)
for Tw-Indegree from E as follows.
We create the vertices as follows. For each v ∈ V (G) we create a vertex in D. For
ease of exposition, we still use v to denote this vertex in D. In addition, for each color
in i ∈ {1, 2, ..., κ}, we create a vertex ci. Therefore, together with the distinguished
candidate p, we have in total |V (G)|+ κ+ 1 vertices. The arcs are created as follows.
For each v ∈ V (D), we create an arc (p, v). For each vertex ci, we create an arc (ci, p).
Therefore, we have that N+(p) = V (D) and N−(p) = {c1, c2, ..., cκ}. In addition, for
each ci, there is an arc (v, ci) for all v ∈ Vi and an arc (ci, v) for all v ∈ Vj with j 6= i.
Finally, we create some arcs between Vi and Vj for i 6= j. Precisely, for two vertices
v ∈ Vi and u ∈ Vj with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ κ, there is an arc (v, u) in D if there is an edge
between v and u in G. See Figure 5.3 for an illustration. In the following, we prove
that E is a yes-instance if and only if E ′ is a yes-instance.
V (G)
Colors
V1 V2 Vi Vκ
v
u
{v, u} ∈ E(G)
c1 c2 ci ct
p
Figure 5.3: Illustration of the W [1]-hardness reduction for Tw-Indegree in Theorem 5.5.
(⇒:) Suppose that E is a yes-instance and Q is a clique including all κ colors,
that is {u, v} ∈ E for all u, v ∈ Q and |Q ∩ Vi| = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ. Due to the
construction, Q induces a transitive tournament in D. Moreover, the induced transitive
tournament is maximal in D[N+(p)] since there is no arc in D[Vi] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ.
Since Q ∩ Vi 6= ∅ and Vi = N−(ci) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, every ci has an in-neighbor in Q;
thus, D[Q ∪ {p}] is a maximal transitive tournament in D with p being the 0-indegree
vertex.
(⇐:) Suppose that E ′ is a yes-instance and Q ∪ {p} induces a maximal transitive
tournament in D with p being the 0-indegree vertex. Due to the construction, Q
induces a clique in G. Since there is no arc in each D[Vi] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, there can
be at most one vertex of Vi in Q. Due to the maximality of D[Q ∪ {p}], for every Vi
(1 ≤ i ≤ κ), at least one vertex of Vi must be in Q (since otherwise, ci can be added
to D[Q ∪ {p}] to form a bigger transitive subtournament). In summary, we conclude
that Q is a clique of G including all colors.
The last parameter we study is |N+(p)|, that is, the Copeland0 score of p.
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Theorem 5.6. Tw-Outdegree is FPT .
The proof for Theorem 5.6 is straightforward: if there is a solution, it must be
totally included in N+(p) ∪ {p}. Thus, the problem can be solved by enumerating
all 2|N
+(p)| subsets of N+(p), and checking whether at least one of them together
with p forms a maximal transitive tournament with p being the 0-indegree vertex.
The algorithm implies a 2|N
+(p)|-size vertex-kernel: if the input partial tournament D
contains at most 2|N
+(p)| vertices then we are done; otherwise, solve the problem in
polynomial time (note that 2|N
+(p)| ≤ |V (D)|) and return a trivial yes-instance or a
trivial no-instance according to the output of the algorithm. A kernel of exponential
size is far from satisfactory and thus a natural question arias: can the kernel be
improved greatly? The following theorem answers the question negatively.
Theorem 5.7. Tw-Outdegree does not admit a polynomial kernel unless the
polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level (PH = ∑3P).
Proof. We prove the theorem via polynomial parameter reduction technique as dis-
cussed in Section 1.3.2. Recall that in order to show the non-existence of a polynomial
kernel for a specific problem Q, it suffices to derive a polynomial parameter reduction
from a parameterized problem which does not have a polynomial kernel (under some
assumption which is unlikely to happen) to Q (see Lemma 1.1).
In fact, the reduction from κ-Msc to Tw in the proof of Theorem 5.4 has already
implied that Tw-Outdegree does not admit a polynomial kernel. This is because
that the κ-Msc with parameter |C|, the size of the collection of subsets, is FPT but
does not admit a polynomial kernel, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the
third level. Formally, the following problem is FPT but does not admit a polynomial
kernel unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level.
κ-Multicolored Set Cover-|C|, (κ-Msc-|C|)
Input: A base set S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and a collection C = {c1, c2, ..., cm} of
subsets of S, where each ci ∈ C has a color from {1, 2, ..., κ}, and moreover,⋃
1≤i≤m ci = S.
Parameter: |C|
Question: Is there a subset C ′ ⊆ C such that C ′ includes exactly one from
the same colored subsets and C ′ covers all elements of S?
Lemma 5.3. [83] κ-Msc-|C| has no polynomial kernel unless the polynomial hierarchy
collapses to the third level.
The following lemma directly follows from the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Lemma 5.4. |C|-Msc is polynomial parameter reducible to Tw-Outdegree.
Theorem 5.7 directly follows from Lemmas 1.1, 5.3 and 5.4.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied some possible winner(s) problems related to Uncovered
set and Banks set on partial tournaments, from the viewpoint of parameterized com-
plexity. We have showed some XP results, W-hardness results as well as FPT results
along with a kernelization lower bound. Our results are summarized in Table 5.1.
There remains one intriguing open problem for further research: is Pwu FPT ?
6
Combinatorial Algorithms for
Borda Manipulation
Manipulation is another widely studied strategic behavior. In this setting, we are given a
set of candidates, a set of votes, a distinguished candidate and a set of voters who have
not cast their votes yet. The problem is whether these voters can cast their votes in a way
so that the given distinguished candidate wins the election. This chapter is concerned with
manipulation in Borda voting.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter is devoted to deriving combinatorial algorithms for the Borda manipulation
problems. In the manipulation problem, we are given an election consisting of a set of
candidates and a multiset of votes cast by a set of voters, a distinguished candidate
and a set of voters who have not cast their votes yet. These voters who have not cast
their votes are called manipulators. The question is whether the manipulators can cast
their votes, referred to as manipulative votes, in a way so that the given distinguished
candidate wins the election. In the weighted manipulation problem, each vote (or
voter) is associated with a positive integer weight w. Moreover, a vote with weight
w is regarded as w individual votes each with weight 1. Therefore, the unweighted
manipulation is a special case of the weighted manipulation with each vote having
weight 1.
Both the weighted and the unweighted Borda manipulation problems are NP-
hard [26, 68, 75]. In particular, the unweighted Borda manipulation is NP-hard even
when there are only two manipulators and three non-manipulative votes [26, 75] (but
the number of candidates is part of the input), and the weighted Borda manipulation is
NP-hard even when there are only three candidates (but the number of manipulators
is part of the input) [68]. By enumerating all possibilities, the unweighted Borda
manipulation problem can be solved in O(m!t) time [26], where m is the number of
candidates and t is the number of manipulators. Betzler, Niedermeier and Woeginger
posed an open question in [26] whether the unweighted Borda manipulation with two
manipulators can be solved in single-exponential time with respect to the number of
candidates. Recall that a problem is solvable in single-exponential time with respect
to some parameter κ if there exists an algorithm solving it in time 2O(κ) · |I|O(1), where
I is the input. Deriving or improving single-exponential algorithms for intractable
combinatorial optimization problems is of particular importance and has received a
considerable attention recently [24, 31, 85, 167, 168, 194]. Many single-exponential
algorithms have been proved practical for instances of moderate sizes. A prominent
example is the Vertex Cover problem which starts from an O∗(2κκ2κ+2)-timei
algorithm [56], and then, after many rounds of improvement, it turns out that this
problem admits a single-exponential algorithm of running time O∗(1.2738κ) [64] which
has been shown very efficient for κ up to 400 [62, 116]. Here, κ denotes the size of the
vertex cover. We refer to [62, 116, 243] for further discussions on this issue.
In this chapter, we answer the question asked in [26] affirmatively by deriving
combinatorial algorithms for both the weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation
problems. Our algorithms remain single-exponential even for the weighted manipulation
problem, with respect to the number of manipulators or the number of candidates
iO∗() is the O() notation with suppressed factors polynomial in the size of the input.
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whenever one of these two parameters is bounded by a constant. Therefore, we not only
answer the open question in [26], but also answer several more general questions.
6.1.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, we use bijections to denote votes. Formally, a vote in this chapter
will be represented by a bijection piv : C → [|C|], where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
The value of piv(c) for a candidate c is the number of candidates ranked below c plus
one. For example, a vote with preference a  b  c is represented by a bijection pi
with pi(a) = 3, pi(b) = 2 and pi(c) = 1. Notice that for a candidate c and a vote pi with
pi(c) = i, the position of the candidate c in the vote pi is m− j + 1, where m is the
number of candidates.
In the following, let m denote the number of candidates. The Borda correspondence
(see also Section 1.2.1) can be defined by a vector 〈m − 1,m − 2, ..., 0〉. Each voter
contributes m− 1 points to his most preferred candidate, m− 2 to his second preferred
candidates, and so on. The candidates who have the highest total score are the winners.
In the weighted Borda system, each voter v is associated with a positive integer weight
f(v) and contributes f(v) · (m−1) points to his most preferred candidate, f(v) · (m−2)
to his second preferred candidate, and so on. Accordingly, candidate having the highest
total score win the election. Therefore, the unweighted Borda system is a special case
of the weighted Borda system with f(v) = 1 for every voter v.
For a candidate c and a voter v, we use BSCv(c) to denote the Borda score of c
contributed by v, that is, BSCv(c) = f(v) · (piv(c)− 1). Let BSCV(c) denote the total
score of c contributed by voters in V , that is, BSCV(c) =
∑
v∈V BSCv(c).
In the settings of manipulation, we have, in addition to V, a set V ′ of voters
which are called manipulators. The manipulators form a coalition and desire to
coordinate their votes to make a distinguished candidate win the new election with
votes in ΠV unionmulti ΠV ′ , where ΠV ′ is the multiset of votes cast by the manipulators. As
in the previous chapters, we distinguish between the unique-winner model and the
nonunique-winner model. However, for simplicity, our algorithms are mainly described
for the unique-winner model in this chapter. All algorithms in this chapter can be
easily adapted to the nonunique-winner model. The formal definitions of the problems
studied in this chapter are as follows.
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Unweighted Borda Manipulation (UM-Borda)
Input: An election (C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V) where p is not the unique winner, and a set V ′
of t manipulators.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes in a way so that p becomes the
unique winner in the election (C ∪ {p},ΠV unionmulti ΠV ′), where ΠV ′ with |ΠV ′| = t is the
multiset of votes cast by the manipulators?
Weighted Borda Manipulation (WM-Borda)
Input: A weighted election (C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V , f1 : V → N) where p is not the unique
winner, a set V ′ of t manipulators and a weight function f2 : V ′ → N.
Question: Can the manipulators cast their votes ΠV ′ in a way so that p is the
unique winner in the weighted election (C ∪ {p},ΠV unionmultiΠV ′ ,V ∪ V ′, f : V ∪ V ′ → N),
where f(v) = f1(v) if v ∈ V and f(v) = f2(v) otherwise, and ΠV ′ with |ΠV ′ | = t is
the multiset of votes cast by the manipulators?
6.1.2 Related Works
As one of the most prominent voting systems, complexity of strategic behavior for
Borda has been intensively studied. It is known that many types of bribery and control
behavior for Borda are NP-hard [54, 98, 99, 223]. For manipulation, WM-Borda is
NP-hard even when the election contains only three candidates [68]. Bartholdi, Tovey
and Trick [156] showed that both UM-Borda and WM-Borda are polynomial-time
solvable if there is only one manipulator. The complexity of UM-Borda in the case
of more than one manipulator remained open for many years, until very recently
it was proved NP-hard even when there are only two manipulators and three non-
manipulators [26, 75]. Heuristic and approximation algorithms for UM-Borda have
been studied in the literature [73, 75, 258]. It is worth mentioning that Zuckerman,
Procaccia and Rosenschein [258] proposed an approximation algorithm for UW-Borda
which can output a success manipulation with t+ 1 manipulators whenever the given
instance has a success manipulation with t manipulators. By applying the integer
linear programming (ILP) technique, UM-Borda can be solved exactly with a very high
computational complexity O∗(m!O(m!)) [26], where m is the number of candidates. Prior
to the work of this thesis, no purely combinatorial exact algorithm is known for UM-
Borda and WM-Borda (except the very brute force one which checks all possibilities).
In particular, Betzler, Niedermeier and Woeginger [26] posed as an open problem
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whether UM-Borda can be solved exactly with a running time single-exponentially
depending on m in the case of two manipulators.
We propose two algorithms solving WM-Borda and UM-Borda in O∗((m · 2m)t+1)
time and O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
)·(t+1)m) time, respectively, where t is the number of manipulators
and m is the number of candidates. Both algorithms rely on dynamic programming
techniques. Our results imply that both WM-Borda and UM-Borda can be solved
in time single exponentially on m in the case of constant number of manipulators.
In particular, for t = 2, we have an algorithm with running time O∗(3m) for UM-
Borda, affirmatively answering the open question in [26]. In fact, when either m or
t is a constant, our algorithms are single-exponential algorithms. See Table 6.1 for
a summary of our results concerning combinatorial algorithms for UM-Borda and
WM-Borda. In addition to combinatorial algorithms, we improve the running time of
the ILP-based algorithm for UM-Borda to O∗(29m
2 logm).
WM-Borda UM-Borda
m and t are not constants O∗((m · 2m)t+1) O∗((t+m−1
t
) · (t+ 1)m)
m is a constant O∗(at) Poly(t)
t is a constant O∗(bm) O∗(cm)
Table 6.1: Running time of the combinatorial algorithms for the weighted and unweighted
Borda manipulation problems. Here, m and t are the number of candidates and the number
of manipulators, respectively. Moreover, a, b, c are constants, and Poly(t) is a polynomial
function in t.
6.2 Algorithm for Weighted Borda Manipulation
In this section, we present an exact combinatorial algorithm for WM-Borda. The
following observation is clearly true.
Observation 6.1. Every yes-instance of WM-Borda has a solution where the distin-
guished candidate p is ranked in the top in every manipulative vote.
Let ((C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V , f1),V ′, f2, t) be the given instance. Due to Observation 6.1,
there must be a solution ΠV ′ with BSCV∪V ′(p) = BSCV(p) +
∑
v′∈V ′ f(v
′) · |C| if the
given instance is a yes-instance. Therefore, to make p the unique winner, BSCV ′(c) ≤
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g(c) should hold for all c ∈ C, where g(c) = BSCV(p)+
∑
v′∈V ′ f(v
′) · |C|−BSCV(c)−1.
The value of g(c) is called the capacity of c. Meanwhile, if in the given instance there is
a candidate c with g(c) < 0, then the given instance must be a no-instance. Therefore,
in the following, we assume that the given instance contains no candidate c with
g(c) < 0. Based on these, we can reformulate WM-Borda as follows:
Reformulation of WM-Borda
Input: A set C of candidates, a capacity function g : C → N, and a multiset
F = {f1, f2, ..., ft} of non-negative integers.
Question: Is there a multiset Π = {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of bijections mapping from C to
[|C|] such that ∑ti=1 fi · (pii(c)− 1) ≤ g(c) holds for all c ∈ C?
Here, the bijection pii corresponds to the vote cast by the i-th manipulator and
fi ∈+ F corresponds to the weight of the i-th manipulator (suppose that a fixed order
over the manipulators is given). Notice that in the Reformulation of WM-Borda, we
do not have the distinguished candidate p. But we have taken the final Borda score of
the distinguished candidate p into account in the above reformulation. This is reflected
by the capacity function g.
Our algorithm is based on a dynamic programming method which is associated
with a boolean dynamic table defined as DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt), where C ⊆ C is a
subset of candidates, Zi ⊆ [|C|] and |C| = |Zi| for all i ∈ [t]. Here, each Zi encodes
the positions that are occupied by the candidates of C in the vote cast by the i-th
manipulator. In particular, a z ∈ Zi corresponds to the (|C| − z + 1)-th position of
the i-th manipulative vote. The entry DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means that there is a
multiset Π = {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of bijections mapping from C to [|C|] such that for each
i ∈ [t], ⋃c∈C{pii(c)} = Zi, and moreover, for every candidate c ∈ C, c is “safe” under Π.
Here, we say a candidate c is safe under Π, if
∑t
i=1 fi · (pii(c)− 1) ≤ g(c). Intuitively,
DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means that we can place all candidates of C in the positions
encoded by Zi for all i ∈ [t] without exceeding the capacity of any c ∈ C. Clearly,
a given instance is a yes-instance if and only if DT (C, Z1 = [|C|], Z2 = [|C|], ..., Zt =
[|C|]) = 1. A formal description of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.1.
Theorem 6.1. WM-Borda is solvable in O∗((m · 2m)t+1) time, where m is the number
of candidates.
Proof. We consider Algorithm 6.1 for WM-Borda. Let C be the set of candidates
and m = |C| be the number of candidates. In the Initialization, we check whether∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c) for each candidate c ∈ C and each encoded position zi ∈ [m]
for each i ∈ [t]. Since there are m many candidates and m many positions to
be considered for each zi, the running time of the Initialization is bounded by
O∗(mt+1). In the Updating, we compute DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) for all C ⊆ C and
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Algorithm 6.1: An exact combinatorial algorithm for WM-Borda.
Input : An instance (C, g, F ) of the Reformulation of WM-Borda.
Output : “Yes” if the given instance a yes-instance, and “No” otherwise.
/* Initialization */
1 forall the c ∈ C and z1, z2, ..., zt ∈ [|C|] do
2 if
∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c) then
3 DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) := 1;
4 else
5 DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) := 0;
6 end
7 end
/* Updating DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) */
8 forall the ` = 2 to |C| do
9 forall the C ⊆ C and all Zi ⊆ [|C|] for every i = 1, 2, ..., |C| with |C| = |Zi| = `
do
10 if ∃c ∈ C and ∃zi ∈ Zi for all i ∈ [t] such that
DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2 \ {z2}, ..., Zt \ {zt}) = 1 and
DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1 then
11 DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) := 1;
12 else
13 DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) := 0;
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 if DT (C, Z1 = [|C|], Z2 = [|C|], ..., Zt = [|C|]) = 1 then
18 Return “Yes”;
19 else
20 Return “No”;
21 end
all Z1 ⊆ [m], Z2 ⊆ [m], ..., Zt ⊆ [m] with |C| = |Z1| = |Z2| = ... = |Zt| = `,
where 2 ≤ ` ≤ m. To compute each of them, we consider all possibilities of
c ∈ C and z1 ∈ Z1, z2 ∈ Z2, ..., zt ∈ Zt. For each possibility, we further check whether
DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \ {z1}, Z2\{z2}, ..., Zt\{zt}) = 1 and DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1.
Since there are at most mt+1 such possibilities, and there are at most 2(t+1)m entries
needed to be computed, we arrive at the total running time of O∗((m · 2m)t+1).
To check the correctness, recall that DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) = 1 means we can
place all candidates of C in the positions encoded by Zi for all i ∈ [t] without
exceeding the capacity of any c ∈ C. According to this, DT (C,Z1, Z2, ..., Zt) is equal
to 1 whenever there exist c ∈ C and zi ∈ Zi for all i ∈ [t] such that DT (C \ {c}, Z1 \
{z1}, Z2\{z2}, ..., Zt\{zt}) = 1 and DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) = 1. This corresponds
exactly to the recurrence for updating the dynamic table. In the Initialization, we set
DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) to 1 if
∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c) which means that we can
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place c in the positions encoded by z1, z2, ..., zt in pi1, pi2, ..., pit, respectively, without
exceeding the capacity of c. Thus, each value of DT ({c}, {z1}, {z2}, ..., {zt}) follows
the meaning of what we defined for the dynamic table. Finally, it is obvious that
a given WM-Borda instance is a yes-instance if and only if DT (C, Z1 = [m], Z2 =
[m], ..., Zt = [m]) = 1.
Algorithm 6.1 applies to the nonunique-winner model. However, in the nonunique-
winner model, we require that
∑t
i=1 fi · (pii(c)− 1) ≤ g(c) + 1 holds for all c ∈ C.
Therefore, we need to replace Line 2 in Algorithm 6.1 with the following line.
if
∑t
i=1 fi · (zi − 1) ≤ g(c) + 1 then
Betzler, Niedermeier and Woeginger [26] posed as an open question whether
UM-Borda in case of two manipulators can be solved in single-exponential time with
respect to the number of candidates. By Theorem 6.1, we can answer this question
affirmatively.
Corollary 6.1. WM-Borda (UM-Borda is a special case of WM-Borda) in case of
two manipulators can be solved in O∗(8m) time, where m is the number of candidates.
In fact, Theorem 6.1 implies a more general result: WM-Borda is solvable in
single-exponential time with respect to m if t is a constant, and with respect to t
if m is a constant, where m and t are the number of candidates and the number of
manipulators, respectively.
6.3 Algorithm for Unweighted Borda Manipulation
In this section, we study the UM-Borda problem. Recall that UM-Borda is a special
case of WM-Borda where all voters have the same unit weight. The specialization
offers us an simper way to calculate Borda scores of candidates. In particular, in the
unweighted Borda system, when compute BSCV ′(c) for a candidate c, it is irrelevant
which manipulators placed c in the j-th positions. The decisive factor is the number
of manipulators placing c in the j-th positions. This leads to the following approach
where we firstly reduce UM-Borda to a matrix problem and then solve this matrix
problem by a dynamic programming algorithm, resulting in a better running time
than that in Section 6.2. Firstly, the matrix problem is defined as follows.
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Filling Magic Matrix (FMM)
Input: A multiset g = {g1 , g2 , ..., gm} of non-negative integers and an
integer t > 0.
Question: Is there an m×m matrix M with non-negative integers such
that:
(1) ∀i ∈ [m], ∑mj=1 (j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi;
(2) ∀i ∈ [m], ∑mj=1M [i][j] = t; and
(3) ∀j ∈ [m], ∑mi=1M [i][j] = t?
Using matrix to solve the manipulation problem has also been considered by
Davies et al. [75]. In this paper, the authors used an n by m relaxed manipulation
matrix to devise several heuristic algorithms for the unweighted manipulation problem
under Borda, Baldwin’s and Nanson’s voting correspondences, where n denotes the
number of voters and m the number of candidates. The entry A[i, j] defined in their
matrix A is the score that the i-th voter gives to the j-th candidate (the scores might
need to be adjusted to get a final solution to the manipulation instance. See [75] for
further details). Therefore, each entry is an integer between 0 to m−1. Our mechanism
differs from theirs in several aspects. First, our matrix has both m rows and m columns.
Moreover, each row corresponds to a candidate and each column corresponds to a
position. The entry M [i, j] is defined as the number of manipulators that rank the i-th
candidate in the (m− j + 1)-th position. Therefore, each entry is an integer between
0 and t, where t is the number of manipulators. Second, their algorithms are heuristic
algorithms, while ours are exact algorithms. Third, our method can be easily adapted
to reduce Borda manipulation instances to ILP instances with m2 variables (we discuss
in detail later), however their method seems difficult to reduce Borda manipulation
instances to ILP instances with the number of variables bounded by a function of m.
In the following, we present an algorithm for FMM. The algorithm is based on
a dynamic programming method associated with a boolean dynamic table DT (`, T ),
where ` ∈ [m] and T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t} is a multiset of non-negative integers.
The entry DT (`, T ) = 1 means that there is an m×m matrix M such that:
(1)
∑m
j=1M [i][j] = t for all i ∈ [`];
(2)
∑m
j=1(j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi for all i ∈ [`]; and
(3)
∑l
i=1 M [i][j] = Tj for all j ∈ [m].
It is clear that a given instance of FMM is a yes-instance if and only if
DT (m,T[m]) = 1, where T[m] is the multiset containing m copies of t. The algo-
rithm for solving FMM is described in Algorithm 6.2.
Lemma 6.1. FMM is solvable in O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t+ 1)m) time.
154 6. Combinatorial Algorithms for Borda Manipulation
Algorithm 6.2: A dynamic algorithm for FMM.
Input : An instance (g = {g1 , g2 , ..., gm}, t) of FMM.
Output : “Yes” if the given instance is a yes-instance, and “No” otherwise.
/* Initialization */
1 forall the possible multisets T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t} with
∑m
j=1 Tj = t do
2 if
∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · Tj ≤ g1 then
3 DT (1, T ) = 1
4 else
5 DT (1, T ) = 0;
6 end
7 end
/* Updating DT (`, T ) */
8 forall the ` = 2 to m do
9 forall the possible multisets T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t} do
10 forall the possible multisets T ′ = {T ′j ∈ N | j ∈ [m], T ′j ≤ Tj} with∑m
j=1 T
′
j = t do
11 Let T − T ′ = {T1 − T ′1, T2 − T ′2, ..., Tm − T ′m};
12 if DT (`− 1, T − T ′) = 1 and ∑mj=1 (j − 1) · T ′j ≤ g` then
13 DT (`, T ) := 1;
14 else
15 DT (`, T ) := 0;
16 end
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 if DT (m,T[m]) = 1 then
21 Return “Yes”;
22 else
23 Return “No”;
24 end
Proof. In the initialization, we consider all possible multisets T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈
[m], Tj ≤ t} with
∑m
j=1 Tj = t. Since T has at most
(
t+m−1
t
)
possibilities (according
to
∑m
j=1 Tj = t), the running time of the initialization is bounded by O
∗(
(
t+m−1
t
)
). In
the updating procedure, we use a loop indicated by a variable ` with 2 ≤ ` ≤ m to
update DT (`, T ). In each loop we compute the values of the entries DT (`, T ) for all
multisets T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}. To compute each of the entries, we check
whether there is a multiset T ′ = {T ′1, T ′2, ..., T ′m} with
∑j=m
j=1 T
′
j = t and T
′
j ≤ Tj for
every j ∈ [m], such that DT (` − 1, T − T ′) = 1 and ∑mj=1 (j − 1) · T ′j ≤ g` . Since
there are at most
(
t+m−1
t
)
possible multisets T ′, the time to compute each DT (`, T ) is
bounded by O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
)
). Since T has at most (t+ 1)m possibilities, there are at most
(t+ 1)m entries needed to be computed in each loop, implying a whole running time of
O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t+ 1)m) for the updating procedure. In conclusion, the whole running
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time of the algorithm is O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t+ 1)m).
To check the correctness, recall that for each ` ∈ [m] and T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈
[m], Tj ≤ t}, DT (`, T ) = 1 means that there is an m×m matrix M such that:
(1)
∑m
j=1 M [i][j] = t for all i ∈ [`];
(2)
∑m
j=1(j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi for all i ∈ [`]; and
(3)
∑`
i=1 M [i][j] = Tj for all j ∈ [m].
Thus, DT (`, T ) = 1 if and only if there is at least one T ′ = {T ′j ∈ N | j ∈ [m], T ′j ≤
Tj} with
∑m
j=1 T
′
j = t such that DT (` − 1, T − T ′) = 1 and
∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · T ′j ≤ g` .
This corresponds to the updating procedure. In the initialization, we compute the
value of DT (1, T ) for all possible multisets T = {Tj ∈ N | j ∈ [m], Tj ≤ t}. We set
DT (1, T ) to 1 whenever
∑m
j=1 Tj = t and
∑m
j=1 (j − 1) · Tj ≤ g1 . Thus, we can set
M [1][j] = Tj to make sure that the three required conditions in our definition for
the dynamic table hold. Finally, it is obvious that the given instance of FMM is a
yes-instance if and only if DT (m,T[m]) = 1 where T[m] is the multiset containing m
copies of t. The theorem follows.
We now come to show how to solve UM-Borda via FMM. A partial vote is a partial
injection pi : C ∪ {p} → [|C ∪ {p}|] which maps a subset C ⊆ C ∪ {p} to [|C ∪ {p}|]
such that for any two distinct a1, a2 ∈ C, pi(a1) 6= pi(a2). Here, C is the domain and
{pi(a) | a ∈ C} is the codomain of pi. A position not in the codomain is called a free
position. For simplicity, we define pi(c) = −1 for c 6∈ C.
Lemma 6.2. UM-Borda can be reduced to FMM in polynomial time.
Proof. Let F = ((C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V),V ′, t) be an instance of UM-Borda. By Observa-
tion 6.1, we know that if F is a yes-instance there must be a solution ΠV ′ such that each
manipulator ranks p in the top. We assume that BSCV(p) + t · |C| −BSCV(c)− 1 ≥ 0
for all c ∈ C as discussed in Section 6.2. Let (c1, c2, ..., c|C|) be any arbitrary order of
C. We construct an instance F ′ = (t, g) of FMM, where g = {g1, g2, ..., g|C|} such that
gi = BSCV(p) + t · |C| −BSCV(ci)− 1 for all i ∈ [|C|]. It is clear that the construction
takes polynomial time. In the following, we prove that F is a yes-instance if and only
if F ′ is a yes-instance.
(⇒:) Given a solution ΠV ′ of F , we can get a solution for F ′ by setting M [i][j] =
|{pi ∈+ ΠV ′ | pi(ci) = j}|, where {pi ∈+ ΠV ′ | pi(ci) = j} is the multiset containing all
votes pi ∈+ ΠV ′ with pi(ci) = j. By the above construction, the correctness of M is
easy to verify.
(⇐:) Let a |C| × |C| matrix M be a solution of F ′ = (t, g = {g1, g2, ..., g|C|}).
Then, a solution for F , where there are exactly M [i][j] manipulators who rank ci
in the (|C| − j + 2)-th positions (notice that we have in total |C| + 1 candidates),
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can be constructed by the polynomial-time algorithm described in Algorithm 6.3.
For simplicity, for a candidate ci and an integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ |C|, ci  j means
that there are less than M [i][j] manipulators who have already placed ci in the
(|C| − j + 2)-th positions. For two partial votes pi and pi′ and two candidates c and c′,
(pi, c)↔ (pi′, c′) means to switch the position of c in pi and the position of c′ in pi′, that
is, if pi(c) = j, pi′(c′) = j′, then, after (pi, c)↔ (pi′, c′), we get pi(c′) = j, pi′(c) = j′.
Algorithm 6.3: Algorithm for reducing from UM-Borda to FMM.
Input : A solution M (an m by m matrix) of an instance
F ′ = (g = {g1, g2, ..., gm}, t) of FMM, where F ′ is constructed from a given
instance F = ((C ∪ {p},ΠV ,V),V ′, t) of UM-Borda as described in the
beginning of the proof to Lemma 6.2.
Output : A solution ΠV ′ of F .
1 Initialize ΠV ′ = {pi1, pi2, ..., pit} of partial votes such that each partial vote has empty
domain;
2 forall the z ∈ [t] do
3 piz(p) := |C|+ 1;
4 end
5 forall the j¯ = |C| to 1 do
6 while ∃piz where the (|C| − j¯ + 2)-th position is free do
7 Let ci be any candidate with ci  j¯;
8 if piz(ci) = −1 then
9 piz(ci) := j¯;
10 else
11 Let j′ = piz(ci) and let piz′ be a vote with piz′(ci) = −1;
12 if the (|C| − j¯ + 2)-th position of piz′ is free then
13 piz′(ci) := j¯
14 else
15 while ∃j′′ > j¯ with pi−1z (j′′) = pi−1z′ (j′) do
16 (piz, pi
−1
z (j
′))↔ (piz′ , pi−1z′ (j′));
17 j′ := j′′;
18 end
19 (piz, pi
−1
z (j
′))↔ (piz′ , pi−1z′ (j′));
20 piz(ci) := j¯;
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 end
25 Return ΠV ′ ;
Since
∑|C|
i=1M [i][j¯] = t and there are exactly t manipulators, there must be a
candidate ci with ci  j¯ whenever there is a vote whose (|C| − j¯ + 2)-th position is
free, which guarantees the soundness of Line 7 in Algorithm 6.3. Similarly, there must
be a piz′ with piz′(ci) = −1 in Line 11, since, otherwise,
∑|C|
j=1M [i][j] > t, contradicting
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that the given instance of FMM is a yes-instance. After the switches in the while
loop in Lines 15-18, and Line 19, both piz and piz′ must fulfill the following property:
no candidate is placed in two different positions in either vote. See Figure 6.1 for an
example of the while loop in Lines 15-18.
Obviously, such a constructed ΠV ′ is a solution for UM-Borda: for each candidate
ci ∈ C, we have
BSCV ′(ci) =
|C|∑
j=1
(j − 1) ·M [i][j] ≤ gi = BSCV(p) + t · |C| −BSCV(ci)− 1
To analyze the running time of the algorithm, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3. The while loop in Lines 15-18 in Algorithm 6.3 takes polynomial time.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we construct an auxiliary bipartite graph B with Cz′
as the left-hand vertices and Cz as the right-hand vertices, where Cz′ and Cz are the
sets of candidates which have been ranked in piz′ and piz in some k-th positions for
k ≤ |C| − j¯ + 2, respectively. Two vertices are adjacent if and only if they represent
the same candidate (as the vertices linked by a gray line in Figure 6.1) or they were
placed in the same (but not identical) positions (as the vertices linked by a dark
line in Figure 6.1). We observe that the constructed auxiliary graph has maximum
degree two. Since Cz′ \ Cz is not empty, there is a simple path P = (ca1 , ca2 , ..., cax)
with ca1 = ci and cax ∈ Cz′ \ Cz. It is clear that each execution of the while loop
corresponds to the following switch procedure: switch the positions of ak and ak+1 for
a k ∈ {1, 3, ..., x− 1} (since ca1 = ci ∈ Cz and cax ∈ Cz′ , we have that x is even). The
lemma follows from the fact that the length of the simple path is bounded by 2|C|.
c5 c1 c7 ci c4
j¯j′j′′
c2 c7 c3 c1 c4 c5
piz
piz′
c5 c7 c3 c1 c4 ci
j¯
c2 c1 c7 ci c4 c5
piz
piz′
Figure 6.1: An illustration of the proof of Lemma 6.3. The left-hand shows the status of piz
and piz′ before the switches. Due to the algorithm, the positions of every pair of candidates
linked by the dark lines are switched. The gray lines here are to show that pi−1z (j′′) = pi
−1
z′ (j
′),
as in the precondition of the while loop in Lines 15-18 in Algorithm 6.3. The right-hand
shows the status after these switches.
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We now analyze the whole running time of Algorithm 6.3. The algorithm has four
loops in total. The for loop in Lines 2-4 clearly takes polynomial time. The following
for loop in Lines 5-24 loops exactly |C| times. Moreover, the for loop contains the
while loop in Lines 6-23. The while loop in Lines 6-23 loops at most t times since
each execute of a loop fixes a (|C| − j¯ + 2)-th free position for some piz where j¯ is the
loop indicator for the second for loop, and we have at most t different piz. Therefore,
to show that the algorithm takes polynomial time, it remains to show that each execute
of the while loop in Lines 6-23 takes polynomial time. This is true since the most
time-consuming step in this while loop is the while loop in Lines 15-18, which, due
to Lemma 6.3, takes polynomial time. Summery all above, the running time of the
algorithm is polynomially in t and |C|.
Due to Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. UM-Borda can be solved in O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t + 1)m) time, where m is
the number of candidates and t is the number of manipulators.
Proof. Given an instance of UM-Borda, we reduce it to an instance of FMM, as
described in Lemma 6.2. Then, we solve the instance of FMM with Algorithm 6.2.
Finally, we construct a solution of the given instance of UM-Borda from the solution
returned from Algorithm 6.2, as described in Lemma 6.2. According to Lemma 6.1,
Algorithm 6.2 runs in O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t+ 1)m). Since it takes polynomial time to reduce
from UM-Borda to FMM, the theorem follows.
We remark that if the number of manipulators is bounded by a constant, the
algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 6.2 runs in O∗((t+1)m) time. In particular,
for t = 2, the algorithm runs in O∗(3m) time.
Next we show that FMM can be solved by an integer linear programming (ILP)
based algorithm. The ILP contains m2 variables xij for i, j ∈ [m], and is subject to
the following restrictions

m∑
i=1
xij = t for all j ∈ [m]
m∑
j=1
xij = t for all i ∈ [m]
m∑
j=1
(j − 1) · xij ≤ gi for all i ∈ [m]
xij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ [m]
where t ∈ N, the number of the manipulators, and g = {g1 , g2 , . . . , gm} with gi ∈ N for
all i ∈ [m], the multiset of the capacities of the candidates, are input.
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H. W. Lenstra [177] proposed an O∗(ζO(ζ))-time algorithm for solving ILP with ζ
variables. The running time was then improved by R. Kannan [161], and Frank and
Tardos [126] (see Lemma 1.1).
Due to Lemmas 6.2 and 1.1, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. UM-Borda admits an algorithm with running time O∗(25(m
2+o(m2)) logm),
where m is the number of candidates.
6.4 Conclusion
We have studied exact combinatorial algorithms for Borda manipulation problems.
In particular, we proposed two exact combinatorial algorithms with running times
O∗((m·2m)t+1) and O∗((t+m−1
t
)·(t+1)m) for weighted Borda manipulation (WM-Borda)
and unweighted Borda manipulation (UM-Borda), respectively, where t is the number
of manipulators and m is the number of candidates in the given election. Observe
that if t is bounded by a constant, UM-Borda can be solved in O∗((t+ 1)m) time. Our
results answer an open question posed by Betzler, Niedermeier and Woeginger [26]
affirmatively. In addition, we presented an integer linear programming based FPT -
algorithm with running time O∗(25(m
2+o(m2)) logm) for UM-Borda. We remark that all
our algorithms can be adapted to solve the weighted and unweighted manipulation
problems for all (positional) scoring voting systems.
One future direction would be to improve the presented combinatorial algorithms.
As showed in this chapter and in [26], UM-Borda is FPT with respect to the number
m of candidates. In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for UM-Borda with running
time O∗(
(
t+m−1
t
) · (t + 1)m). In particular, if the number of the manipulators is a
constant, the algorithm is single-exponential in the number of candidates. A challenging
task is to investigate whether there is a single-exponential algorithm for UM-Borda
when the number of manipulators is not a constant.
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This thesis investigated the (parameterized) complexity of strategic voting prob-
lems in restricted settings. In the following two sections, we first summarize our results
and then discuss some directions for future research.
7.1 Summary of Results
This thesis mainly investigated the (parameterized) complexity of control, bribery and
manipulation in elections under natural restrictions. In addition, this thesis explored
the parameterized complexity of a number of possible winner(s) problems on partial
tournaments with respect to several natural parameters.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we studied the (parameterized) complexity of control problems
in generalized single-peaked elections. In particular, we studied control problems for
r -Approval, Condorcet, Maximin and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 in k -peaked
elections in Chapter 2. We proved that all the NP-hardness of these control problems
in the general case still hold even in 3, 4-peaked elections. However, in 2-peaked
elections, several NP-hardness in general turned out to be polynomial-time solvable.
See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for summaries of our results regarding these problems. In
Chapter 3, we studied the (parameterized) complexity of control problems in elections
with bounded single-peaked width for Condorcet, Maximin and Copelandα for every
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We proved that for the constructive control by adding/deleting votes, all
the NP-hardness in general still hold even in elections with single-peaked width 3.
However, for the destructive case, all the NP-hardness results turned out to be FPT
with respect to single-peaked width, implying the polynomial-time solvability of these
problems in elections with constant single-peaked width. Furthermore, we derived a
framework for identifying FPT control problems with respect to the single-peaked
width. See Table 3.1 for a summary of our results regarding this topic. Many of our
NP-hardness reductions apply to other restricted elections, such as elections with
bounded single-crossing width and d-Euclidean elections. See Section 3.6 for detailed
discussions.
In Chapter 4, we studied the distance restricted bribery problem for Condorcet,
Maximin and Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In the bribery problem, each voter
may be bribed to recast his vote in any arbitrary way [108]. In the distance restricted
bribery problem, each voter can recast a new vote which, however, has to be as close as
to his original vote. We adopted the Hamming distance and the Kendall-Tau distance
to measure the similarity of two votes. Our results show that the distance restricted
bribery problem is generally NP-hard even when the distance is bounded by a small
constant. See Table 4.1 for a summary of our results regarding this topic.
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In Chapter 5, we studied several possible winner(s) problems on partial tourna-
ments. In this scenario the candidates are represented by vertices. Moreover, there
is an arc from a vertex a to a vertex b if a beats b. Here, a “beats” b means that
there are more voters who prefer a to b. The winners are selected according to some
well-defined tournament solutions, e.g, Uncovered set, Banks set, etc. In particular, we
focused on the possible winner problems with respect to Uncovered set and Banks set.
For Uncovered set, the question is whether a given subset of vertices (candidates) can
be included in the Uncovered set by adding/reversing some arcs to the given partial
tournament. In particular, we studied three parameters: the size of the given subset
of vertices, the number of arcs that are allowed to be reversed and the number of arcs
that are allowed to add. For Banks set, the question is whether a given distinguished
vertex (candidate) is a 0-indegree vertex in some maximal transitive subtournament.
In particular, we studied three parameters: the size of the maximal transitive sub-
tournament, the number of the in-neighbors of the distinguished candidate, and the
number of the out-neighbors of the distinguished candidate. For problems considered
in this chapter, we proposed FPT results, W-hardness results and XP results. See
Table 5.1 for a summary of our results regarding this topic.
In Chapter 6, we studied exact combinatorial algorithms for both weighted and
unweighted Borda manipulation problems. In particular, we proposed two exact
combinatorial algorithms with running times O∗((m ·2m)t+1) and O∗((t+m−1
t
) · (t+1)m)
for weighted Borda manipulation (WM-Borda) and unweighted Borda manipulation
(UM-Borda), respectively, where t is the number of manipulators and m is the number
of candidates. Observe that if t is bounded by a constant, UM-Borda can be solved in
O∗((t+ 1)m) time. Our results answer an open problem posed by Betzler, Niedermeier
and Woeginger [26] affirmatively: UM-Borda with two manipulators can be solved
in single-exponential time with respect to the number of candidates. Moreover, we
proposed an integer linear program formulation for UM-Borda with m2 variables. As
a consequence of our formulation and the FPT algorithm for ILP devised by Frank
and Tardos [126], UM-Borda can be solved in O∗(25(m
2+o(m2)) logm) time. Our results
are summarized in Table 6.1 and Theorem 6.3.
7.2 Further Research Directions
For open questions and remarks concerning the specific problems investigated in this
thesis, we refer to the respective conclusion section of each chapter. More specifically,
questions regarding control problems in k -peaked elections can be found in Section 2.4,
regarding control problems in elections with bounded single-peaked width, bounded
single-crossing width, Euclidean elections can be found in Section 3.6, regarding the
distance restricted bribery problem can be found in Section 4.4, regarding the possible
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winners problems can be found in Section 5.4, and regarding manipulation problems
can be found in Section 6.4. In the following, we discuss more prominent directions
for future research.
7.2.1 Practical FPT Algorithms
Parameterized complexity of voting problems has been widely studied in COMSOC,
and many voting problems have been proved to be FPT (see e.g., [23, 25, 84, 154,
246, 249]). Nevertheless, most of the FPT -algorithms are based on ILP formulations,
and thus are far from practical. In this thesis, we derived such FPT -algorithms
for destructive control problems in elections with bounded single-peaked width for
Condorcet, Copelandα for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Maximin, with respect to single-peaked
width. It is intriguing to investigate practically efficient FPT -algorithms for these
problems. Furthermore, deriving explicit kernels for these problems is also another
challenging task.
7.2.2 Experimental Studies
To date, most of the work in COMSOC focused on the worst-case analysis of voting
problems. Recently, this purely worst-case analysis, which ignores real-world settings,
was criticized by researchers. See [67, 114, 191, 214, 239] for detailed discussions.
In this direction, two things are expected to be done. The first thing is to examine
the hard voting problems (NP-hard or W-hard) with algorithms that run on real-
world data. Some representative work can be found in [73, 189, 219, 238]. Concerning
hard problems studied in this thesis, it is interesting to study heuristic algorithms
for these problems and examine the performance of these algorithms with real-world
data, in order to investigate how hard it is to solve these problems in practice. We
refer to [191] for information on a site that gathers real-world preference data that is
open to researchers. Another method to examine whether a certain voting problem is
hard to solve in practice is to encode the voting problem into constraint satisfactory
problems (CSPs for short). There has been many advanced CSP solvers for researchers
to use such as CPLEX. See [136] for further discussions on CSP solvers.
The second thing is to examine the feasibility of strategic behavior in elections
that are subject to some prominent distributions, through the lens of probability
theory. For example, Procaccia and Rosenschein [214] introduced the concept of
junta distributions (generally speaking, these are distributions over the elections that
satisfy several constraints) and proved that if a (heuristic) algorithm often solve
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the manipulation problem when the instances are distributed according to a junta
distribution, it would also often solve the manipulation problem when the instances
are distributed according to many other plausible distributions. Another recent related
work can be found in [137]. It is interesting to investigate the feasibility of strategic
behavior in elections with bounded single-peaked width or bounded single-crossing
width where the subelections restricted to the intervals are subject to some distributions,
such as junta distributions.
7.2.3 Approximation Algorithms
Approximation algorithms lie in the central of computer science. Designing approx-
imation algorithms for voting problems has long been studied (see e.g., [23, 53, 73,
143, 176, 181, 240, 241]). However, approximation algorithms for voting problems
in restricted elections have been less investigated so far. It is interesting to study
approximation algorithms for problems studied in this thesis, such as control problems
in 2,3-peaked elections or in elections with constant single-peaked width or constant
single-crossing width.
7.2.4 Surveys to Read
Finally, we refer to several representative surveys on computational social choice for
more open problems and research directions: [22, 49, 66, 182, 220].
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